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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main focus of my thesis lies on gaining a better understanding of the mechanisms that
guide the attribution of blame and praise. Understanding why we judge some behavior as
more blame- or praiseworthy than others is of great importance for ethics and economics.
First, because it allows us to study how people make value judgments in economically
important situations and second, because the attribution of blame and praise influences
the behavior of those subject to it.
In the second chapter of my thesis, my coauthors, Prof. Bjo¨rn Bartling and Prof. Roberto
A. Weber, and I experimentally answer the question of whether people can avoid blame
by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for
others. This research question was motivated by the observation that, in corporate and
political contexts, individuals often present ignorance as an excuse for why they should
not be held responsible for adverse outcomes that their actions caused. The study directly
addresses this issue, by quantifying the extent to which engaging in willful ignorance allows
a decision maker to deflect external blame for his actions and their consequences. To this
end, we conducted a laboratory experiment in which some participants could choose to
remain ignorant about the consequences of their actions for others and in which other
participants had the opportunity to impose costly monetary punishment after observing
behavior and the resulting outcomes. We interpret the assigned punishment as a measure
of blame for an action and its consequences. The results show that, when taking an action
that increases one’s own welfare, but also results in harm to others, it is better to have
avoided knowledge that harm would occur. Thus, willful ignorance can help avoid blame.
At the same time, however, we find that willful ignorance itself is evaluated negatively,
regardless of the consequences. That is, choosing to forgo information concerning the
consequences of one’s action and acting in a self-regarding way incites blame, even when
the resulting consequence is beneficial for others. By remaining ignorant the decision
2
maker shows disregard for the possibility that others may be harmed and this appears
su cient for provoking blame and punishment.
In the third chapter of my thesis, I study how perceptions of responsibility guide the
attribution of blame and praise. Through this channel, responsibility perceptions play a
crucial role in many environments that are of traditional interest to economists. For ex-
ample, in labor markets, workers and managers are fired or rewarded depending on their
responsibility for the failure or success of a project and in political economy contexts, peo-
ple make voting decisions based on the attribution of responsibility to politicians for the
implementation of reforms and economic outcomes. I develop a notion of causal respon-
sibility that measures the causal importance of a person’s action for the implementation
of an event, when the event’s implementation depends on the interaction of potentially
many parties, persons and/or chance. I incorporate the notion in a framework of re-
sponsibility preferences in which agents value monetary payo↵, but also have a taste to
punish (reward) other agents for the implementation of what they judge are bad (good)
events, but only to the extent that these agents are causally responsible for the event.
Furthermore, I study how those subject to responsibility-driven attribution of punishment
and reward react to it, thereby analyzing the consequences of responsibility perceptions
for equilibrium outcomes in a game-theoretic environment. I show how, depending on
the specific environment, causal responsibility perceptions can induce distinctively di↵er-
ent equilibrium outcomes in which, in some cases, causal responsibility for an event is
maximally di↵used between all, and, in other cases, maximally focused on some of the
involved agents. Finally, I test the predictive power of the causal responsibility notion
for the allocation of punishment in data from existing, incentivized experiments. I find
that it can explain observed punishment patterns in many cases more successfully than
existing theories and that it remains a highly significant predictor for punishment even
after controlling for several other potential punishment motives.
While chapters two and three study the attribution of blame and praise and therefore
focus on the reaction to certain behavior, in the fourth chapter my coauthors, Prof. Arno
Riedl and Prof. Roberto A. Weber, and I study how ethical behavior, and specifically
cooperative behavior, itself is influenced by the constraints and institutions that are in
place in a society. Institutions are an important means for fostering prosocial behaviors.
For example, sanctioning institutions have been shown to be e↵ective for supporting high
levels of cooperation in social dilemmas. Moreover, institutions may directly shape indi-
viduals’ preferences and beliefs. In many contexts, however, institutions are limited in
scope and can govern prosocial behavior only in some domains. In other domains, society
must rely on voluntary prosocial behavior of individuals. We use a laboratory experiment
to study how the presence and nature of an institution that enforces prosocial behavior in
one domain a↵ect the behavior in other domains, beyond the reach of the institution. In
3
addition, we study if and how the presence of an institution alters prosocial preferences
and beliefs about others’ behavior. Groups play two identical public good games, with
one game potentially governed by an institution enforcing cooperation. We vary whether
the institution is absent, imposed exogenously, or arises endogenously through voting by
group members. We find that the presence of an institution in one game generally en-
hances cooperation in the other game. However, cooperation boosted by an exogenously
imposed institution nevertheless decays over time, while the endogenously determined
institution leads to stable spillover e↵ects on voluntary cooperation levels. We also find
that the presence of an institution strengthens beliefs about others’ prosocial behavior
and enhances prosocial preferences even towards strangers. When deciding about the
implementation of such institutions in reality, these e↵ects should to be taken into ac-
count by policy makers and can, potentially, alter the analysis in favor of (endogenously
implemented) institutions.
4

!
!
5 
Chapter 2 
 
Does Willful Ignorance Deflect 
Punishment? – An Experimental 
Study1 
 
 “A man is responsible for his ignorance.” – Milan Kundera, Laughable Loves 
2.1 Introduction  
Many important decisions involve tradeoffs between personal benefits and impacts on the welfare 
of others. In such situations, there is often the possibility of remaining uninformed about how 
one’s actions affect others. Moreover, such “willful ignorance” may provide a justification for 
self-interested behavior. That is, while a decision maker is typically held responsible for 
knowingly committing an action that hurts others, the attribution of responsibility is less clear 
when he acts without knowledge of consequences. Such reasoning may even hold when the 
decision to remain ignorant is made privately, as ignorance allows one to act selfishly without 
direct confrontation with the consequences for others or the associated guilt (Dana et al., 2007). 
Thus, strategically manipulating one’s information about the consequences of one’s actions for 
others provides a path through which ignorance, even when deliberate, might provide insulation 
from responsibility or blame.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This paper is published as Bartling, Björn, Florian Engl, and Roberto A. Weber. "Does willful ignorance deflect 
punishment?–An experimental study," European Economic Review, 70, 512-524, 2014. We would like to thank an 
associate editor, two anonymous referees, Martin Dufwenberg, Bertil Tungodden, and participants at the ABEE 
Symposium 2012 on Behavioural Economics in Markets and Organizations in Amsterdam, the 2012 Zurich 
Workshop in Economics, the Sixth Annual NYU-CESS Conference on Experimental Political Science 2013, the 
2013 Spring School in Behavioral and Experimental Economics in San Diego, and the 2013 Asia-Pacific ESA 
Conference in Tokyo for valuable comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Foundation for 
Research in Science and the Humanities at the University of Zurich. 
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In corporate and political contexts, individuals often present ignorance as an excuse for 
why they should not be held responsible for adverse outcomes that they caused. For example, 
following corporate scandals and fraud, CEOs and board members often excuse their role by 
claiming they were not aware of what took place further down the hierarchy. Examples include 
former Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, who claimed ignorance about any accounting irregularities at 
the failed firm, and Rupert Murdoch, who was directly accused of showing “willful blindness” 
concerning the phone-hacking practices at News Corporation.2 In the political sphere, public 
officials often argue that being unaware of acts committed by subordinates should exonerate 
them from blame.3 For example, in response to revelations about the NSA’s widespread 
wiretapping of allied leaders’ phones, high-ranking U.S. government officials claimed lack of 
knowledge that these surveillance practices were taking place.4 
Prior research in economics demonstrates that decision makers seize upon strategies to act 
self-interestedly at the expense of others, when presented with opportunities for avoiding blame 
or responsibility.5 An important but largely open question, however, is to what extent such 
strategies are, in fact, effective in deflecting blame.6  
Our study directly addresses this issue, by quantifying the extent to which engaging in 
willful ignorance allows a decision maker to deflect external blame for his actions and their 
consequences. To this end, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which some participants can 
choose to remain ignorant about the consequences of their actions for others and in which other 
participants have the opportunity to impose costly monetary punishments after observing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!See http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-02-05/commentary-ken-lays-audacious-ignorance  and 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/may/01/phone-hacking-report-wilful-blindness 
3 In fact, political science has long recognized the ability to avoid blame as an important determinant of a politician’s 
success (Weaver, 1986) and ignorance as a potential strategy to do so (McGraw, 1991). 
4 See http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304470504579162110180138036  
5 Some research demonstrates that decision makers hide behind uncertainty - both their own and that of others - 
about what outcomes will result or how such outcomes were produced in order to keep more money in a 
distributional context (Dana et al., 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ockenfels and Werner, 2012). In some 
cases, this can even mean that people are willing to accept less money in order to forgo the opportunity to share and 
have the other person know that sharing could have taken place  (Broberg et al., 2007; Dana et al., 2006; Lazear et 
al., 2012). Hamman et al. (2010) show that delegating distributive decisions to others similarly provides a 
justification for self-interested behavior. More generally, a growing literature on behavioral ethics (Treviño et al., 
2006; Bazerman and Gino, 2012) seeks to identify factors that influence ethical conduct, often highlighting how 
contextual features can lead otherwise “good” people to feel licensed to act unethically (Mazar et al., 2008; Dana et 
al., 2012).  
6 Experimental research in economics has only recently started to investigate the effectiveness of blame-avoidance 
strategies. For example, Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) show that delegating a decision that can lead to an unfair 
allocation is an effective way to shift blame from oneself toward the person to whom the decision is delegated.  
!
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behavior and the resulting outcomes. We interpret the assigned punishment as a measure of 
blame and responsibility attribution for an action and its consequences.  
More precisely, in our experiment a dictator plays a binary dictator game under one of 
two possible states of the world. The state of the world is chosen by a random device and 
determines whether an action that is personally beneficial for the dictator benefits or harms the 
receiver. The dictator can decide whether or not to learn the true state, and faces no cost for 
acquiring this information. The realized state is irrelevant for the dictator’s payoffs, meaning that 
ignorance creates no uncertainty about the dictator’s payoffs, but enables the dictator to remain 
ignorant about the effects of his action on others. Thus, our design affords the dictator the 
opportunity to remain willfully ignorant regarding the social consequences of his actions. 
Our focus is not on the effects of willful ignorance per se, however (cf. Dana et al., 2007), 
but instead on the extent to which remaining willfully ignorant allows the dictator to avoid blame 
and responsibility when a bad outcome results for the receiver. Therefore, in our experiment a 
third party observes the actions of the dictator and the outcome of the game and decides whether 
and to what extent to punish the dictator for his behavior.  
Our results show that, when outcomes detrimental to the receiver result, ignorance is 
indeed effective in reducing punishment. That is, when taking an action that increases one’s own 
welfare, but also results in harm to others, it is better to have avoided knowledge that harm would 
occur. Thus, willful ignorance can help avoid blame. 
At the same time, however, we find that willful ignorance itself is evaluated negatively, 
regardless of the consequences. That is, choosing to forgo information concerning the receiver’s 
payoffs and acting in a self-regarding way incites punishment, even when the resulting state of 
the world is one in which the dictator’s self-interest is also beneficial for the receiver. By 
remaining ignorant the dictator shows disregard for the possibility that the receiver may obtain a 
low payoff and this appears sufficient for inducing punishment by third parties. Thus, the mere 
act of avoiding information about how one’s decisions affect others provokes blame and 
punishment.  
As a result of the above two counteracting effects of ignorance on punishment by third 
parties, in expectation, willful ignorance does not yield a higher payoff than knowingly acting 
selfishly. That is, while ignorance provides some blame avoidance when bad outcomes result, the 
fact that its use produces blame even when the outcomes are good makes it an ineffective strategy 
for obtaining higher payoffs in our experiment. 
!
!
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However, the punishment pattern revealed in our study has important implications for 
how willful ignorance might interact with punishment outside the laboratory. Attention to the 
possibility of blame and punishment is often salient only when bad outcomes arise – e.g., 
following a scandal or harmful misdeed. The fact that decision makers are penalized less when 
acting under willful ignorance therefore suggests that willful ignorance may be a good strategy in 
contexts where punishment is unlikely to be considered absent some noticeably bad consequence. 
Thus, corporate and political leaders who suspect wrongdoing in the institutions they manage 
may, indeed, benefit from a strategy involving willful ignorance. 
Our results also have implications for economic theories of social preferences. We find 
significant differences in punishment for the same outcome, depending on whether the dictator 
revealed the state before making his choice. This cannot be explained by theories that incorporate 
social motives through preferences over final payoff distributions (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), which predict the same punishment for an allocation, 
independently of the actions that led to the allocation. The qualitative comparative-static effect of 
willful ignorance on punishment is consistent with theories that incorporate intention-based 
reciprocity as a motive (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 
2006; Sebald, 2010). However, these models fail to predict our additional finding that willfully 
ignorant dictators are still punished less when the beneficial outcome occurs than when the unfair 
outcome obtains. That is, outcomes matter even for willfully ignorant dictators. 
Research on procedural fairness recognizes that people care not only about distributions 
of final outcomes, but also about the procedures employed to implement outcomes (Frey et al., 
2004; Bolton et al., 2005; Trautmann, 2009; Krawczyk, 2011; Fudenberg and Levine, 2012). Our 
study contributes to this literature in that we show that punishment is not determined solely by 
consequences, but also by the process – in our case, the dictator’s decision whether to acquire 
information – that leads to those consequences. Our research thus also relates to recent studies 
that find both ex ante fairness (equal opportunities, fair procedures) and ex post fairness (equal 
payoffs) to influence distributive choices (Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010; Brock et al., 2013; 
Cappelen et al., 2013). We find that simple models combining ex ante and ex post fairness (e.g., 
Brock et al., 2013; Saito, 2013), are able to predict both the qualitative comparative-static effect 
of willful ignorance on the assigned punishment as well as the finding that punishment depends 
on consequences following willful ignorance.  
!
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There exists prior evidence that willful ignorance can be used to obtain more favorable 
wealth distributions, in the context of bilateral bargaining. Building on earlier experiments on 
bilateral bargaining with incomplete information about values, which demonstrated that more 
informed parties extract more favorable payoffs (Roth and Murnighan, 1982), Kagel et al. (1996) 
show that responders in an ultimatum game are willing to accept very unequal monetary payoffs 
more often when the proposer is only partly informed about the receiver’s payoffs than when the 
proposer has complete information. Thus, a party that is ignorant about the consequences of an 
offer for the other party can make less favorable offers. Conrads and Irlenbusch (2013) – using a 
design, like ours, that is motivated by Dana et al. (2007) – confirm that this extends to (willful) 
ignorance: offers to another party by a proposer in an ultimatum bargaining game, who chooses 
to remain ignorant or cannot avoid being ignorant, are accepted more frequently than comparable 
offers by a fully informed proposer. Our first result that willful ignorance deflects punishment for 
low receiver payoffs thus concords with their finding that willful ignorance leads to higher 
acceptance rates of unequal proposals.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental 
design. Section 3 summarizes our results with respect to the observed punishment pattern and the 
dictator’s decisions. Section 4 discusses the predictions of different social preference models 
regarding the qualitative comparative-static effect of willful ignorance on punishment behavior. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 Experimental Design 
Our study uses one-shot binary dictator games that are modified to allow for willful ignorance 
and punishment. In the modified games, there are three players, as well as a move by nature that 
determines payoffs. Nature moves first, implementing one of two payoff states, ω1 or ω2, with 
equal probabilities, i.e., p(ω1) = p(ω2) = 0.5.  
The state determines the relationship between a dictator’s choices and the payoffs of a 
passive receiver, as depicted in Figure 1. More precisely, a dictator chooses between two options, 
a1 and a2. Regardless of the state, the dictator receives a payoff of 70 for choosing a1 and 50 for 
choosing a2. However, the state determines whether or not the dictator’s and receiver’s interests 
are aligned. In ω1, the receiver receives 10 for the dictator’s choice of a1 and 50 for a choice of 
a2. In ω2 the receiver’s payoffs are reversed: 50 for a choice of a1 and 10 for a2. 
 
!
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Figure 1: The Dictator’s Choice Options in State ω1 and State ω2. The dictator’s 
monetary payoff is shown in the top row, the receiver’s payoff in the bottom row. 
 
Figure 1 also presents labels that provide an interpretation of the dictator’s actions and 
their consequences, conditional on the realization of a particular state. In state ω1, a choice of a1 
leads to an unfair allocation in that the dictator receives the highest possible payoff and the 
receiver the lowest one. Conversely, a choice of a2 in state ω1 leads to a fair allocation. Thus, in 
ω1 there is a conflict between what is best for the dictator and for the receiver, as in standard 
dictator games. However, this conflict is entirely removed in state ω2. Here a choice of a1 is 
dominant for a dictator who cares both about her own payoff and that of the receiver, while a2 
leads to a dominated allocation of 50-10.7  
Depending on the treatment, the dictator is either informed about the realized state or not. 
In a baseline condition, the dictator is informed about the state before making a choice. In a 
hidden information condition, he is not initially informed, but he can choose whether to find out 
the state at no cost or remain willfully ignorant. The dictator then chooses between a1 and a2, 
either with or without knowledge of the state.  
Finally, a third party can inflict punishment upon the dictator, after observing the 
dictator’s choices (a1 or a2 and, in the hidden information condition, whether he remained 
ignorant or not), the realized state, and thus the resulting payoffs. Our primary interest is in these 
punishment decisions by third parties who were not directly affected by the dictator’s decision.8  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 We use the labels “fair,” “unfair,” etc. for expositional reasons in the paper. In the experimental instructions, the 
dictator’s choice options were neutrally framed as “Option 1” and “Option 2.” 
8 We use a third-party, instead of a second-party, punishment design, firstly, because we are primarily interested in 
broad social norms of whether willful ignorance serves as an excuse for acting in a self-interested manner and third-
party punishment is often employed to study norm violations; see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). Moreover, 
measuring third-party punishment allows observing punishment assignments that are not confounded by income or 

 









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The third party has an endowment of 50 and can reduce the dictator’s payoff. Punishment 
is costly for the third party. For each unit of own income spent by the third party, the dictator’s 
payoff decreases by 5. Punishment is constrained in that the dictator’s payoff cannot be reduced 
below 10. Thus, for example, if the dictator’s payoff is 70 before punishment, the third party can 
spend any integer amount between 0 and 12 of own income, to deduct up to 60 from the 
dictator’s payoff. If the dictator’s payoff is 50, the third party can spend at most 8 units of own 
income, which decreases the dictator’s payoff by 40.  
Final payoffs are as follows. The dictator receives 70 or 50, depending on her choice of a1 
or a2, minus the punishment assigned by the third party (five times the units of own income spent 
by the third party). The receiver gets either 50 or 10, depending on the dictator’s decision and the 
relevant state. The third party’s payoff is 50 minus the units of own income spent to punish the 
dictator.  
We implemented two treatment conditions that differ only with respect to the information 
that the dictator possesses regarding the state. 
 
2.2.1 Baseline 
In the baseline condition, it is common knowledge that the dictator is informed about the state of 
the world before he makes his decision between a1 and a2. Thus, the dictator is fully aware of 
whether the choice is between the unfair and fair allocations or the dominant and dominated 
ones. To elicit dictator’s complete strategies, we implemented the strategy method. That is, we 
asked each dictator how he would decide if state ω1 were realized and how he would decide if 
state ω2 were realized. Only after the dictator made both choices, he learned the actual realized 
state, and he knew that his choice in this state would be binding. 
The third party was informed (i) about the state of the world and (ii) the dictator’s choice 
in this realized state, and could then assign punishment to decrease the dictator’s payoff. We also 
applied the strategy method to elicit the punishment choices. That is, we asked the third party to 
indicate how much she would deduct from the dictator’s payoff for both possible choices by the 
dictator in both possible states of the world. Only after the third party made her decisions in all 
four possible cases, she learned the state of the world and the dictator’s decision in this state. The 
third party knew that the chosen amount of punishment in the relevant case would be binding. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
direct reciprocity effects. In contrast to the receiver (i.e., the second party), the third party always has an endowment 
of 50 points, irrespective of the resulting outcome. 
!
!
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2.2.2 Hidden Information 
In the hidden information condition, it is common knowledge that the dictator is initially 
uninformed about the state of the world. Importantly, this uncertainty does not apply to the 
dictator’s own payoffs, which are identical in both states. A choice of a1 gives the dictator 70, 
while a2 gives the dictator 50. Uncertainty thus only applies to the consequences of the two 
choices for the receiver’s payoffs, as described in Figure 1. The dictator has the option to reveal 
the state before making his allocation decision. Ignorance is the default, but revealing is costless 
and implemented by clicking a button on the decision screen.  
If the dictator remains ignorant, he will never be informed about the underlying state of 
the world and he will thus never learn the receiver’s payoff. However, if the dictator reveals, he 
learns the state of the world and chooses either between the unfair and fair allocation in state ω1, 
or between the dominant and dominated allocation in state ω2.9 
As in the baseline, we implemented the strategy method to elicit the allocation choices, 
where possible. That is, dictators first decided whether they wanted to acquire the payoff 
information or remain ignorant. If a dictator chose to remain ignorant, he then made a choice 
between a1 and a2, while if the dictator chose to acquire the payoff information, he then indicated 
choices of a1 or a2 for each of the two possible realized states. Only after the dictator made both 
choices, he learned the state of the world; he knew that his choice in this state would be binding.  
The third party was informed of (i) whether or not the dictator revealed the state, (ii) the 
realized state of the world, and (iii) what choice the dictator made, either in ignorance or 
conditional on the realized state. The third party thus knew the state of the world even if the 
dictator chose to remain ignorant. We again used the strategy method to elicit the punishment 
decisions by third parties for all possible states and actions by the dictator. Note that there are 
now eight possible cases, as all four possible allocations can result either after remaining ignorant 
or after revealing.  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 A basic common feature of our two treatments is that the information about the state of the world is always 
available to a decision maker, and the only difference is that willful ignorance is possible in one treatment but not in 
the other. This allows us to compare the consequences of a dictator’s decision to remain ignorant when she could 
have acquired information, to situations in which the dictator is, either by default or by choice, informed. An 
alternative baseline, in which dictators are never informed, potentially provides insights into how judgments of 
punishment and blame are formed (cf. Gurdal et al., 2013), but departs from our main research question. 
!
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2.2.3 General Procedures 
Before subjects entered the lab, they randomly drew a place card that specified at which 
computer terminal to sit and thus a subject’s role and the group matching. Subjects found paper 
copies of the instructions at their assigned computer terminals. One third of the subjects were 
assigned the role of the dictator (neutrally labeled as “player A”). Two thirds of the subjects read 
in the instructions that they would be either in the role of the receiver (“player B”) or in the role 
of the third party (“player C”). These subjects all made choices as third parties and they learned 
of their actual roles only afterward. If they were assigned the role of the third party, then the 
chosen amount of punishment in the relevant case would be binding. If they were assigned to the 
role of receiver, their decisions would have no impact on the group. This procedure enabled us to 
elicit punishment decisions, which are the focus of this paper, from two thirds of our subjects.10  
We conducted four sessions of the baseline condition, with 81 subjects in total (27 
subjects in the role of the dictator and 54 subjects in the role of the receiver/third party). We also 
conducted four sessions of the hidden information condition, with 90 subjects in total (30 
subjects in the role of the dictator and 60 subjects in the role of the receiver/third party).  
All sessions took place at the decision laboratory of the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich in June 2012. The experiments were computerized with the software “z-
Tree” (Fischbacher, 2007) and the recruitment was conducted with the software “ORSEE” 
(Greiner, 2003). Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. Students majoring in economics or psychology were 
not eligible to participate. Each subject participated in only one experimental condition. Subjects’ 
instructions included comprehension questions that had to be answered correctly before the 
experiment could begin. A summary of the instructions was read aloud to ensure common 
information regarding the instructions. An English translation of the original German instructions 
for the hidden information condition can be found in the online Appendix B. Sessions lasted 
about 50 to 60 minutes. Payoffs from the game, denominated in “points,” were converted into 
money at the rate of 2 points to CHF 1 (about $1 at the time of the experiment) at the end of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10! Note that this design choice, while eliminating strategic concerns for third parties, might place third parties 
mentally in the role of the receivers when making their punishment decisions. Nikiforakis and Mitchell (2014) 
compared a punishment protocol like ours to a protocol where the role of the third party was known in advance. They 
found a greater demand for punishment when roles were assigned ex post but, importantly, this effect was constant 
across treatments and thus did not influence treatment effects. 
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experiment. On average, subjects earned CHF 39.80 in the baseline sessions and CHF 41.30 in 
the hidden information sessions. These amounts include a show-up fee of CHF 15.  
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Punishment Pattern 
The focus of this paper is the pattern of punishment for dictator allocation choices by third 
parties. Our particular interest is in studying how the dictator’s choice to either remain ignorant 
or become informed about the receiver’s payoffs influences punishment. 
Figure 2 shows the average punishment that was assigned to the dictator for the different 
realized allocations in the baseline and in the hidden information condition.11 The exact values 
can be read from Table 1. For instance, the left black bar in Figure 2 shows that the dictator 
receives a deduction of 19.72 points, on average, if he chooses the unfair allocation in state ω1 in 
the baseline condition.  
In accordance with prior findings on third-party punishment (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2004), the figure shows that the dictators are punished significantly more for knowingly 
implementing the unfair allocation than for the fair allocation. This holds true in the baseline and 
when the dictator chose to acquire the information in the hidden information condition. When 
dictators remained ignorant, the difference in punishment for implementing the unfair vs. fair 
allocation was smaller, but also statistically significant. Thus, regardless of the dictator’s 
knowledge or willful ignorance of the consequence to the receiver, a choice that results in an 
unfair allocation is punished more relative to one that results in a fair one (p<0.01 in all three 
comparisons, using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test).12  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Averages are calculated including observations with zero punishment, i.e., we report unconditional averages. 
12 All tests reported in this paper are two-sided. 
!
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Our data show, however, that willful ignorance mitigates the punishment received by a 
dictator whose actions result in the unfair allocation. A willfully ignorant dictator who chooses 
70 points for himself is punished significantly less if the unfair allocation realizes (11.42) 
compared to a dictator who directly chooses the unfair allocation when the consequences are 
known – i.e., after revealing (16.25) or in the baseline condition (19.72) (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, p<0.01, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.014, respectively).13 Thus, our experiment reveals 
that willful ignorance can mitigate some of the blame and punishment received when knowingly 
implementing unfair outcomes.! 
Result 1: Willfully ignorant dictators are punished less for implementing an unfair 
outcome compared to dictators who knowingly chose the same outcome. Willful 
ignorance thus deflects blame for unfair outcomes. 
However, the opposite pattern emerges when one considers what happens in cases where 
the resulting allocation is the dominant one, which is favorable to both the dictator and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 We do not find that revealing the state is treated differently from exogenously knowing the state. A comparison of 
the punishment for a dictator who reveals in the hidden information condition with the punishment in the baseline 
condition, where the dictator knows the state of the world by default, reveals no significant differences (Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests, p=0.331, p=0.743, p=0.900, and p=0.196, for unfair, fair, dominant, and dominated, respectively). !
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Figure 2: Average Punishment of the Dictator by the Third Party. The significance of the 
difference in punishment is indicated by the p-values of the respective non-parametric tests 
(signed-rank or rank-sum). All four comparisons between Baseline and Hidden Info – Revealed 
are insignificant.!
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receiver. Here, willfully ignorant dictators are punished significantly more (8.00) compared with 
dictators who choose the same dominant allocation after revealing (2.76) or in the baseline 
condition (1.76) (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.034, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.039, 
respectively). Thus, willful ignorance itself appears to receive blame and punishment, even when 
it results in an outcome favorable to everyone.  
Result 2: Willfully ignorant dictators are punished more for implementing a 
dominant outcome compared to dictators who knowingly chose the same outcome. 
Willful ignorance is thus inherently blameworthy. 
Due to this opposing effect of willful ignorance on punishment, the difference in 
punishment between the unfair and the dominant allocation is much smaller when the dictator 
remained ignorant (3.42) than when he revealed the state in the hidden information condition 
(13.58) or in the baseline (17.96). Nevertheless, all three differences are highly significant 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p<0.01).  
Result 3: Dictators, including willfully ignorant ones, are punished more if an 
unfair outcome is implemented than if a dominant outcome is implemented. 
Outcomes thus matter for punishment even under willful ignorance. 
We observe a similar pattern when a dictator chooses 50 for himself. In accordance with 
Result 1, if the choice is made under willful ignorance and the dominated allocation is 
implemented, the dictator is punished significantly less (6.00) compared to a dictator who 
chooses dominated after revealing (9.50) or in the baseline condition (12.41) (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p=0.029 and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.011, respectively). However, the willfully 
ignorant dictator is punished significantly more if the fair allocation realizes (4.42) compared to a 
dictator who chooses fair after revealing (0.58) or in the baseline condition (0.56) (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p<0.01, and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01, respectively).14 This finding 
confirms Result 2. The difference in punishment between the fair and the dominated allocation is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 As we report below, willfully ignorant dictators never chose 50 points for themselves. Also, none of the dictators 
who revealed chose dominated in state ω2. In the baseline condition, only one dictator chose dominated. While we 
call the allocation (50-10) “dominated,” the fact that one subject chose it highlights the possibility that it could 
alternatively be labeled “spiteful” or “competitive” because it maximizes the relative payoff advantage of the 
dictator. Punishment for a dictator who learns that the state of the world is!ω2 and nevertheless chooses (50-10) could 
thus be driven by third parties who want to sanction “spiteful” or “competitive” dictators. We thank a referee for 
suggesting this interpretation. 
!
!
17 
again much smaller when the dictator remained ignorant than when he revealed the state in the 
hidden information condition or in the baseline condition (1.59 vs. 8.92 and 11.85, respectively). 
This difference is at least marginally significant in all three cases (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, 
p=0.052, p<0.01 and p<0.01, respectively), which is consistent with Result 3. 
To summarize, we find a consistent comparative-static effect of willful ignorance on 
punishment. On the one hand, for resulting allocations that yield the receiver the low payoff of 
10, the dictator is punished significantly less when he remained ignorant than when he had the 
payoff information (Result 1). On the other hand, for allocations that are beneficial to the receiver 
– i.e., when the receiver gets the high payoff of 50 – the dictator is punished significantly more 
when he remained ignorant (Result 2). Willful ignorance thus deflects blame and punishment for 
socially “bad” outcomes (the unfair or the dominated allocation). The fact that the dictator did 
not know for sure that the receiver would get a low payoff appears to serve, to some extent, as an 
acceptable excuse. At the same time, willful ignorance is regarded as blameworthy in itself. A 
willfully ignorant dictator is punished significantly more than a dictator who reveals or a dictator 
in the baseline condition when the receiver experiences no harm (in either the fair or the 
dominant allocation). Remaining ignorant means that the dictator shows some disregard for the 
possibility of the receiver obtaining a low payoff, and this appears sufficient for inducing 
punishment by third parties. Finally, we observe that outcomes matter (Result 3). Dictators 
always receive more punishment when their actions yield the disadvantageous outcome for the 
receiver, regardless of the information possessed or acquired by the dictator. 
A similar pattern to the one that we observe in punishment levels also emerges when we 
look at the comparative-static effect of willful ignorance on the frequency of punishment, 
presented in Table 1. A willfully ignorant dictator who chooses a1 and a payoff of 70 for himself 
is punished less often if the unfair allocation results (38 percent), compared to a dictator who 
reveals (53 percent) or to the baseline condition (61 percent) (McNemar test, p=0.012, and 
Fischer exact test, p=0.024, respectively). Conversely, if the dominant allocation results, a 
willfully ignorant dictator is punished more frequently (27 percent versus 13 percent, in both 
cases) (McNemar test, p=0.039, and Fischer exact test, p=0.101, respectively).15 Similarly, a 
willfully ignorant dictator who chooses 50 for himself is punished more often if the fair 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 In the Appendix we report the results of a hurdle model to address the question whether the effects of willful 
ignorance on average punishment levels are driven by different frequencies of punishment or different levels 
conditional on punishment taking place. The analysis suggests that differences in frequencies primarily drive our 
results.  
!
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allocation results and less often if the dominated allocation results, compared to a dictator who 
reveals or to the baseline condition, though the difference is not significant in all cases 
(McNemar tests, p=0.012 and p=0.180, and Fisher exact tests, p=0.010 and p=0.021, 
respectively).16  
 
Table 1: Punishment Behavior by Experimental Condition 
 Average Punishment Frequency of Punishment 
 Baseline 
Hidden Info 
- Revealed 
Hidden Info 
- Ignorant Baseline 
Hidden Info 
- Revealed 
Hidden Info 
- Ignorant 
unfair (70-10) 19.72                   16.25                                  11.42  0.61 0.53 0.38 
fair (50-50) 0.56                            0.58                            4.42  0.04 0.05 0.20 
dominant (70-50) 1.76                          2.67                                 8.00                                     0.13 0.13 0.27 
dominated (50-10) 12.41                        9.50                                  6.00  0.50 0.37 0.28 
 
Results 1 and 2 are further illustrated in Figure 3. The figure shows the individual third 
parties’ punishment assignments in the hidden information condition when either the unfair 
allocation (left panel) or the dominant allocation (right panel) is realized. Circles above (below) 
the 45-degree line indicate greater (lower) punishment by third parties of dictators who revealed 
the state before choosing an allocation than of dictators who remained willfully ignorant. The 
numbers in the circles indicate the number of observations; circles without numbers represent one 
observation. For instance, when the unfair allocation realized, 27 third parties punished neither a 
willfully ignorant dictator nor a dictator who revealed the state of the world. Providing further 
support for the punishment pattern we observed earlier, of those third parties who did punish the 
unfair allocation, the majority assigned greater punishment to a dictator who revealed the state 
than to a willfully ignorant dictator. The pattern is reversed when the dominant allocation 
realizes: the majority of those third parties who punished assigned more punishment to a willfully 
ignorant dictator than to a dictator who revealed the state.17 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Consistent with our observation on levels of punishment (see footnote 13), there is no difference in the frequency 
of punishment between the baseline and the hidden information conditions when the dictator reveals the payoff 
information (Fisher exact tests, p=0.451, p=1, p=1, p=0.186 for unfair, fair, dominant, and dominated, respectively).!
17 We can also connect the behavior of individual third parties across realized allocations (i.e., across the two panels 
of Figure 3). Table A.2 in the online Appendix A presents the punishment patterns of individual third parties across 
the two outcomes and reveals that we observe similar patterns, at the individual level, that we find on aggregate. 
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Figure 3: Individual Third Party’s Punishment Assignment for the Unfair and Dominant 
Allocation Depending on the Dictator’s Choice to either Reveal or Remain Ignorant. 
 
2.3.2 Expected Payoffs of Dictators 
We now turn to the dictators’ expected payoffs for different strategies. There are four choice 
strategies in the baseline conditions, based on the two possible realized states and the two 
possible actions in each state. Because there is no uncertainty, these strategies are identified by 
the resulting outcomes (see Figure 1): {unfair, dominant}, {fair, dominant}, {unfair, dominated}, 
and {fair, dominated}. In the hidden information condition, the dictator can choose to either 
reveal the payoff information – in which case the same four strategies as in the baseline become 
available – or to remain willfully ignorant, in which case the two unconditional action choices, a1 
or a2, are available. Table 2 shows the dictators’ average expected payoffs, based on the 
punishment behavior of third parties, for each of these possible strategies.  
Our main interest is in the effect of the dictator’s choice to remain ignorant on his 
expected payoff. We first compare the strategies that select the same allocations. In this regard, 
there is little difference between the expected payoffs of a dictator who chooses to remain 
   





   



 





         Unfair allocation            Dominant allocation 
    Willfully ignorant dictator                                           Willfully ignorant dictator 
D
ic
ta
to
r w
ho
 re
ve
al
ed
 
D
ic
ta
to
r w
ho
 re
ve
al
ed
 
!
!
20 
ignorant and selects action a1 (60.29) and either a dictator in the baseline (59.26) or a dictator 
who reveals the payoff information and selects action a1 regardless of the realized state (60.54).18  
 
Table 2: Expected Payoffs of Dictators under Different Strategies 
 
Baseline 
Hidden Information 
 Revealed Ignorant 
{unfair, dominant}   (a1| ω1) (a1| ω2) 59.26 60.54  
{fair, dominant}       (a2| ω1) (a1| ω2) 58.84 58.38  
{unfair, dominated} (a1| ω1) (a2| ω2) 43.94 47.13  
{fair, dominated}     (a2| ω1) (a2| ω2) 43.52 44.96  
{unfair / dominant}  (a1) -  60.29 
{fair / dominated}    (a2) -  44.79 
 
We can also compare the strategy of remaining ignorant and selecting a1 to revealing and 
acting fairly in the hidden information condition or in the baseline condition (i.e., giving the 
receiver a payoff of 50, regardless of the state). These are the most frequently chosen strategies 
(see Section 3.3). While the differences are small, the expected payoff of remaining ignorant and 
playing a1 (60.29) is significantly higher than the expected payoff of either of these two other 
strategies (58.38 and 58.84; respectively, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p<0.01, and Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, p<0.01). The observation of very small payoff differences reflects our finding that 
willful ignorance has two countervailing effects on punishment, described in Results 1 and 2.  
 
2.3.3 Dictators’ Strategies and Resulting Allocations 
Finally, we consider the dictators’ information acquisition decisions in the hidden information 
condition, as well as their allocation choices in both conditions.  
In the baseline, 33 percent of dictators (9 of 27) chose the action a1 regardless of the state, 
which corresponds to the allocations {unfair, dominant}. Almost twice as many, or 63 percent 
(17 of 27), chose the strategy that gave the receiver a payoff of 50 in either stage – e.g., a2 in state 
ω1 and a1 in state ω2, or {fair, dominant}. One subject chose action a2 in state ω2, implementing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 The difference is marginally statistically significant in the first comparison (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.075) but 
not in the second (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.137). For all statistical tests in this subsection, we generate a 
distribution of payoffs, for each strategy, using the empirical punishment behavior of the third parties. 
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{fair, dominated}. This overall pattern of behavior is in line with earlier results on dictator games 
with punishment.19 
In the hidden information condition, 43 percent of dictators (13 of 30) remained ignorant 
about the consequences of their decision for the receiver.20 All of the dictators who remained 
ignorant chose action a1 {unfair / dominant}. Of those dictators who revealed the state, 12 
percent (2 of 17) choose a1 unconditionally {unfair, dominant} and 88 percent (15 of 17) choose 
a2 in state ω1 and a1 in state ω2 {fair, dominant}. Dictators who revealed the state thus chose the 
fair allocation in state ω1 in the large majority of the cases, indicating that they reveal the state 
primarily in order to condition their allocation choice on the state of the world.  
The dictators’ strategies resulted in different frequencies of the possible allocations in the 
two conditions. In the baseline, when state ω1 realized, 33 percent of dictators (9 of 27) chose the 
unfair allocation. The unfair allocation resulted with higher frequency (50 percent, or 15 of 30) in 
the hidden information condition. In state ω2, the dominant allocation resulted almost universally 
in both the hidden information (30 of 30 cases) and baseline conditions (26 of 27 cases).  
The fact that unfair allocations result more frequently under hidden information than in 
the baseline resembles the findings in Dana et al. (2007). In their experiment, hidden information 
increased the frequency of the unfair allocation from 26 to 63 percent. The interpretation of Dana 
et al. is that the possibility to remain ignorant gives subjects the moral “wiggle room” to behave 
self-interestedly. While similar in direction, the effect in our experiment is much smaller and not 
statistically significant (Fisher exact test, p=0.284). Of course, a key difference between the two 
experiments is the presence of a punishment stage in our design. The threat of punishment alone 
potentially limits the extent to which subjects are willing to act as if willful ignorance absolves 
them of responsibility. As we see, third parties still hold dictators responsible for their 
ignorance.21   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 In Bartling and Fischbacher (2012), for instance, 63 percent of dictators selected a fair allocation in a binary 
dictator game with punishment that is comparable to our game if state ω1 prevails. 
20 This percentage almost exactly matches the 44 percent of dictators who remained ignorant in Dana et al. (2007). 
21 Moreover, while in Dana et al., subjects who remained willfully ignorant never found out about the consequences 
for the receiver, dictators in our experiment received a “punishment signal” about the realized state of the world, due 
to the fact that third parties punished differently when the unfair allocation resulted than when the result was the 
dominant allocation. Thus, dictators lost some of the benefit of remaining ignorant, due to the information conveyed 
by punishment. 
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2.4 How Well do Social Preference Models Account for the Results? 
In this paper, we ask the empirical question whether willful ignorance can reduce punishment for 
a dictator who implements an unfair allocation. Our goal was not to design an experiment to 
distinguish between different behavioral models of punishment and social preferences. However, 
it is nevertheless instructive to discuss the qualitative predictions of some leading models in the 
literature regarding the impact of the dictator’s choice to remain willfully ignorant on the 
punishment by the third party. Note first that the canonical model of pure self-interest predicts no 
punishment at all, because it is costly. This prediction is clearly inconsistent with the data.  
 
2.4.1 Outcome-Based Models of Social Preferences 
Outcome-based models of social preferences introduce utility considerations over parties’ final 
payoffs. For example, two leading models assume that people may dislike payoff inequalities 
(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). In the spirit of these models, 
suppose that the third party’s punishment decisions are driven by the ex post payoff difference 
between the dictator and the receiver. Consistent with the punishment motive “ex post 
inequality,” we observe higher punishment for allocations with higher final inequality (Result 3). 
For a given allocation, however, the punishment motive “ex post inequality” does not predict a 
difference based on how that allocation was produced. Our main findings (Results 1 and 2) do 
not support this prediction. 
 
2.4.2 Intention-Based Models of Social Preferences 
A key feature of a second class of models (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; 
Sebald, 2010) is that players respond to the perceived intent (kind or unkind) of other players but 
not to realized ex post payoffs. The kindness of a player is typically evaluated relative to a fair 
“reference” payoff—e.g.,! the average between the highest and the lowest efficient payoff that a 
player can grant another player. A player’s action is perceived as kind (unkind) if he believes that 
his action choice gives the other player more (less) than such a reference payoff. In the spirit of 
these models, we assume that the dictator’s kindness toward the receiver drives the third parties’ 
punishment decisions.22  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The psychological content of models of intention-based reciprocity is that unkindness triggers a reaction “in kind,” 
i.e., punishment. While these models formally capture bilateral interactions, the third party in our experiment is not 
directly affected by the dictator’s choices. Hence, our assumption that a third party’s punishment decisions are driven 
!
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Consider the dictator’s choice of the unfair allocation (70-10) in state ω1 in the baseline or 
after revealing in the hidden information condition. The implementation of the unfair allocation 
is unkind because it leaves the receiver with less than the reference payoff of 30 (the average of 
the receiver’s highest and lowest possible payoff of 50 and 10, respectively). Second, the 
implementation of the fair allocation (50-50) in state ω1 in the baseline or after revealing in the 
hidden information condition is kind. Finally, remaining willfully ignorant leads to a lottery over 
the receiver’s payoff with an expected payoff of 30, regardless of whether the dictator chooses a1 
or a2, which is neither kind nor unkind since it corresponds precisely to the reference payoff. 
Qualitatively, the punishment motive “intent” thus correctly predicts Results 1 and 2. The same 
prediction pattern prevails in state ω2. However, the punishment motive “intent” cannot explain 
Result 3. After the decision to remain ignorant, the finally resulting allocation should not 
influence the third party’s evaluation of the dictator’s kindness and thus not affect punishment.23 
 
2.4.3 Models of procedural fairness 
Models of procedural fairness assume people care not only about outcomes but also about the 
procedures that lead to these outcomes (Frey et al., 2004; Bolton et al., 2005; Trautmann, 2009; 
Krawczyk, 2011; Fudenberg and Levine, 2012; Brock et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 2013; Saito, 
2013). An important example of such a procedure is the notion of “equal opportunities” which 
can be interpreted as the idea that not only ex post realized payoff differences are important but 
also ex ante expected payoff differences.  
 Simple models of procedural fairness are suggested by, e.g., Brock et al. (2013) or Saito 
(2013), who extend the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model to allow for a convex combination of ex 
ante and ex post payoff comparisons. Suppose the third party’s punishment decisions are driven 
by such a convex combination of ex ante and ex post payoff differences between the dictator and 
the receiver and sufficient weight is placed on both ex ante and ex post payoff differences. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
by the dictator’s unkindness towards the receiver is not formally in line with these models. Third-party punishment is 
typically associated with norm enforcement. In that sense, one can argue that the psychological content of models of 
intention-based reciprocity captures the norm that one should not be unkind, and the willingness to punish violations 
of this norm. A similar line of argument can be made regarding our assumption that the inequality between the 
dictator and the receiver drives the third party’s punishment in the models discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.3.  
23 The hybrid model of outcome- and intention-based social preferences by Falk and Fischbacher (2006) makes the 
same qualitative prediction in our context. In their model, a player is considered as unkind if he implements an 
allocation that favors him in expectation. The expectation is taken at the player’s decision node, so that remaining 
ignorant can again be treated as granting the reference payoff, as in the model by Sebald (2010).!
!
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Consider first the third party’s evaluation of ex ante payoff differences. If the unfair 
allocation (70-10) results in state ω1 in the baseline or after revealing in the hidden information 
condition, the ex ante payoff difference is 60. Since the ex ante payoff difference in case of a 
willfully ignorant dictator who chose a1 is only 40, the model qualitatively predicts Result 1. If 
the fair allocation (50-50) results in state ω1 in the baseline or after revealing in the hidden 
information condition, the ex ante payoff difference is zero. Since the ex ante payoff difference is 
20 in case of a willfully ignorant dictator who chose a2, the model also qualitatively predicts 
Result 2. The same qualitative prediction pattern prevails in state ω2. Moreover, since ex post 
payoff differences are accounted for as well, qualitatively, the model also correctly predicts 
Result 3.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper studies how the opportunity to remain willfully ignorant – by avoiding information on 
the consequences of one’s actions for others – affects the extent to which individuals are held 
accountable and punished by third parties for the resulting outcomes. Discussions of 
responsibility in political and corporate scandals are often accompanied by claims of ignorance 
that could have been resolved if the involved parties had sought out the relevant information. It is 
important, therefore, to understand whether such strategies are effective for deflecting blame and 
punishment. 
 Our findings reveal an interesting pattern. By remaining willfully ignorant, decision 
makers deflect some punishment when bad consequences arise, due to the fact that something 
good could have happened. Conversely, when good outcomes result from decisions made under 
willful ignorance, the fact that less desirable outcomes could have obtained provides grounds for 
punishment. But even under willful ignorance, punishment is still higher when bad consequences 
arise than when good outcomes result. Such punishment behavior by third parties is consistent 
with behavioral social preference models that combine ex ante and ex post fairness concerns.  
For dictators in our experiment, willful ignorance is not a better strategy, in expectation, 
than acquiring payoff information. This is mainly because the third parties punish willful 
ignorance even when fortune produces a favorable outcome for the receiver. Nevertheless, the 
detected punishment pattern may have very different consequences outside the laboratory, where 
attention to the possibility of punishing someone is often salient only when bad outcomes arise. 
!
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In such situations, our finding that decision makers receive lighter sanctions for bad outcomes 
suggests that willful ignorance may be an effective strategy for circumventing blame and 
punishment outside the laboratory. 
Interestingly, in many legal systems the “equal culpability” doctrine permits defendants 
who acted under willful ignorance of the existence of a fact to be treated as if they had possessed 
actual knowledge of its existence (Marcus, 1993; Husak and Callender, 1994).24 While this 
observation might suggest that the law is in contradiction with people's common moral sense, as 
elicited in our experiment, one important difference between our experimental environment and 
the one governed by the legal system is that the former is a one-shot interaction while the latter is 
a repeated game. Deterrence of future offenses is one main function of punishment under the law, 
and if ignorance were a valid excuse in the law, this deterrence function would be undermined. In 
contrast, a deterrence motive was absent in our experimental one-shot setting.   
 A final aspect of our experimental design worth stressing is that information acquisition 
was costless for dictators. Thus, both in the baseline as well as in the hidden information 
condition, the relevant information was available to the dictator at no cost; the dictator merely 
had the opportunity to avoid seeing it in the latter condition. If information acquisition were, 
instead, costly, this might enhance the moral justification for remaining ignorant. For example, 
following the 2008 financial crisis, many individuals and institutions involved in the sale of 
deceptively valued and marketed investment products tried to deflect responsibility with the 
claim that these products were too difficult to understand, i.e., they implicitly referred to the cost 
of being fully informed.25 Of course, as the cost of becoming informed increases it becomes, at 
some point, inefficient or even impossible for decision makers to become informed about the 
consequences of their actions. Hence, in some cases, ignorance may be a valid excuse for not 
considering the consequences of one’s actions, though uncertainty and asymmetric information 
about these costs may complicate such considerations. These issues raise interesting questions for 
future research.  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24!For example, a defendant who was hired by a stranger to drive a car across the United States boarder and who 
claimed not to have had knowledge of the drugs that were hidden in the car was held liable to the same extent as he 
would have been had he had that knowledge (United States v. Jewell).!
25 See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/business/12crime.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&th&emc=th 
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2.A Appendix !
Regression analyses 
Table A.1 reports the results of regression analyses to complement the non-parametric tests 
reported in the paper. Columns (1) and (2) show OLS and Tobit regressions of the punishment 
level on dummy variables of the dictator’s decisions in the different treatments. Since the 
dictator’s choices might affect the likelihood and amount of punishment differently, columns (3a) 
and (3b) report estimates from a hurdle model, an econometric specification that treats the 
decision to punish and the amount of punishment as two separate stochastic processes.26 The last 
column reports the number of observations underlying the estimation in column (3b). 
The omitted category in all regressions is the choice of the fair allocation in the baseline 
condition. The first three dummy variables measure the difference between the omitted category 
(fair) and the three other possible allocations (unfair, dominant, and dominated) in the baseline 
condition. For all three comparisons, regressions (1) and (2) show a significant and positive 
difference with the exception of the comparison between the fair and dominant allocations in the 
OLS model. The hurdle model reveals that the unfair, dominant and dominated allocations are 
punished significantly more often than the fair allocation. But conditional on punishment 
occurring, there is no significant difference in the punishment amount between the fair allocation 
and the other three allocations (the coefficients are often large in magnitude, but the large 
standard errors reflect the very limited punishment of the fair allocation in the baseline, where 
only two subjects chose positive punishment).  
The next four dummy variables measure the difference between the baseline and the 
hidden information condition when the dictator reveals the state. In all four regressions, none of 
the four coefficients is significant, which confirms our previous finding that the punishment 
pattern for a dictator who reveals is the same as the pattern in the baseline condition.  
Finally, the last four dummy variables measure the difference in punishment for a given 
allocation between a dictator who reveals and a dictator who remains ignorant in the hidden 
information condition. The OLS and Tobit regressions show significant differences in all four 
comparisons consistent with the directional results in our main analysis. The hurdle model again 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 First, a standard probit model estimates the likelihood that a third party will punish the dictator; second, a 
truncated linear regression estimates the conditional likelihood of a third party punishing a certain amount 
(McDowell, 2003; see, also, Erkal, Gangadharan, and Nikiforakis (2011) for an example of where hurdle models are 
used with experimental data). The hurdle is crossed if a third party decides to punish.  
!
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reveals that these differences are driven by the frequencies of punishment, though the coefficients 
in regression (3b) are often large in magnitude and their sign indicates that the amount is 
influenced in the same direction as the decision to punish. 
 
Table A.1: Regression Analyses 
 
OLS   
(1) 
Tobit     
(2) 
Hurdle model  
  
Probability 
(3a) 
Amount 
(3b) 
# obs. with 
positive 
punishment 
unfair (70-10) 19.17*** 70.55*** 0.66*** 30.65 33 
 (2.92) (12.09) (0.11) (20.55)  
dominant (70-50) 1.20 20.85** 0.21** -4.31 7 
 (0.78) (9.96) (0.09) (20.70)  
dominated (50-10) 11.85*** 58.64*** 0.57*** 20.18 27 
 (2.06) (11.70) (0.11) (20.18)  
HI × unfair (70-10) -3.47 -6.21 -0.06 -2.34 32 
 (3.93) (6.69) (0.08) (5.88)  
HI × dominant (70-50) 0.91 2.55 0.01 16.02 8 
 (1.29) (9.59) (0.10) (12.81)  
HI × dominated (50-10) -2.91 -8.80 -0.11 1.69 22 
 (2.83) (6.84) (0.07) (5.65)  
HI × fair (50-50) 0.03 3.93 0.05 -11.16 3 
 (0.61) (13.86) (0.13) (24.70)  
HI × ignorant × unfair (70-10) -4.83*** -11.20*** -0.12*** -0.92 23 
 (1.26) (2.88) (0.04) (4.29)  
HI × ignorant × dominant (70-50) 5.33** 19.51** 0.16** 15.97 16 
 (2.10) (7.75) (0.07) (10.66)  
HI × ignorant × dominated (50-10) -3.50*** -9.15** -0.07* -7.90 17 
 (1.29) (3.88) (0.04) (5.05)  
HI × ignorant × fair (50-50) 3.83*** 28.82*** 0.26*** 26.77 12 
 (1.38) (9.84) (0.09) (18.68)  
Constant 0.56 -59.92*** - -0.78 2 
 
(0.47) (12.16)  (21.39)  
Observations 696 696 696 202 202 
(Pseudo) R2 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.11  
Notes: The dependent variable in regression (1), (2) and (3b) is the size of the punishment reduction 
received by a dictator. The dependent variable in regression (3a) is a dummy that equals 1 if the third 
party punishes. “Probability” reports the marginal effects from a probit regression calculated at the mean. 
“Amount” is a linear regression truncated at 0. The omitted category in all regressions is the choice of the 
fair allocation in the baseline condition. “HI” indicates the hidden information condition. Robust standard 
errors clustering at the subject level are reported in parentheses.  
*** denote significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
Chapter 3
A Theory of Causal Responsibility
Attribution1
“No snowflake in an avalanche ever feels responsible.” Stanislaw Jerzy Lec
3.1 Introduction
Perceptions of responsibility oftentimes guide the attribution of blame and praise. When
we like an event, we typically praise the person responsible for its implementation, and
when we don’t like an event, we blame the person responsible for its implementation.
Through this channel, responsibility perceptions play a crucial role in many environments
that are of traditional interest to economists. For example, in labor markets, workers
and managers are fired or rewarded depending on their responsibility for the failure or
success of a project. In political economy contexts, people make voting decisions based
on the attribution of responsibility to politicians for the implementation of reforms and
economic outcomes. In behavioral ethics, the question arises whether firms or their cus-
tomers are responsible for negative externalities of the production process. Ultimately,
the design of institutions like hierarchies and voting rules can be guided by judgments of
1This paper must be cited as: Engl, F. (2015): “A Theory of Causal Responsibility Attribution,”
Working Paper. I want to thank my supervisor, Roberto Weber, for excellent guidance throughout the
project, and my co-supervisor, Mar´ıa Sa´ez-Mart´ı, for numerous helpful comments and discussions. I also
thank Bjo¨rn Bartling, Ernesto Dal Bo, Pedro Dal Bo, Lea Cassar, Guillaume Fre´chette, Lea Heursen,
Matthew Jackson, Dorothea Ku¨bler, Igor Letina, Nick Netzer, Arno Riedl, Andrew Schotter, Eldar Shafir,
Dirk Sliwka, Joel Sobel and Ran Spiegler and seminar and conference participants at the University of
Cologne, the University of Munich, the Zurich Workshop in Economics, the ZWEBER 2014, the 2015
Zurich-Basel Workshop in Micro Theory, the NYU-CESS 8th Annual Experimental Political Science
Conference, and the 2015 Morality, Incentives and Unethical Behavior Conference at UC San Diego for
helpful discussions and comments.
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when it is better to di↵use or to focus responsibility on individual agents. As these ex-
amples demonstrate, responsibility perceptions become especially important when events
are implemented through the interaction of several parties and potentially nature, i.e.
when the question arises who is more or less responsible for an event. Understanding the
determinants of responsibility perceptions in group settings and their implications for the
attribution of blame and praise are therefore important research questions in economics.
Despite their importance, little research in economics has dealt with the evaluation of
responsibility and an established theoretic notion of responsibility does not exist.2 In
this paper, I study the attribution of responsibility to agents for the implementation
of an event, when the event’s implementation depends on the interaction of multiple
agents and/or nature. In particular, I develop a notion of causal responsibility, which is
based on a counterfactual-reasoning approach, incorporate the notion into a framework
of responsibility preferences and study its implication for the allocation of punishment
and reward in a two-stage game. Responsibility preferences imply that, in addition to
their preferences over monetary payo↵s, agents have a taste to reward (punish) other
agents for the implementation of what they judge as good- or bad events, to the extent
that those agents are causally responsible for the event.3 I further demonstrate that the
predictions of the theory can explain existing evidence from experiments that prominent
existing theories have di culties explaining.
The notion of causal responsibility attempts to objectively capture the causal importance
of an agent’s action for the implementation of an event.4 It is especially important,
because it often serves as a necessary condition for other factors that play a role for the
attribution of punishment and reward. For example, Thompson (1980), in his work on the
responsibility of public o cials, writes that, ”unless an o cial’s action is at least a causal
factor of an event, it is hard to see why the question should arise of holding that o cial,
rather than anyone or everyone else, responsible for it.” In the realm of moral judgments,
2A growing experimental literature studies the implications of responsibility perceptions for the attri-
bution of punishment (Bartling, Fischbacher, and Schudy, forthcoming; Duch, Przepiorka, and Stevenson,
2014). A notable theoretical exception, that will be discussed in greater detail later on, is the experi-
mental study by Bartling and Fischbacher (2012), who develop a notion of responsibility that measures
an agent’s responsibility for an event by his impact on the probability that the event is implemented
compared to some reference probability. In the theoretical work of Prendergast (1995) and Sliwka (2006),
responsibility is allocated ex ante by a principal to a worker for the implementation of a task and Manove
(1997) models “responsible jobs” as those in which a worker’s e↵ort can influence the output.
3A large number of experimental studies has shown that people are willing to incur costs in order to
punish and reward other people (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, and Richerson, 2003;
Nikiforakis and Mitchell, 2013) and that this holds even for una↵ected third parties (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004; Leibbrandt and Lo´pez-Pe´rez, 2012; Bartling, Engl, and Weber, 2014). I am therefore taking the
willingness to punish and reward as given and study the comparative-static e↵ects of changes in causal
responsibility on punishment and reward.
4Of course, other approaches to responsibility exist. For example, Hart (1968) categorizes four di↵er-
ent notions of responsibility that play a role in legal contexts: role-responsibility, causal-responsibility,
liability-responsibility, and capacity-responsibility.
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the psychologists Darley and Shultz (1990) write that “judgments of moral responsibility
presuppose those of causation. If the protagonist is judged not to have caused the harm,
then there is no need to consider whether he is morally responsible for it,” and, going
even further, Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing (2009) argue that the “causal structure is so
central to moral judgment that representations of causal structure, causal models, serve as
the representational medium for appraising and reasoning about the morality of events.”
Thus, when ignoring the underlying causal structure, predictions for the attribution of
punishment and reward can be faulty.
Understanding the link between perceptions of causality and responsibility has therefore
long been recognized as an important area of research in many social sciences. For ex-
ample, in law, Hart (1968) and Hart and Honore (1985) argue that causality is the prime
determinant of responsibility which, in turn, determines legal liability. Wright (1985,
1988) and Moore (2009) discuss specific models of causation and their relationship with
responsibility and legal liability. In political science, causality-based models of responsi-
bility are used as a justification for why people should vote in elections (Goldman, 1999)
and as an explanation for the di culty of apportioning appropriate blame and praise
to public o cials (Thompson, 1980). Furthermore, Gomez and Wilson (2003) study the
claim that more sophisticated voters should be better at understanding causal mechanisms
and therefore attribute more responsibility for economic outcomes to the party that rules
congress as opposed to the party of the president. Abramowitz, Lanoue, and Ramesh
(1988) and Iyengar (1996) study how personal finances and the media, respectively, can
influence perceptions of the government’s causal responsibility. Philosophy has considered
the dilemma of how to ration medicine when it is in limited supply and suggested that
those who are causally responsible for their illness, for example, by smoking, should be
given lower priority (Dietrich, 2002). In addition, several studies discuss the challenges
of causal and moral responsibility concepts from a philosophical point of view (Bunzl,
1979; Sober, 1988; Miller, 2001). In economics, Berg (1982) argues that a consumer’s
causal responsibility for increases in supply capacity should be considered when designing
peak-load pricing schemes in electricity markets. In psychology, evaluations of causality
have long been an important part in the judgment of responsibility and blame, both in the
tradition of attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Shaver, 1985) as well as in culpable control
theory (Alicke, 1992, 2000; Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, and Davis, 2008), and are generally
seen as a prerequisite for the attribution of blame (Darley and Shultz, 1990; Schlenker,
Britt, Pennington, Murphy, and Doherty, 1994; Weiner, 1995; Sloman, Fernbach, and Ew-
ing, 2009; Malle, Guglielmo, and Monroe, 2014). The role of perceptions of causality for
the attribution of blame has been confirmed in many experimental psychological studies
(Spellman, 1997; Lagnado and Channon, 2008; Cushman, 2008).
However, many of these studies rely on simple heuristics for the evaluation of causal
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responsibility, oftentimes boiling down to a simple Yes/No decision. Hence, on first sight,
it might look like the study of causal responsibility doesn’t require much insight and
can therefore safely be ignored in economic models. And, indeed, when a single agent
chooses an action that directly translates into an event, individual causal responsibility
is straightforwardly established as only that agent and his choice of action determined
the event. However, when events are implemented through the interaction of several
parties and/or nature, determining each parties degree of causal responsibility for the
event is not trivial. For example, when a single research group accomplishes an important
scientific breakthrough, like finding a cure for cancer, that research group is attributed
full responsibility for the outcome and therefore receives praise. However, what if two
research groups simultaneously and independently find a cure for cancer? Are they both
perceived as a cause for the outcome and thus both praised as much as the single group,
or not at all, because no group alone was pivotal for the breakthrough? How does the
answer change if there are ten or more successful research groups?
Intuition suggests that two successful research groups are still held responsible, and thus
praised, to some degree, but not as much as the single successful research group. In
order to be able to handle such questions theoretically, I extend and bring into the eco-
nomic framework a notion of responsibility that was pioneered by Chockler and Halpern
(2004) in the artificial intelligence literature and that is based on the structural account
of causation (Pearl, 2000; Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Woodward, 2003).5 In Chockler and
Halpern’s notion, the responsibility of A for the realized event B inversely depends on
the minimum number of changes that have to be made to the specific context in order
to make B counterfactually depend on A. Hence, in the example above, two success-
ful research groups are less responsible for the scientific breakthrough than the single
successful research group. But they are more responsible than if 10 groups would have
independently achieved the same breakthrough. Recent experiments in psychology that
elicit non-incentivized responsibility ratings mostly confirm the comparative-statics pre-
dictions of such a counterfactual-reasoning-based responsibility notion (Gerstenberg and
Lagnado, 2010; Zultan, Gerstenberg, and Lagnado, 2012; Lagnado, Gerstenberg, and Zul-
tan, 2013). For example, in Lagnado, Gerstenberg, and Zultan (2013) subjects were told
that for a hypothetical team of four, consisting of members A, B, C and D, to be success-
5Put simply, under the structural account, A is a cause for B, if there exist hypothetical contingencies
in which B counterfactually depends on A. In the case of two successful research groups, even though
the outcome - having a cure for cancer - does not counterfactually depend on any of the two in the actual
realization, there exists a possible hypothetical contingency, namely the one in which only one found a
cure and the other didn’t, in which the event counterfactually depends on the successful group. Thus, the
structural account allows both research groups to be a cause of the event. Such counterfactual reasoning
is not only used as a tool in the theoretical causality literature, but has also been shown by psychologist
to be a common method that people employ when assessing causality (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982;
Kahneman and Varey, 1990; Roese, 1997; Spellman, 1997; Spellman and Mandel, 1999; Alicke, 2000).
For an extensive recent summary of di↵erent approaches to causality, see Beebee, Hitchcock, and Menzies
(2012).
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ful, both A and B as well as one out of C and D have to succeed in their individual task.
Subjects were then asked to rate the responsibility of A for the failure of the team task,
if A failed and varying combinations of B, C and D also failed. Subject attributed higher
responsibility to A, the smaller the number of changes that had to be made to the other
members’ outcomes, in order to make the team’s failure counterfactually depend on A’s
failure.
While lending support to a notion of causal responsibility that is based on counterfac-
tual reasoning, these studies don’t show how responsibility perceptions influence actual
behavior. However, psychological factors like responsibility perceptions are typically only
of interest to economists, if they induce behavioral consequences, such as changes in
choice-behavior. In this study, I, therefore, firstly formalize an extended notion of causal
responsibility in game-theoretic notation, making it tractable for economic modeling, and,
secondly, incorporate causal responsibility in a preference framework that allows to study
its behavioral implications for the allocation of punishment and reward.6 Furthermore, I
study how those subject to responsibility-driven attribution of punishment and reward re-
act to it, thereby analyzing the consequences of responsibility perceptions for equilibrium
outcomes. I show how, depending on the specific environment, causal responsibility per-
ceptions can induce distinctively di↵erent equilibrium outcomes in which, in some cases,
causal responsibility for an event is maximally di↵used between all, and, in other cases,
maximally focused on some of the involved agents. Finally, I test the predictive power of
the notion causal responsibility for the allocation of punishment in data from existing, in-
centivized experiments. I find that it can explain observed punishment patterns in many
cases more successfully than existing theories and that it remains a highly significant
predictor for punishment even after controlling for several other potential punishment
motives.
My overall notion of causal responsibility features a convex combination of an ex ante and
an ex post component. Ex post causal responsibility measures how causally responsible
the action of an agent turned out to be for the implementation of an event, taking the
realized actions of all agents and (potentially) nature into account. It crucially depends
on the “distance” of an agent’s action from being pivotal for the event, where “distance”
is measured by the number of hypothetical changes to the realized actions of the other
agents (and nature) that it takes to make the action of the agent under consideration
pivotal for the event. Therefore, an agent is said to bear full ex post causal responsibility
for an event, if his action is pivotal for it. A non-pivotal agent’s degree of partial ex post
6To highlight the importance of such formalization, one might draw a parallel to the theory of inequity
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). While it was well known how to measure inequity and that people
might care about inequity, only its formulation in terms of notation tractable for economic modeling
and its inclusion in a preference framework facilitated the study of its impact on behavior and thus its
implications for economic contexts, such as markets, wage setting, etc.
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causal responsibility for an event inversely depends on the necessary number of changes
to the actions of the other agents (and nature) to make the agent under consideration
pivotal for the event. A non-pivotal agent, who, given his action, could never be pivotal
for an event bears no ex post causal responsibility for the event. The ex ante causal re-
sponsibility component captures that, in the presence of nature, there can exist objective
uncertainty about the degree of ex post causal responsibility that follows from a given
action. Therefore, agents whose actions induce a higher expected level of ex post causal
responsibility for an event are attributed higher ex ante causal responsibility for the event.
The convex combination of ex post and ex ante causal responsibility can be interpreted as
follows: Placing weight on ex ante causal responsibility only can be understood as deonto-
logical responsibility attribution, whereas placing weight on ex post causal responsibility
only can be understood as consequentialist responsibility attribution. In most real-world
cases, agents are expected to place weight on both, deontological and consequentalist
motives.7
The model consists of a two-stage game with complete information. In the first stage,
several agents with standard preferences and potentially nature simultaneously choose
actions. The realized actions collectively implement a stage-1 event. In the second stage,
another agent, with “responsibility preferences”, evaluates the possible stage-1 events and
the stage-1 agents’ causal responsibility for them. He then has the opportunity to punish
or reward the stage-1 agents through an allocation decision.8 Intuitively, the stage-1
agents could be thought of as firms which decide whether to operate with a clean or a
dirty technology. The dirty technology is cheaper, but, if too many firms use it, it leads
to the destruction of the environment. Firms only intend to maximize their profits and
therefore don’t care about the destruction of the environment. However, another agent,
who can be thought of as a consumer, cares about the destruction of the environment and
evaluates it as a bad event. He observes the production choices of the firms and will, when
making his consumption decision, take their causal responsibility for the destruction of
the environment into account. In equilibrium, the firms rationally anticipate the e↵ects of
their actions on the reaction of the consumer and adopt their behavior accordingly. The
existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the environment is destroyed
depends on the number of firms that are operating in the market. If enough firms are
present, there exists an equilibrium in which all firms use the dirty technology and the
environment is destroyed. In this case causal responsibility is di↵used enough among
7In comparison with Chockler and Halpern’s notion of responsibility, my notion di↵ers in two impor-
tant aspects: First, I allow that ex post causal responsibility is also evaluated for hypothetical, unrealized
events, making it possible to assign responsibility for events that did not happen, but could have hap-
pened, given an agent’s action. Second, I allow objective uncertainty to play a role through its impact
on ex ante causal responsibility.
8Throughout, the paper adopts a positive approach to responsibility assessments, i.e. it seek to
understand and model how responsibility perceptions influence how people actually reward and punish
instead of studying how they should reward and punish.
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them such that the consumer’s negative reaction is outweighed by the fixed gain of lower
production costs.
In economics, the only other paper that I am aware of which provides a theoretic notion
of ex post responsibility allocation in a multi-agent context is the experimental study
of Bartling and Fischbacher (2012). Their measure attributes most responsibility for
an event to the agent whose action led to the largest increase in the probability that the
event is implemented compared to the ex ante belief of the agent evaluating responsibility,
which is assumed to be based on his belief about the average play in the game. My
approach di↵ers in several important aspects. First, their notion is not included in a
preference framework or a game-theoretic equilibrium concept. Hence, it doesn’t model
how responsibility perceptions enter the utility function and how such preferences might
play out in equilibrium. Second, it crucially depends on the beliefs of the agent who
evaluates responsibility. Those beliefs are assumed to concord with “average play”. If
average play is that an action is taken with certainty, as in a pure-strategy equilibrium, no
agent who takes that action is attributed any responsibility for the event, even if his action
is pivotal. Third, given the construction of their measure, the sum of responsibility cannot
exceed one, i.e. it is not possible to have multiple agents who are each fully responsible
for an event. Two agents who each increased the probability of an event happening to the
same extent each have responsibility 1/2, independent of whether they are both pivotal, or
not. Therefore, their measure is a di↵usion of responsibility measure (Darley and Latane´,
1968). Fourth, moves of nature are ignored, while my measure specifically recognizes the
role of nature in the formation of causal responsibility perceptions.
The theory of causal responsibility can also be compared to social preference theories,
some of which are able to make predictions for punishment and reward in scenarios as
the ones described above.9 For example, outcome-based social preference theories predict
that people engage in punishment and reward, when it can be used to decreases final
payo↵ inequalities (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). These theories
therefore predict punishment and reward independent of the responsibility of the agents.
Intention-based social preference theories, on the other hand, predict punishment and
reward as a way to reciprocate unkind with unkind and kind with kind behavior (Rabin,
1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). Players evaluate kindness by comparing the
9One concept that is related at first sight is Konow’s concept of distributional justice, which is based on
a notion of accountability (Konow, 1996, 2000, 2001). Konow asks the question of how to justly allocate
an endowment among the agents that produced it. He concludes that allocations should be driven by
the variables that the agents could control, but not by those they couldn’t control. For example, when
agents’ production depends on their e↵ort but also on their innate ability, a just distribution would
be proportional to the agents’ e↵orts, but not to their innate ability. The main distinguishing feature
compared to my concept is that I am not interested in finding a “just” distribution, but on how causal
reasoning influences actual behavior. While higher e↵ort can correlate with a higher degree of causal
responsibility, this is not necessarily the case.
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payo↵ that was given to them to a reference payo↵, often assumed to be the average be-
tween the highest and the lowest e cient payo↵ possible. Crucially, kindness evaluations
presuppose full causal responsibility, as only when one is pivotal could one have any in-
fluence on the final payo↵. Therefore these theories are unable to make sharp predictions
for punishment and reward when pivotality is not achieved, which oftentimes happens in
the type of group situations that I am most interested in.10
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the notion
of causal responsibility. Section 3 incorporates causal responsibility in a framework of
responsibility preferences and analyzes a simple example in order to distinguish the pre-
diction from other prominent theories. In Section 4, existing experimental evidence is
analyzed in light of the theory of responsibility preferences. Section 5 discusses some
caveats and lays out avenues for future research and Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The notion of causal responsibility
Before defining responsibility preferences and the game structure per se, this section for-
malizes the notion of causal responsibility in a simultaneous-move environment. The
framework is as follows: There is a finite set I of agents indexed by i 2 I = {0, 1, ..., n}
with nature being indexed as agent 0. Each agent i takes an action ai 2 Ai, where Ai is
the finite set of feasible actions of agent i. The set of feasible action profiles is denoted as
A =
Q
i2I Ai. Moves of nature follow an exogenously given probability distribution over
nature’s action space A0, denoted by !.
The realized action profile a = (a0, ..., an) determines the event x 2 X, where X is
the set of all possible events. The function f relates actions to events f : A ! X.
Oftentimes, events are binary: a reform is either implemented, or not; a team project
is either successful, or not; climate change happens, or not. Similarly, actions are often
binary choices: a senator votes for, or against a reform; e↵ort is provided, or not; a firm
decides to use dirty, or clean technology.
In the following, I firstly provide a measure of ex post causal responsibility, which is based
on the realized actions profile. Then, I provide a measure of ex ante causal responsibility,
which is based on nature’s probability distribution and the chosen actions. Overall causal
responsibility is finally defined as a convex combination of ex ante and ex post causal
responsibility.
10From a philosophical perspective, another way to distinguish intentionality from causal responsibility
is to ask whether the concept could also be applied to purely physical objects instead of people. While it
is natural to say an avalanche was causally responsible for the destruction of a village, it is not natural
to say that the avalanche’s intention was unkind.
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3.2.1 Ex post causal responsibility
An agent i’s ex post causal responsibility for an event x, captured by the function rEPi,x ,
is evaluated after the realized action profile a = (a0, ..., an) and the accompanying real-
ized event f(a) are observed. I model ex post causal responsibility after the intuition of
Chockler and Halpern (2004) who introduce a responsibility function in which responsi-
bility is inversely related to the minimum number of changes that have to be made in
a specific context in order to achieve pivotality. Therefore, I first introduce a function
that measures the “distance” that an agent’s action is away from being pivotal for the
realization of the event x, given the realized action profile a. This “distance” function
depends on the number of changes one has to make to the actions of the other agents and
nature in order to make the action of the agent under consideration pivotal for the event.
The “distance” measure is then used to construct the causal responsibility function.
In order to formally measure the “distance” of agent i’s action from being pivotal for
event x, I first define a set A˜(x, ai). This set comprises all action profiles a˜ 2 A for
which it holds that, if the other agents (including nature) play actions a˜ i, then agent
i’s action ai is pivotal for event x. Being pivotal means that there exists an alternative
action for agent i, a˜i, such that, if agent i would switch from ai to a˜i, event x would not be
implemented anymore. Formally, A˜(x, ai) = {a˜ 2 A | f(ai, a˜ i) = x and f(a˜i, a˜ i) 6= x}.
Next, I let c(y, z) be a function that counts the number of di↵erent entries in vectors y
and z. Hence, c(a˜, a) yields the number of actions in which the realized action profile a
di↵ers from an alternative action profile a˜.
Definition 1. The distance of agent i’s action ai from being pivotal for event x, di,x, is
defined as
di,x(a) =
8<:mina˜2A˜(x,ai) c(a˜, a) if A˜(x, ai) 6= ;1 if A˜(x, ai) = ;. (3.1)
Agent i’s distance from pivotality is defined to be infinite, if there exist no changes to the
other agents’ actions (including nature) that would make agent i’s action pivotal for the
event x. On the other hand, if there exist changes that would make his action pivotal,
then distance is defined as the minimum number of changes necessary in order to do so.
The minimum is bounded below by 1 because the change of action, from ai to a˜i, that
agent i has to make in order to change the event is accounted for as well. It is also
bounded above by |I|, the cardinality of set I. Hence, di,x : A! {1, 2, ..., |I|,1}.11
11The distance function, in this form, treats every change of action identically. I discuss potential
extensions to alternative formulations in section 3.5.
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The distance function is used to formulate an axiom, which relates distance from pivotality
to the ex post causal responsibility function, rEPi,x .
Axiom 1 (Monotonicity). For any two agents i 6= j 2 I, rEPi,x (a)   rEPj,x (a) if and only if
di,x(a)  dj,x(a).
The monotonicity axiom states that for any two agents, the agent with smaller distance
from pivotality for event x has a higher degree of ex post causal responsibility for event x.
Therefore, in the example from the introduction, two independently successful research
groups each bear less ex post causal responsibility for a scientific breakthrough than a
single successful research group. But they bear more ex post causal responsibility than
each of ten independently successful research groups. Any ex post causal responsibility
function that is decreasing in distance would satisfy this axiom. In order to increase
tractability, I define ex post causal responsibility to have a specific form, which has some
desirable properties in addition to satisfying the monotonicity axiom.
Definition 2. An agent i’s degree of ex post causal responsibility for event x 2 X, rEPi,x ,
is defined as
rEPi,x (a) =
1
di,x(a)
. (3.2)
Since distance can only take on discrete values, the ex post causal responsibility function is
discrete, rEPi,x : A! {0, 1|I| , 1|I| 1 , ..., 1}. Ex post causal responsibility values, however, are
easy to calculate and interpret. In the case of the research groups, one successful research
group has ex post causal responsibility of 1 for the event, two groups have ex post causal
responsibility of 12 , three of
1
3 , and so forth. Furthermore, the function possesses two
desirable properties, which, together, are unique to this function.12
First, since the distance, di,x(a), is bounded below by 1 (in this case, agent i is pivotal
for event x without any changes to the others’ actions), the monotonicity axiom leads to
the corollary that the ex post causal responsibility function, rEPi,x , achieves a maximum
if di,x(a) = 1. Furthermore, as the largest value di,x(a) can achieve is infinity, the ex
post causal responsibility function, rEPi,x , achieves a minimum if di,x(a) = 1. The ex
post causal responsibility function reflects these bounds and lets the lower and the upper
bound of ex post causal responsibility be 0 and 1. The scale from 0 to 1 has the advantage
that it is immediately interpretable as no (rEPi,x (a) = 0), partial (r
EP
i,x (a) 2 (0, 1)), and full
(rEPi,x (a) = 1) ex post causal responsibility.
12The function is therefore characterized by properties P.1 and P.2 (for a theorem and the proof, see
Appendix 3.A.1).
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Property 1 (Boundedness). For any agent i 2 I, rEPi,x (a) = 0 if and only if di,x(a) =1
and rEPi,x (a) = 1 if and only if di,x(a) = 1.
Second, the function also satisfies a proportionality property, which governs the relation-
ship between causal responsibility and distance from pivotality in between the bounds of
zero and one. It says that the proportion of ex post causal responsibility of any two agents
for an event x is inversely related to the proportion of their distance from pivotality for
that event. Hence, an agent whose distance from pivotality for an event is twice as big as
another agent’s, ceteris paribus, has half the ex post causal responsibility for that event.
Applied to the example, two independently successful research groups have half the ex
post causal responsibility for a scientific breakthrough than a single successful research
group and three independently successful groups have three times as much ex post causal
responsibility than nine independently successful groups.
Property 2 (Proportionality). For any two agents i 6= j 2 I, rEPi,x (a)
rEPj,x (a)
= dj,x(a)di,x(a) .
Of course, other possibilities than a fixed relative relationship between distance and ex
post causal responsibility are conceivable. For example, the e↵ect of distance on causal
responsibility could be decaying with distance such that doubling the distance halves
causal responsibility when distance is small but does not do so when distance is large.
Whether this fixed relationship holds is therefore an empirical question.
Importantly, the event under consideration, x, need not be equal to the realized event
f(a). Hence, the framework allows to evaluate ex post causal responsibility even for
hypothetical, i.e. unrealized events. Take the example of a person who decides about
shooting or not shooting a gun. If he shoots, he has a 50 percent probability of killing
another person. If he doesn’t shoot, nothing happens. Suppose he shoots and kills the
other person. In that case, he is pivotal and thus fully ex post causally responsible for
the killing. However, it is also natural to assign responsibility for events that could have
happened had nature chosen otherwise. Suppose he shoots, nature intervenes, and he
does not kill the other person. In that case, we would still assign partial ex post causal
responsibility to the person for the hypothetical event of killing the other person, for
which the person would have been pivotal had nature chosen di↵erently.
To illustrate the di↵erence between partial and no ex post causal responsibility, consider
the example of a team of workers that has the task to complete a project successfully.
If one worker decides to shirk, but his coworkers work hard and successfully finish the
project, the shirking worker has no ex post causal responsibility for the success of the
project, because, for no alternative actions of his coworkers, would his shirking be pivotal
for the success. On the other hand, he is partially ex post causally responsible for the
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hypothetical event that the project failed, because, if just enough other workers would
have also decided to shirk such that the project fails, his shirking would have been pivotal
for the failure.
Example
The following example demonstrates how ex post causal responsibility is evaluated in two
simple environments. In both environments, agent 1 can take actions u and d and agent
2 can take actions l and r.
The two environments are shown in Table 3.1. In the substitutes environment, event e1
is implemented whenever agent 1 chooses u or agent 2 chooses l, otherwise event e2 is
implemented. In the complements environment, event e1 is implemented whenever agent
1 chooses u and and agent 2 chooses l, otherwise event e2 is implemented.
l r
u e1 e1
d e1 e2
Substitutes environment
l r
u e1 e2
d e2 e2
Complements environment
Table 3.1: Two simple environments.
In the following, the ex post causal responsibility of agent 1 for event e1 is evaluated.13
The resulting ex post causal responsibility values are shown in Table 3.2.
In the substitutes environment, when agent 1 chooses u and agent 2 chooses r, i.e. the
realized action profile is (u, r), agent 1 is pivotal for event e1 and, thus, his ex post causal
responsibility for event e1 is rEP1,e1(u, r) = 1. In this case, agent 1 is said to bear full ex post
causal responsibility for event e1. If, on the other hand, the action profile (u, l) realizes,
then agent 1 is not pivotal for event e1. However, he would be, if agent 2 would change
his action. Thus, the distance from pivotality for agent 1 and event e1 is d1,e1(u, l) = 2
and rEP1,e1(u, l) =
1
2 . Then, agent 1 is said to bear partial ex post causal responsibility for
event e1. This is the case of the two independently successful research groups which each
find a cure for cancer. Next, consider agent 1 taking action d. In this case, agent 1 is
never pivotal for event e1 for any of agent 2’s possible actions. Hence, for both possible
realized action profiles the ex post causal responsibility of agent 1 for event e1 is zero,
13Note that, in principle, for every action profile, the evaluation of four di↵erent ex post causal respon-
sibility values is possible - one for each player-event combination.
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rEP1,e1(d, l) = r
EP
1,e1(d, r) = 0. Agent 1 is said to have no ex post causal responsibility for
event e1.
l r
u
e1
rEP1,e1(u, l) =
1
2
e1
rEP1,e1(u, r) = 1
d
e1
rEP1,e1(d, l) = 0
e2
rEP1,e1(d, r) = 0
Substitutes environment
l r
u
e1
rEP1,e1(u, l) = 1
e2
rEP1,e1(u, r) =
1
2
d
e2
rEP1,e1(d, l) = 0
e2
rEP1,e1(d, r) = 0
Complements environment
Table 3.2: Ex post causal responsibility in two simple environments.
Next, consider the complements environment. This environments highlights two addi-
tional features of ex post causal responsibility. First, it distinguishes the notion of ex
post causal responsibility from notions of di↵usion of responsibility that simply split re-
sponsibility among the involved agents (Latane´ and Darley, 1968). Consider the action
profile (u, l). In this case, agent 1, but also agent 2 are pivotal for event e1 and, thus,
both possess full ex post causal responsibility for the event. Ex post causal responsibility
is therefore not di↵used, if agents act as complements, but it is di↵used, if agents act
as substitutes. Second, the environment also captures how ex post causal responsibility
can be evaluated for hypothetical events. Consider the action profile (u, r). In this case,
event e2 is implemented. However, agent 1 nevertheless bears partial ex post causal re-
sponsibility for the unrealized event e1, for which his action would have been pivotal, if
agent 2 had played l instead of r. If agent 1 chooses action d, he bears no ex post causal
responsibility for event e1, similar to the substitutes environment.
3.2.2 Ex ante causal responsibility
While the notion ex post causal responsibility has many appealing features, it alone
cannot capture all intricacies that we expect to play a role for the overall assessment of
an agent’s causal responsibility for an event. In particular, one challenge arises which
makes it necessary to complement the notion of ex post causal responsibility with an ex
ante analysis. Namely, two agents can both be ex post causally responsible to the same
degree for an event even if, ex ante, their actions had vastly di↵erent probabilities to
reach the same level of ex post causal responsibility. For example, compare two agents
who each decide whether to shoot a gun or not. The only di↵erence being that if they
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shoot, the first agent has a 99 percent chance to kill an innocent bystander and the second
has a 1 percent chance to kill an innocent bystander. Suppose both agent shoot and a
bystander is killed in both cases. In this case, both agents would be attributed full ex
post causal responsibility for the death of the bystander even if, ex ante, their actions had
vastly di↵erent probabilities to reach that level of ex post causal responsibility. The ex
ante causal responsibility component handles such situations.
Let a 0 = (ai)i2I\{0}. An agent i’s ex ante causal responsibility for an event x is defined
as the expected level of ex post causal responsibility for that event, given the actions of all
agents (excluding nature) and nature’s exogenously given probability distribution, !.14
Definition 3. An agent i’s degree of ex ante causal responsibility for event x 2 X is
defined as
rEAi,x (a 0,!) = E![r
EP
i,x (a)]. (3.3)
The ex ante causal responsibility component thus captures the fact that, in the presence
of moves of nature, the agents’ chosen actions induce an explicit probability distribution
over ex post causal responsibility levels. Agents whose actions induce a higher level of
expected ex post causal responsibility bear a higher level of ex ante causal responsibility.
If there are no moves of nature, or, in other words, if nature’s action set is a singleton, ex
ante and ex post causal responsibility coincide.
Example
Consider an individual decision problem with risk in which an agent 1’s action space is
the choice of an integer from 0 to 9, a1 2 {0, ..., 9}. Simultaneously, a lottery also picks
an integer from 0 to 9 with 10 percent probability each. This probability distribution is
denoted by !. Event e1 is implemented if the sum of the chosen numbers is at least 10,
otherwise event e2 is implemented. Thus, the agent can implement event e2 alone, by
choosing 0, but to implement event e1, both, agent and lottery are needed.
What is the agent’s ex post and ex ante causal responsibility for event e1? First, the agent
bears full ex post causal responsibility for event e1 whenever it is implemented. This is
because the agent could always prohibit the implementation of event e1 by choosing 0.
If the agent chooses a positive integer, but the lottery chooses such that event e2 is
implemented, then the agent has a degree of ex post causal responsibility of 1/2 for the
hypothetical event e1. He bears no ex post causal responsibility for event e1, if he chooses
14I restrict ex ante causal responsibility to exclusively depend on randomness that is generated due to
moves of nature. The reasons for this restriction are elaborated on in the next section, when the notion
is introduced in a game-theoretic framework.
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0, as then he could not be pivotal for event e1 for any of the lottery’s possible picks.
rEP1,e1(a1, a0) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if a1 > 0 and a1 + a0   10
1
2 if a1 > 0 and a1 + a0 < 10
0 if a1 = 0
This example illustrates the shortcoming of a measure that is solely based on an ex post
notion of causal responsibility. The agent bears full ex post causal responsibility for event
e1 when he picks 1 and the lottery 9 and when he picks 9 and the lottery 1, even though
the ex ante probabilities of reaching such levels of ex post causal responsibility, given his
action, were very di↵erent.
The notion of ex ante causal responsibility captures just that. Let F0 be the cumulative
distribution function of the lottery. The ex ante causal responsibility of the agent for
event e1 is
rEA1,e1(a1,!) =
8<:(1  F0(10  a1)) · 1 + F0(10  a1) · 12 = a110 · 1 + (1  a110) · 12 if a1 > 00 if a1 = 0.
Ex ante causal responsibility of the agent for event e1 thus increases in the agent’s stated
integer value.
3.2.3 Overall causal responsibility
The two notions of ex ante and ex post causal responsibility are now combined as a convex
combination to yield a function of overall causal responsibility.
Definition 4. An agent i’s degree of overall causal responsibility for event x 2 X is
defined as
ri,x(a,!) = ↵ · rEAi,x (a 0,!) + (1  ↵) · rEPi,x (a) (3.4)
with ↵ 2 [0, 1].
The parameter ↵ is an individual-specific parameter of the agent who evaluates the causal
responsibility of agent i for event x. An agent with ↵ = 0 places value on ex ante causal
responsibility only, and might therefore be understood as an agent who is only driven
by deontological motives. An agent with ↵ = 1, on the other hand, only considers ex
post causal responsibility, and might be understood as an agent who is only driven by
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consequentialist motives. When ↵ 2 (0, 1) a combination of ex ante and ex post causal
responsibility is used. Oftentimes, this seems to be the most natural case. In the example
from above, ↵ 2 (0, 1) would mean that for the evaluation of causal responsibility for
killing another person by shooting a gun, it matters, both, whether a person was actually
killed (ex post causal responsibility) and with which probability a shot would result in the
death (ex ante causal responsibility). An appropriate experimental design is able to test
whether both factors play a role and allows the structural estimation of the parameter ↵.
An important feature of the notion is that it can potentially be included in di↵erent
preference frameworks and di↵erent strategic settings. Therefore, it should be understood
and used as a portable extension of existing models (PEEM) (Rabin, 2013). For example,
if one is interested in studying settings of distributive justice, then including the notion
of causal responsibility into a preference framework of inequity aversion can be used
to study how agents react di↵erently to inequality depending on how responsible they
were for it. On the other hand, a principle who wants to reward agents for the successful
implementation of a project can use causal responsibility to allocate a bonus in proportion
to the agents’ causal responsibility for the project. In the following, I will incorporate the
notion in a framework of responsibility preferences in which an agent has a preference to
reward and punish other agents for being causally responsible for events that he deems
bad or good.
3.3 Model
After having defined the notion of causal responsibility, it can now be used to study how
responsibility perceptions influence behavior. To this end, I incorporate evaluations of
causal responsibility into the utility function. Specifically, I assume that there exists an
agent with responsibility preferences. He observes the behavior of other agents and has a
taste, in addition to his taste for monetary payo↵, to reward or punish those other agents
for the implementation of what he judges as good or bad events, but only to the extent
those agents are causally responsible for them.
I analyze the behavioral implications of responsibility preferences in a two-stage game.
Stage-1, the collective action stage, is a simultaneous-move game in which a group of
agents, the stage-1 agents and, potentially, nature, simultaneously take actions. These
actions generate a stage-1 payo↵ for the stage-1 agents and, together, also result in an
event. The stage-1 agents have preferences over monetary payo↵ only. Another agent,
who is not involved in its implementation, cares about which event is implemented. For
example, the stage-1 agents could be thought of as a group of workers, each of whom
decides whether to work or to shirk. The workers only care to maximize their utility.
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The boss, on the other hand, cares about whether the group finishes a team project
successfully, or not (event).
In stage-2, the responsibility attribution stage, the a↵ected agent judges the possible events
in stage 1 and the stage-1 agents’ causal responsibility for them. He is assumed to possess
responsibility preferences and will therefore assign punishment and reward to the stage-1
agents in relation to their responsibility for what he judges as good or bad stage-1 events.
For example, the boss will want to reward and punish those workers that were causally
responsible for the success or failure of the team project.
3.3.1 Setup
Formally, the game is set up as follows:
Stage 1 - Collective action stage
In stage 1, each of a finite set of agents I = {0, 1, ..., n} simultaneously takes an actions
ai 2 Ai where Ai denotes agent i’s finite set of feasible actions. If present, nature is
denoted as agent 0. The set A =
Q
i2I Ai is the set of all feasible action profiles in stage
1 and a = (a0, ..., an) is an element of that set. A behavioral strategy of agent i in stage
1, denoted by  i, is a probability distribution over the agent’s action set Ai and nature’s
“strategy” ! is an exogenously given probability distribution with full support over A0,
which is common knowledge. The set of feasible strategies of agent i 2 I \ {0} is denoted
by ⌃i2I\{0} =  Ai2I\{0} and the set of feasible strategy profiles ⌃ =
Q
i2I\{0}⌃i.
The function ⇡Ii : A ! R links the stage-1 action profile to the monetary stage-1 payo↵
of each agent i 2 I \ {0}. Additionally, there exists an agent K 62 I, who is inactive
in stage 1, but will become active in stage 2. The function f : A ! X links the action
profile to the event x. Agent K cares about the event, which is captured by his stage-1
payo↵ function ⇡IK : X ! R.15 At the end of stage 1, the realized action profile a and
the resulting payo↵s are known to all agents. I denote the history of play after stage 1 by
h 2 H.
Stage 2 - Responsibility attribution stage
In stage 2, only agentK takes an action, which determines the stage-2 payo↵s. Specifically,
after each history h, agent K makes an allocation decision pi(h) 2 Pi for each stage-1
agent i 2 I\{0}, where Pi is the set of feasible, history-independent allocations for agent i.
Agent K’s action space at history h is thus P =
Q
i2I\{0} Pi and the n-dimensional vector
15Note that the restriction to a single stage-2 agent is for notational simplicity only and that ⇡IK is a
payo↵ expressed in monetary units which does not necessarily equal his monetary payo↵. For example,
agent K could also be a third party that cares about the payo↵ distribution between the stage-1 agents
and a second party.
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p(h) = [p1(h), ..., pn(h)] denotes an element of the set. A behavioral strategy for agent
K is a function  K that associates with every history h 2 H a probability distribution
 K(h) over P . The set of feasible strategies is ⌃K =  P .
The stage-2 monetary payo↵s after history h are denoted by the functions ⇡IIi : A⇥P ! R
for stage-1 agents i 2 I \{0} and ⇡IIK : A⇥P ! R for agent K. Let z 2 Z ⇢ H denote the
terminal history and Z the set of feasible terminal histories. Stage-1 agents are assumed
to possess monotonic preferences over monetary payo↵s only. Their stage utility is thus
uIi (a) = ⇡
I
i (a) and u
II
i (pi(h)) = ⇡
II
i (pi(h)). The function Ui : Z ! R denotes the utility
of agent i from the game as a whole, which is simply defined as the sum of his utilities in
the two stages (no discounting). The stage-1 agents choose strategies to maximize their
expected utility from the game as a whole, rationally anticipating the behavior of agent
K in stage 2.
3.3.2 Responsibility preferences
Agent K, on the other hand, is assumed to possess responsibility preferences. He observes
the actions of the agents in stage 1, the implemented event, and the resulting stage-1
payo↵s. He has a preference, in addition to his preference for monetary payo↵, to reward
or punish stage-1 agents for the implementation of what he judges as good or bad events
in stage-1, but only to the extent those agents are causally responsible for them. In the
following, I introduce the components of a utility function that represents such preferences.
I assume that agent K judges the possible stage-1 events x 2 X according to a judgment
function j : X ! R. Agent K can judge an event x as good (j(x) > 0), bad (j(x) < 0), or
neutral (j(x) = 0). Specifically, I assume that the judgment depends on the payo↵ that
an event generates for agent K in stage 1, ⇡IK(x), relative to a reference payo↵, ⇡¯
I
K(X),
which depends on the set of feasible payo↵s.16
Definition 5. Agent K’s judgment of event x is given by the judgment function j : X ! R
which is defined as
j(x) = ⇡IK(x)  ⇡¯IK(X) (3.5)
with ⇡¯IK(X) 2 [minx2X ⇡IK(x), maxx2X ⇡IK(x)].
Formulating the judgment function in relative terms has two appealing features. First,
when only two events are possible, they are judged neutrally only in case of indi↵erence,
when both generate the same payo↵. This captures the fact that we don’t reward two
16For example, a reference payo↵ equal to the average between the best and the worst possible payo↵,
⇡¯IK(X) = 0.5 · [minx2X ⇡IK(x) + maxx2X ⇡IK(x)] would be similar to intention-based social preference
models (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004).
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equally “good” or punish two equally “bad” events, when nothing else was possible.
Second, it provides an intuitive scale: The more an event’s payo↵ deviates from the
reference payo↵, the better or worse it is judged to be.17
AgentK then evaluates the causal responsibility, ri,x(a,!), of each of the stage-1 agents for
each possible event, as introduced in section 2. Note that, in this strategic setting, ex ante
causal responsibility could, in principle, depend on two types of uncertainty: objective
uncertainty, stemming from moves of nature, and subjective uncertainty, stemming from
the stage-1 agents’ behavioral strategies. Therefore, one might argue that agentK’s beliefs
about the behavioral strategies of the stage-1 agents should be accounted for in the ex
ante causal responsibility component instead of the realized stage-1 action profile. I follow
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s formulation
of dynamic psychological games and assume that agents play pure strategies only and that
behavioral strategies represent the frequencies with which pure strategies are chosen in a
population. Therefore, opposed to moves of nature, behavioral strategies do not induce
actual randomization in stage-1 and should not be accounted for in the ex ante causal
responsibility component (for similar arguments, see Sebald (2010) and Blanco, C¸elen,
and Schotter (2013)). Hence, after observing history h, agent K implicitly updates his
beliefs to concord with the actions that lead to history h. Since, in stage-2, only updated
beliefs enter the ex ante causal responsibility function, I abstain from modeling beliefs
and the updating process explicitly and directly replace them with the observed actions.
Given how agent K judges the stage-1 events and evaluates the agents’ causal respon-
sibility for them, agent K’s overall judgment of the behavior of agent i, given i’s ac-
tion, comprises the sum over the judgments of all possible events, weighted by agent
i’s causal responsibility for them,
P
x2X ri,x(a,!) · j(x). Similar to the judgment of
events, behavior can be judged as praiseworthy (
P
x2X ri,x(a,!) · j(x) > 0), blameworthy
(
P
x2X ri,x(a,!) · j(x) < 0), or neutral (
P
x2X ri,x(a,!) · j(x) = 0). Note that the overall
judgment of agent i’s behavior is sensitive to the reference payo↵, ⇡¯IK(X). Three points, in
particular, are worth highlighting: First, if the reference payo↵ is equal to the payo↵ of one
of the possible events, e.g., the event that generates the highest or lowest stage-1 payo↵ for
agent K, then that event is judged as neutral. Any level of causal responsibility for a neu-
tral event does not change the overall judgment of agent i’s behavior, as ri,x(a,!) · 0 = 0.
Second, an interior reference payo↵, ⇡¯IK(X) 2 (minx2X ⇡IK(x), maxx2X ⇡IK(x)), leads to
17The reference payo↵, ⇡¯IK(X), could be interpreted as an individual- and context-specific parameter
of agent K which can be identified with appropriate experimental methods. For example, the share given
to a recipient in a dictator game at which a third party switches from punishing to rewarding the dictator
can be interpreted as the neutral event that determines the reference payo↵ of the third party (Nikiforakis
and Mitchell, 2013). Any share above is interpreted as a good, and any share below is interpreted as a
bad event for that third party. This would capture the fact that individuals are heterogeneous in their
evaluation of events. Some have high reference points and judge any deviation as bad, and others have
low reference payo↵s and judge any deviation as good.
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some events being judged as bad (j(x) < 0) and others as good (j(x) > 0). The additive
nature of the overall judgment of behavior induces the important feature that causal re-
sponsibility for a bad event and simultaneous causal responsibility for a good event can
(partly) cancel each other out. For example, let j(e1) > 0 > j(e2) > j(e3). If agent i
is fully causally responsible for event e3, then agent K’s overall judgment of i’s behavior
will increase if i is also partially causally responsible for event e1, but decrease if he is also
partially causally responsible for event e2.18 However, the additive nature also implies
that the relative pattern of overall judgment can be sensitive to the reference payo↵. For
example, take an agent who is fully causally responsible for event e3 and, in addition,
partially causally responsible for event e2. Whether the partial causal responsibility for
event e2 increases or decreases the overall judgment of his behavior by agent K depends
on whether the reference payo↵ of K is lower or higher than the payo↵ of event e2, which
determines whether j(e2) > 0 or j(e2) < 0. This potential sensitivity of the overall judg-
ment to the reference payo↵ makes it imperative to discuss any assumption made on the
reference payo↵ and its potential impact on the analysis. It does not mean, however, that
there always exists a reference payo↵ that explains any findings and, thus, that the theory
is not falsifiable. In all examples discussed and all experiments analyzed in this paper,
the reference payo↵, as long as it is interior, has no influence on the comparative static
predictions of the theory.
Given agent K’s overall judgment of agent i’s behavior after history h, he chooses an
allocation, pi(h), for that agent accordingly. Agent K is said to punish agent i, if he
reduces his stage-2 payo↵ (pi(h) < 0), and he is said to reward agent i, if he increases his
stage-2 payo↵ (pi(h) > 0).19 We are now ready to define the stage-2 utility function of
agent K with responsibility preferences.
Definition 6. The stage-2 utility of agent K is a function uIIK : A ⇥ P ⇥ {!} ! R that
is defined as
uIIK (p(h), h,!) = ⇡
II
K (p(h)) + ⇢
X
i2I\{0}
"X
x2X
ri,x(a,!) · j(x)
#
· pi(h) (3.6)
The parameter ⇢   0 captures how much agent K cares about punishing or rewarding
the behavior of the stage-1 agents compared to monetary payo↵. To maximize his utility,
agent K will match the signs of the overall judgment of behavior of agent i and the
allocation to agent i. Therefore, an overall blameworthy (praiseworthy) behavior of agent
i is matched with punishment (reward) of agent i.
18See Section 3.4.2 for experimental evidence on this additive nature.
19The implicit reference allocation is therefore zero, the allocation that neither in- nor decreases agent
i’s payo↵. This is the natural allocation reference when thinking about punishment and reward.
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The overall utility of agent K is a function UK : Z ⇥ {!} ! R and thus depends on
the terminal history and nature’s “strategy” in stage 1. It is simply defined as the sum
of the payo↵s from stage 1 and 2 (no discounting). The game is thus specified as   =
(I [ K,A, P,!, (Ui)i2I\{0}, UK). Since this is a standard multi-stage game with moves
of nature, all standard equilibrium concepts apply and a subgame perfect equilibrium is
guaranteed to exist.
3.3.3 A simple example
In this section, I use a simple numerical example to demonstrate the implications of
responsibility preferences and the analysis of subgame perfect equilibria. Throughout
the analysis, for ease of exposition, I will focus on pure strategy equilibria only. In
the example, two politicians, I = {A,B}, vote in congress to enact a bill into law by
voting “yay” or “nay”, Ai = {y, n} 8 i 2 I. The bill is passed, S, if at least one of
them votes for it, and it fails, F , otherwise. Thus, the set of events is X = {S, F}.
If the bill passes, both politicians’ remuneration is raised, but at the expense of the
electorate, which is represented by agent K. Table 3.3 provides the stage-1 payo↵s of the
game. Note the game resembles the environments discussed in section 2: politicians act
as substitutes in implementing S and as complements in implementing F . At the end of
stage 1, the actions, the implemented event, and the resulting payo↵s are known to all
agents, matching a scenario in which politicians’ votes can be observed (e.g. votes of the
US congress).
y n
y (5, 5, 1) (5, 5, 1)
n (5, 5, 1) (3, 3, 5)
Table 3.3: Stage-1 payo↵s. The left, middle, and right number are agent A, B, and K’s
payo↵s.
In stage 2, after history h, agent K can choose an allocation pi(h) 2 [ 10, 10] for each of
the two politicians i 2 {A,B}, which might be interpreted as the electorate’s support in
the next election. The allocation choice for agent i induces his stage-2 payo↵ ⇡IIi (pi(h)) =
pi(h). The vector of allocation decisions, p(h) = [pA(h), pB(h)] induces the stage-2 payo↵
of agent K after history h, ⇡IIK (p(h)) =  
P
i2I
pi(h)2
2 . The convex cost function ensures
an interior solution and can be interpreted as the increasing marginal cost of opposing or
supporting a given politician.
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I assume that the reference payo↵ for the judgment of the law for agent K is ⇡¯IK(X) = 3,
the midpoint between the payo↵s he receives if the law passes or fails. Note that, with only
two possible events, the prediction for the qualitative allocation pattern is identical for
any interior reference payo↵ ⇡¯IK(X) 2 (⇡IK(S), ⇡IK(F )) . Agent K thus judges the failure
of the law as a good stage-1 event j(F ) = 5  3 = 2 > 0 and the passage as a bad stage-1
event j(S) = 1 3 =  2 < 0. Because there are no moves of nature involved, agent K will
judge the causal responsibility of the politicians only according to their chosen actions,
similar to Table 3.2. The first-order condition of utility maximization of agent K in stage
2 yields the best-response function of agent K after history h for politician A:
p⇤A(h) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
⇢ 1dA,S(y,y) j(S) = ⇢ · 12 · ( 2) =  ⇢ if h = (y, y)
⇢ 1dA,S(y,n) j(S) = ⇢ · 1 · ( 2) =  2 ⇢ if h = (y, n)
⇢ 1dA,F (n,y) j(F ) = ⇢ · 12 · 2 = ⇢ if h = (n, y)
⇢ 1dA,F (n,n) j(F ) = ⇢ · 1 · 2 = 2 ⇢ if h = (n, n)
The allocation for politician B is symmetric. Thus, responsibility preferences yield a clear
pattern of allocation decisions. For example, if ⇢ = 0.5, then p⇤A(y, n) =  1, p⇤A(y, y) =
 0.5, p⇤A(n, y) = 0.5, and p⇤A(n, n) = 1. In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the
politicians rationally anticipate the behavior of the electorate in stage 2 and maximize
their payo↵s from the game as a whole, which are presented in Table 3.4.
y n
y
5  ⇢
5  ⇢
5  2 ⇢
5 + ⇢
n
5 + ⇢
5  2 ⇢
3 + 2 ⇢
3 + 2 ⇢
Table 3.4: Overall payo↵s for agent A and B.
It is easy to see that playing (y, y) in stage 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium as, even
though (y, y) di↵uses causal responsibility among the two politicians, both have an incen-
tive to deviate and vote n in order to avoid being opposed, while still enjoying the high
payo↵ in stage 1. If ⇢  12 , there exist two subgame perfect equilibria in which exactly one
politician votes “yay”, one politician votes “nay” ((y, n) and (n, y)), the law passes and
the electorate allocates support and opposition according to p⇤i (h) . On the other hand, if
⇢ > 12 , then there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which both politicians
vote “nay” (n, n), the law fails to be passed, and the electorate allocates support and
opposition according to p⇤i (h).
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Hence, if the electorate does not care enough about allocating punishment and reward
for the passage or failure of the law, it will be implemented with just enough votes as
necessary. If, however, the electorate cares enough, the law will not be implemented as
the opposition a politician incites by implementing the law is enough to deter him from
voting for it. Generalized to more than two politicians, the results remain the same.
In equilibrium, such a law is either implemented with the smallest majority necessary,
or, if it is not implemented, everyone votes against it. This tracks nicely the anecdotal
evidence which suggests that political parties often have problems motivating their own
members to vote for a particular issues because the party members fear they will be held
responsible in their constituency. In fact, there even exists an o cial position, the “party
whip”, whose task is to find majorities and ensure party discipline in legislative voting.
One example for such equilibria in the real world is Germany’s politicians’ stance on
nuclear energy. For some time, there was a small majority in parliament that was in favor
of nuclear energy ((y, n) equilibrium) . After Fukushima, public awareness increased (⇢
increased), and the parliament voted for Germany’s exit from nuclear energy. Since then,
no politician openly argues in favor of nuclear energy ((n, n) equilibrium).
3.3.4 Comparison with alternative theories
At this point, it is instructive to discuss the predictions of other preference frameworks.
Certainly, a new theory is only of interest if it makes distinctively di↵erent predictions
than other, competing theories, in situations in which the predictions of the established
theories seem to go wrong. In the following, I will discuss the predictions of other theories
for the simple example introduced above.
Standard preferences
The workhorse model of standard preferences assumes that agents act in order to maximize
their monetary payo↵. If this is the case, agent K would never deviate from the allocation
pi(h) = 0 after any history h as doing so is costly. In stage 1, the two agents rationally
anticipate that they will neither get punished nor rewarded in stage 2. Therefore, (n, n)
is never played in equilibrium in stage 1 and the law always passes. In stage 1, the action
profiles (y, y), (y, n), and (n, y) can all be part of an SPNE . Hence, in comparison to
responsibility preferences, standard preferences predict neither punishment nor reward,
the law is always passed and also (y, y) is part of an equilibrium.
Outcome-based social preference model
Models of outcome-based social preferences allow concerns about the payo↵ distribution to
enter the utility function. For example, the two prominent theories by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that agents have an aversion against
53
final payo↵ inequalities. If agent K possesses outcome-based social preferences in the
formulation of Fehr and Schmidt, he chooses pi(h) to maximize his utility from the game
which is given by
UK(h,p(h)) = ⇡
I
K(h) 
X
i2I
pi(h)2
2
  ↵
X
i2I
max[(⇡Ii (h) + pi(h))  (⇡IK(h) 
X
i2I
pi(h)2
2
), 0]
   
X
i2I
max[(⇡IK(h) 
X
i2I
pi(h)2
2
)  (⇡Ii (h) + pi(h)), 0]
The parameters ↵ >     0 measure how much agent K cares about advantageous ( )
and disadvantageous (↵) inequality. Agent K uses punishment and reward to reduce
payo↵ inequalities between him and the stage-1 agents. Therefore, he will punish both
politicians if the law is passed and reward both politicians if the law fails, but never
more as to achieve payo↵ equality. In case of an interior solution (agent K would not
punishment or reward more than to achieve equality of payo↵s), agent K allocates after
history h according to
p⇤i (h) =
8<:   ↵(1+↵) if h 2 {(y, y), (y, n), (n, y)} 
(1  ) if h = (n, n)
Importantly, punishment and reward only depend on the payo↵s that were implemented
in stage 1 and are independent of the stage-1 actions that led to those payo↵. Therefore,
if the law is passed, agent K will punish agent A and B equally, independent of whether
only one or both of them voted “yay”. Similarly, when the law fails, reward will be equal
for both stage-1 agents. Note that (y, y) is always sustained as part of a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. This is because any deviation of one of the stage-1 agents would not
alter his payo↵. The law would still be passed and punishment in stage-2 would still
be the same. Whether (n, y) and (y, n), or (n, n) are part of a SPNE depends on the
specific parameters. Thus, the two important di↵erences to the responsibility preference
framework are that a) the two stage-1 agents are always punished and rewarded equally,
only depending on which event is implemented and b) (y, y) is always sustained as a
SPNE.
Intention-based social preferences
Another class of social preferences focuses on intention-driven reciprocity. The key as-
sumption of these models is that kind behavior is reciprocated with kind behavior and
that unkind behavior is reciprocated with unkind behavior (Rabin, 1993). Given the
sequential nature of the example, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) is applicable.
As before, I assume that stage-1 agents act only to maximize their material payo↵. Fur-
thermore, I assume that agent K evaluates the kindness of agent A and B only based on
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his stage-1 payo↵, and that therefore any alterations of his payo↵ due to the costs he bears
for punishment and reward in stage 2 do not influence his evaluation of kindness. Then,
agent K perceives agent A’s action as kind (unkind) if K believes that A believes that
his action grants K a higher (lower) payo↵ than certain reference payo↵. The reference
payo↵ is assumed to be the average of the lowest and the highest e cient payo↵ that A
could give K, according to his beliefs about agent K and agent B’s strategy.
Agent K will punish (reward) a stage-1 agent, if that agent granted him a payo↵ that is
lower (higher) than the reference payo↵. The allocation predictions for agent A are as
follows: If agent B votes “yay”, then the bill is passed independently of agent A’s vote.
Hence, in this case, agent A cannot influence agent K’s payo↵ and no matter whether he
votes “yay” or “nay” his action is judged as neither kind nor unkind and will therefore
neither incite punishment nor reward in stage 2. On the other hand, if agent B votes
“nay”, then agent B can influence whether the bill is passed or not and therefore the
payo↵ of agent K in stage 1. As, in this case, voting “nay” would grant agent K a higher
payo↵ than voting “yay”, voting “yay” is interpreted as an unkind action and voting
“nay” is interpreted as a kind action. Therefore, in stage 2, agent K will reward agent
A for voting “nay” and punish agent A for voting “yay”. The allocation predictions for
agent B are symmetric.
Anticipating the best-response of agent K in stage 2, in stage 1, playing (y, y) is always
sustained as part of a SPNE because deviating neither changes stage-1 payo↵s nor agent
K’s perception of one’s kindness. Additionally, depending on how much agent K cares
about reciprocation (⇢ > 0), either (n, n) or (n, y) and (y, n) are possible as part of an
equilibrium. Thus, the main di↵erence to responsibility preferences is that intention-based
social preferences make no di↵erentiated allocation predictions once an agent’s action is
not pivotal and thus is not fully causally responsible. Therefore, intention-based models
fail to explain many situations that are of interest in group decision making.
Model / History (y, y) (y, n) (n, y) (n, n)
Standard 0 0 0 0
Causal responsibility  ⇢  2 ⇢ +⇢ +2 ⇢
Inequity aversion   ↵(1+↵)   ↵(1+↵)   ↵(1+↵) +  (1  )
Reciprocity 0  ⇢ 0 +⇢
Table 3.5: AgentK’s optimal allocation to agent A under di↵erent preference frameworks.
Table 3.5 summarizes the predictions of the di↵erent preference models for the allocation
decision of agent K in stage 2 after all possible histories. It shows that the responsibility-
based preference model makes distinctive predictions compared to the other theories.
Interestingly, responsibility-based preference-theory is the only theory that does not sup-
port (y, y) as part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, which, intuitively, makes sense.
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By deviating from (y, y) an agent’s stage-1 payo↵ is kept constant, but he can hope to
get a higher payo↵ in stage-2. In the responsibility framework, such a higher payo↵ is
generated, because, by deviating in stage-1, an agent can shed himself from being causally
responsible for the event that agent K dislikes.
3.3.5 The e↵ects of causal responsibility attribution in two com-
mon environments
While the last section served to demonstrate the workings of causal responsibility-based
preferences and the di↵erences to other theories in a simple numerical example, this section
goes a step further and analyzes how causal responsibility attribution a↵ects equilibrium
outcomes in more generalized environments. Specifically, I analyze two environments in
which everything is identical but the payo↵ structure of the stage-1 agents in stage 1.
In the first environment, the private gains environment, stage-1 agents can choose between
two actions. One leads to a private benefit, but, if enough stage-1 agents take it, an event
occurs that is detrimental to agentK. Thus, this is an environment with private gains and
a potential negative externality. For example, one can think of workers who derive private
gain from shirking, firms that can increase their profit by choosing a dirty technology, or
airplane passengers that gain from taking the plane. If enough workers shirk, the project
fails, if enough firms use the dirty technology, the environment is destroyed, and if enough
passengers book a flight, the plane flies and creates CO2 emmisions. Each of these events
is judged as bad by the stage-2 agent, who can be thought of as a boss who dislikes the
failure of the team-project, a consumer who dislikes destruction of the environment, or
society, which dislikes climate change.
In the second environment, the collective gains environment, stage-1 agents again choose
between two actions. The only di↵erence is that, in this environment, a certain number
of stage-1 agents has to take an action in order to create a benefit for all stage-1 agents.
Again, if enough of them take the action, an event is triggered that is detrimental to
agent K. For example, one could think of politicians who can only implement a reform
that benefits themselves at the cost of the taxpayer if enough of them vote for it, or
of firms which can only form a cartel if enough of them participate, but, if the cartel
is established, the higher price benefits all firms. Agent K can be thought of as the
electorate, that doesn’t like if politicians enrich themselves, or of consumers that have to
pay higher prices.20
20The collective gains environment is thus a generalization of the simple numerical example in the last
section.
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The formal setup is as follows: In both environments, the set of stage-1 agents, I, is
indexed by i 2 {1, ..., n}, nature is not present, and an agent K 62 I acts only in stage
2. The stage-1 agents’ identical action sets consists of two actions, Ai = {a, a} 8 i 2 I.
The stage-1 actions induce one of two possible events, X = {e, e}. The function f , which
governs which event is implemented, is defined as
f(a) =
8<:e if
P
i2I 1(ai = a)   t
e if
P
i2I 1(ai = a) < t
(3.7)
where n > t > 0 and 1(ai = a) = 1 if ai = a and zero otherwise. Thus, when at least t
stage-1 agents choose action a, event e is implemented.
In stage 1, agent K gets a strictly higher payo↵, if event e is implemented, ⇡IK(e) > ⇡
I
K(e).
The payo↵s of the stage-1 agents, however, depend on the specific environment. In the
private gains environment, their stage-1 payo↵ only depends on their individual action
and their payo↵ is higher, if they take action a, ⇡Ii (a) > ⇡
I
i (a) 8 i 2 I. Thus, the agents
privately benefit from taking a, but if at least t of them do so, event e, which hurts agent
K, is implemented. In the collective gains environment, on the other hand, all stage-1
agents get a higher payo↵ only if enough of them take action a to implement event e.
Thus, ⇡Ii (e) > ⇡
I
i (e) 8 i 2 I.
At the end of stage 1, agentK observes the actions that were taken and the event f(a) that
was implemented. In stage 2, after history h, agentK chooses an allocation for each stage-
1 agent, pi(h) 2 [p, p] 8 i 2 I, with p > 0 > p. The allocation choice for agent i induces
agent i’s stage-2 payo↵ ⇡IIi (pi(h)) = pi(h), which simply equals the allocation. Agent K’s
stage-2 payo↵ is determined by his allocation decisions. Specifically, he is assumed to face
convex allocation costs, such that his stage-2 payo↵ equals ⇡IIK (p(h)) =  c
P
i2I
pi(h)2
2 ,
where c > 0 is a cost parameter.
We can solve both games for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria by applying backward
induction. As event e grants him a higher stage-1 payo↵ than event e, agent K judges
event e as better than event e, j(e) > j(e). This holds independent of the reference point.
Importantly, a stage-1 agent who chooses a has positive causal responsibility for event e
only and an agent who chooses a has positive causal responsibility for event e only. Under
the assumption that agent K possesses responsibility preferences represented by a utility
function of the form of equation 3.6, solving for the optimal allocation policy after history
h yields
p⇤i (h) =
8<:
⇢
c
1
di,e(a,a i) j(e) if ai = a
⇢
c
1
di,e(a,a i)
j(e) if ai = a
8 i 2 I (3.8)
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Note that this best-response function is independent of the specific environment.21 It can
therefore always be used for the analysis of causal responsibility attribution in environ-
ments with binary events and binary actions. In stage 1, the stage-1 agents rationally
anticipate the optimal allocation policy and choose their strategies in order to maximize
their expected payo↵ from the whole game (no discounting). In the following, I discuss the
di↵erent equilibrium predictions in the private gains and the collective gains environment.
Proposition 1 (Private gains environment).
(1) Suppose ⇢ < c·⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)j(e) j(e) . Then there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in which all stage-1 agents choose action a, event e is implemented, and agent K allocates
according to equation (3.8).
(2) Suppose ⇢   c · ⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)j(e) j(e) . Then there exists an integer m   1 for which it holds
that:22
i) If t m > 0, then there exists a SPNE in which t m stage-1 agents choose action a,
n (t m) choose action a, event e is implemented, and agent K allocates according
to equation (3.8).
ii) If t m  0, then there exists a SPNE in which all stage-1 agents choose action a,
event e is implemented, and agent K allocates according to equation (3.8).
iii) If t+m  2 < n, then there exists a SPNE in which all stage-1 agents choose action
a, event e is implemented, and agent K allocates according to equation (3.8).
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
The intuition behind the first part of the proposition is that if agent K does not care
enough about the stage-1 agents behavior to deter them from taking a when doing so
makes them fully causally responsible for event e, then they will not be deterred for any
level of causal responsibility for event e and, in equilibrium, all stage-1 agents take a. In
this case, the behavior of stage-1 agents in equilibrium coincides with that of the SPNE
with standard preferences for which agent K would never engage in costly allocation
decisions and all stage-1 agents take action a.
Second, when agent K cares enough to deter taking a when it leads to full causal respon-
sibility for e, multiple equilibria are possible. The farther away from t is the number of
21Throughout this section I assume that the interval of possible allocations for i, [p, p], is large enough
such that equation 3.8 yields an interior solution.
22The threshold number m depends on the cost of punishment, c, the preference parameter, ⇢, the
di↵erence in stage-1 payo↵s, ⇡Ii (a)   ⇡Ii (a), and the di↵erence in judgment, j(e)   j(e). For notational
simplicity, I omit these variables when writing m.
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stage-1 agents that take a (in both directions), the smaller is their causal responsibility for
event e and, hence, the smaller is the relative gain in stage 2 that could be generated by
playing a instead of a. At the same time, the di↵erence in stage-1 payo↵s, ⇡Ii (a)  ⇡Ii (a),
is fixed. Therefore, there exists a threshold number of moves away from t, denoted by m,
for which it holds that, if (t   m) agents take a then an agents who takes a would not
want to deviate, but if (t m  1) agents take a, he would want to deviate and also take
a. If exactly t   m agents take a, no stage-1 agent has an incentive to deviate, which
constitutes an equilibrium. Similarly, if t +m   2 stage-1 agents take a, then any agent
who takes a has no incentive to deviate, but if t+m 1 agents take a, causal responsibility
is di↵used enough such that any agent who takes a has an incentive to deviate and take
a. Therefore, if t+m  2 < n, there exists an equilibrium in which all stage-1 agents take
a.23
t"0" n"t+m'2"
EQM" EQM"
t'm"
Figure 3.1: Private gains environment. The line shows the number of stage-1 agents that
choose a, the condition for event e, t, the total number of stage-1 agents, n, the threshold
number m, and the SPNE for the case that 0 < t m and t+m  2 < n. Arrows to the
right (left) indicate that, for this number of agents who take a, any agent who takes a (a)
would want to deviate.
The case in which t  m > 0 and n > t +m   2 is presented in Figure 3.1. Intuitively,
if less than t   m agents take a, the degree of causal responsibility for event e is low
enough such that it is profitable to take a. With every additional agent who takes a
causal responsibility rises until, when t   m agents take a, any additional agent would
increase causal responsibility high enough to deter taking a. In the interval from t  m
to t+m  2, taking a gives a higher overall profit than taking a. However, if more than
t +m   2 agents take a, causal responsibility is low enough again such that taking a is
more profitable.
The following corollary describes the relationship of the threshold number m with the
variables of the environment.
Corollary 1 (Private gains environment).
The threshold number m is
i) increasing in the preference parameter ⇢.
23The reason for t m in the case of the lower bound and t+m 2 in the case of the upper bound is that
both yield the same distance from pivotality for event e, (t 1) (t m) = m 1 and (t+m 2) (t 1) =
m  1.
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ii) decreasing in the cost of punishment, c.
iii) increasing in the di↵erence in judgments of the two events, j(e)  j(e).
iv) decreasing in the di↵erence in stage-1 payo↵s of the stage-1 agents, ⇡Ii (a)  ⇡Ii (a).
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
These parameters thus influence the number of agents who take action a in the “t m”-
equilibrium. For example, the smaller is agent K’s di↵erence in judgment of the two
events (reflected by j(e) j(e)), the more agents will take a. Intuitively, the less a manager
cares about the success of a project compared to its failure, the more workers will allow
themselves to shirk, but not enough to really make the project fail. The parameter also
influence whether an equilibrium in which everyone takes a exists. If t + m   2   n,
then there never exists an equilibrium in which everyone takes a and e is implemented.
Therefore, the existence depends on the di↵erence n  t and the variables that determine
m.
In the collective gains environment, equilibrium predictions di↵er substantially. Specifi-
cally, there always exists an equilibrium in which all stage-1 agents take action a and event
e is implemented. Furthermore, if e is implemented in equilibrium, it is only implemented
by the smallest number of agents necessary.
Proposition 2 (Collective gains environment).
(1) Suppose ⇢ > c·⇡Ii (e) ⇡Ii (e)j(e) j(e) . Then there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in which all stage-1 agents choose action a, event e is implemented, and agent K allocates
according to equation 3.8.
(2) Suppose ⇢  c · ⇡Ii (e) ⇡Ii (e)j(e) j(e) . Then there exist two subgame perfect Nash equilibria. One
in which all stage-1 agents choose action a, event e is implemented, and agent K allocates
according to equation 3.8. And another one, in which t agents choose action a, event e is
implemented, and agent K allocates according to equation (3.8).
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
The case in which condition (2) of Proposition 2 holds is shown in Figure 3.2. The
intuition goes as follows: Assume all agents take a and event e is implemented. In this
case, each agent has an incentive to deviate. By deviating he can still enjoy the higher
stage-1 payo↵ while increasing his stage-2 payo↵. Causal-responsibility attribution, in
this case, induces the classic free-rider problem. Other theories do not do so as they
don’t predict di↵erential allocation decisions as soon as more than t agents take action a.
This reasoning holds until exactly t agents take a. These t agents are all fully causally
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Figure 3.2: Collective gains environment: The line shows the number of stage-1 agents
that choose a, the condition for event e, t, the total number of stage-1 agents, n, and the
SPNE if part (2) of Proposition 2 holds. Arrows to the right (left) indicate that, for this
number of agents who take a, any agent who takes a (a) would want to deviate.
responsible for event e. Any additional agent who switches to taking a will induce a lower
stage-1 payo↵ for himself and all other stage-1 agents. Therefore, if agent K’s allocation
decision is not deterrent in the case of full causal responsibility for event e (part (1) of
Proposition 2), then an equilibrium exists in which exactly t agents take a. If less than
t agents take a, then there exists again an incentive to deviate to a as doing so does not
influence the payo↵ in stage-1 but increases the payo↵ in stage-2, such that, in a second
equilibrium, all agents take a.
To summarize, the analysis has shown that variations in the stage-1 environment can lead
to very di↵erent equilibrium predictions under the causal responsibility framework. Two
features stand out.
First, if e is implemented in equilibrium, then all n agents take action a in the private
gains environment, while only the minimal necessary number, t, take a in the collective
gains environment. Therefore, in equilibrium, causal responsibility is maximally di↵used
among all agents in the former environment, while it is fully focused on the t agents that
take a in the latter environment. On the other hand, if e is implemented in equilibrium,
then there might still be some agents who take a in the private gains environment but no
agent takes a in the collective gains environment.
Second, the conditions for which e is implemented in equilibrium di↵er among the two
environments. In the collective gains environment, e is only implemented in equilibrium,
if ⇢  c · ⇡Ii (e) ⇡Ii (e)j(e) j(e) , whereas, in the private gains environment, e is implemented in
equilibrium, if ⇢  (1+n  t) · c · ⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)j(e) j(e) . Hence, if ⇡Ii (e) ⇡Ii (e) = ⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a), then
the condition for the existence of an equilibrium in which e is implemented is weaker in
the private gains environment than in the collective gains environment (as 1+n  t > 1).
This is because causal responsibility is fully di↵used in the private gains environment,
whereas di↵usion of responsibility is prevented by the free-riding problem in the collective
gains environment. Furthermore, the existence of the equilibrium depends on the total
number of agents, n, in the private gains environment. Only if n is large enough is
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causal responsibility for event e di↵used enough to allow an equilibrium. The number for
which this is the case can be interpreted as a critical mass of agents that results in such
herding behavior. In the collective gains environment, on the other hand, the existence
is independent of the total number of agents.
These equilibrium predictions seem to coincide with what is observed in reality. In col-
lective gain environments, critical reforms are often implemented in parliament with only
a small majority by the ruling party and the existence of cartels often crucially depend
on each member. Even though all politicians might benefit from the implementation of
a reform and all firms in an industry benefit from the higher prices caused by a cartel,
blame and punishment is nevertheless only attributed to those who induced the events. In
private gain environments, introspection suggests that the larger is the di↵erence between
n and t, i.e. the number of agents in the environment and the threshold level necessary
to induce a certain event, the more likely it is that, in equilibrium, every agent takes the
blameworthy action and the bad event is implemented. For example, flying is a widely
enjoyed and few spend time thinking about their causal responsibility for the occurring
emissions. This might be because the number of persons is far away enough from the
number necessary for a plane to fly such that the equilibrium in which everyone takes
advantage of flying exists. When people are fully causally responsible for emissions, for
example, when driving a car, they are much more aware of their full causal responsibility
and therefore hesitate more to cause the same amount of emissions.
3.4 Experimental evidence
While section 3.3.4 demonstrated that the theory of causal responsibility makes pre-
dictions distinctively di↵erent from prominent existing theories, such distinctiveness is
certainly only desirable if it allows the explanation of data that cannot be explained by
existing theories. While there exists no experimental study that was specifically designed
to test the predictions of causal responsibility theory against other theories, in this section,
I discuss experimental evidence from a range of existing studies. Each of these studies
can be interpreted as a test of a separate aspect of the causal responsibility model. In the
following, I focus on the di↵erent predictions for the allocation decision of agent K and
abstain from full scale equilibrium analyses.
The key requirements to qualify for analysis are that the experiment i) consists of two
stages: one stage in which potentially multiple agents and nature simultaneously choose
actions that implement some stage-1 payo↵s and another stage in which an agent inde-
pendently decides about an allocation decision which influences the stage-2 payo↵s, and
ii) that actions and the associated payo↵s are observable after stage 1. One challenge that
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comes with interpreting existing experimental designs in light of responsibility theory is
that the set of stage-1 events, X, is seldom explicitly modeled. However, in many cases,
there are obvious candidates for such underlying events or it is possible to deduce them
from the set of monetary stage-1 payo↵s. For expositional ease, I assume that agent K
faces a convex allocation cost function, which ensures an interior solution can exist.
3.4.1 The e↵ect of moves of nature on causal responsibility
First, I will test the assumption that di↵erences in ex post causal responsibility can be
driven by nature’s actions. To this end, I will turn to the study by Gurdal, Miller, and
Rustichini (2013). In their experiment, a stage-1 agent A chooses between a risky and a
safe asset, AA = {r, s}, that determines the stage-1 payo↵ of an agent K. The safe asset
gives agent K a certain payo↵ of ⇡c and the risky asset gives agent K a payo↵ of ⇡h > ⇡c,
if nature chooses h, and a payo↵ of ⇡l < ⇡c, if nature chooses l. At the end of stage 1,
agent K learns the choice of agent A, his payo↵ from stage 1 and, importantly, nature’s
choice, independent of whether agent A chose the safe or the risky asset. Agent A has
a payo↵ of zero in stage 1. The experiment varies the payo↵s of the two assets and the
probability with which the lottery chooses h and l. Table 3.6 summarizes stage 1.
h (p) l (1  p)
r ⇡h ⇡l
s ⇡c ⇡c
Table 3.6: Stage-1 environment.
In the second stage, agent K has some money-equivalent points to distribute, at no cost
to himself, between agent A and another agent B, who was not involved in stage-1. Agent
K cannot keep the points for himself, but can refrain from distributing them. I denote
the payo↵ that is given to agent A in stage 2 after history h as pA(h).
The authors find that the allocation to A is significantly higher when A chooses the risky
asset and the lottery selects h than if he chooses the risky asset and the lottery selects
l, thus pA(r, h) > pA(r, l). This result cannot be explained by a theory of reciprocity,
as the perceived kindness of A should only depends on his action and not on the action
of the lottery. Furthermore, also outcome-based social preference theories have di culty
explaining the result, as agent K typically distributed all points. Thus, any allocation
that decreased the payo↵ inequality between K and A, increased the payo↵ inequality
between K and B.
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Causal responsibility-based preferences, however, have no di culty explaining this finding.
First, there are three natural candidates for events in stage 1, namely the realizations of
⇡h, ⇡l, and ⇡c. For any reference payo↵, the agent K judges the events in the order of
the monetary payo↵ that they grant him, j(⇡h) > j(⇡c) > j(⇡l). Second, agent A always
bears full ex post causal responsibility for the event that is implemented in stage 1 as
he could have changed it by changing his action.24 Thus, the theory predicts that the
allocation to agent A is higher when A chooses r and the lottery chooses h than if A
chooses r and the lottery chooses l, because agent K holds A responsible for a good and
a bad result in stage-1.
The authors also find that pA(s, h) < pA(s, l), i.e. agent K gave more to agent A when he
chose the safe asset and the lottery chose l than when he chose the safe asset and the lottery
chose h. However, the e↵ect was much smaller in size and in many configurations not
significant. Again, this result cannot be explained by traditional theories of reciprocity or
inequity aversion. In this case, also a theory of responsibility preferences has di culties
explaining the result, because both, the judgment of the event as well as the causal
responsibility level of agent A is identical for the two payo↵s.25
3.4.2 The e↵ects of causal responsibility for unrealized events
In section 3.4.1, an agent A who chooses the risky asset was fully ex post causally re-
sponsible for the actually implemented event and partially causally responsible for the
hypothetical event that would have been implemented had the lottery chosen di↵erently.
However, this did not change the predictions for the allocation decision and was therefore
neglected in the discussion. Now, I will turn to evidence that suggests that causal re-
sponsibility for a hypothetical event does, in fact, influence allocation decisions. This can
be the case, for example, when a stage-1 agent bears full ex post causal responsibility for
a realized good and partial ex post causal responsibility for an unrealized bad event. In
this case, he will receive a lower allocation compared to an agent who bears full ex post
causal responsibility for the good event only and the reason for this lies in the additive
nature of the overall judgment of the agent’s behavior. Furthermore, in the presence of
a lottery, unrealized events can also matter for overall judgment of an agent’s behavior
through their impact on ex ante causal responsibility.
24Note that if A chooses r, he is also partially ex post causally responsible for the payo↵ that didn’t
realize. We will ignore this as well as the ex ante causal responsibility evaluation, for now, because it
does not change the relevant predictions.
25However, an extended model of causal responsibility could not only incorporate causal responsibility
for the implementation of an event, but also incorporate causal responsibility for the prevention of an
event. Such an extension could explain why the allocation is lower after (s, h) - choosing the safe option
makes agent A fully ex post causally responsible for the prevention of the best event - and higher after
(s, l) - choosing the safe option makes agent A fully ex post causally responsible for the prevention of the
worst event.
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An experiment that allows to examine such situations is the study by Bartling, Engl,
and Weber (2014). In the experiment, a dictator chooses between two possible actions,
AD = {u, d}, under two possible states of the world, A0 = {l, r}. The state of the world is
chosen by nature with equal probability and determines whether an action, which benefits
the dictator, benefits or harms the recipient. While, in the baseline, the state of the world
was known to the dictator, in the treatment, the dictator was initially ignorant about
the state of the world, but could reveal it at no cost. Conforming to the responsibility
framework, I interpret the state of the world as the action of nature. Table 3.7 summarizes
the payo↵s for the dictator and the recipient for the cases in which the dictator is informed
or not informed about the state of the world. It is plausible to assume that the four
possible payo↵ allocations between the dictator and the recipient mirror four possible
events: an unfair (e1), a fair (e2), a dominant (e3), and a dominated (e4) event. A third
party observes the actions of the dictator and the state of the world and decides whether
and to what extent to punish the dictator.
l
u
e1
(70, 10)
d
e2
(50, 50)
r
u
e3
(70, 50)
d
e4
(50, 10)
l (0.5) r (0.5)
u
e1
(70, 10)
e3
(70, 50)
d
e2
(50, 50)
e4
(50, 10)
Table 3.7: Payo↵s of the dictator and the recipient. Left and middle panel: Dictator is
informed about the state of the world. Right panel: Dictator is not informed about the
state of the world.
What are the predictions for allocations if the third party allocates according to the causal
responsibility motive? First, under the assumption that the third party judges the events
in the same way as the recipient, and with an interior reference payo↵, he will judge event
e1 and e4 as bad and event e2 and e3 as good, thus j(e2) > 0 > j(e1) and j(e3) > 0 >
j(e4).26 Second, he evaluates the dictator’s causal responsibility for the respective events
according to Table 3.8. If the dictator is informed about the state of the world, he is fully
causally responsible for whatever event he implements as his action is always pivotal and
ex ante and ex post causal responsibility coincide. For example, if nature chose l, the
dictator knows this and chooses u, then he is fully causally responsible for event e1. The
comparative-statics predictions for the third party’s allocation to the dictator in the case
of an informed dictator would thus be pD(u|l) < pD(d|l) and pD(u|r) > pD(d|r), where
26The assumption that the third party has similar judgments as the recipient is reasonable, in this
case, because the third party and the recipient were only told at the very end of the experiment which
role they actually had. The dictator, on the other hand, always knew his role.
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pD(aD|a0) denotes the allocation after the dictator takes aD in the case that state a0 was
known to him. Note that a lower allocation is equivalent to a higher punishment.
Informed? aD a0 ! rEPD,e1 r
EP
D,e2 r
EP
D,e3 r
EP
D,e4 r
EA
D,e1 r
EA
D,e2 r
EA
D,e3 r
EA
D,e4
yes u l (1, 0) 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
yes d l (1, 0) 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
yes u r (0, 1) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
yes d r (0, 1) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
no u l (12 ,
1
2) 1 0
1
2 0
1
2 0
1
2 0
no d l (12 ,
1
2) 0 1 0
1
2 0
1
2 0
1
2
no u r (12 ,
1
2)
1
2 0 1 0
1
2 0
1
2 0
no d r (12 ,
1
2) 0
1
2 0 1 0
1
2 0
1
2
Table 3.8: Ex post and ex ante causal responsibility levels.
If the dictator is not informed about the state of the world, however, causal responsibility
attribution is di↵erent. First, the dictator still bears full ex post causal responsibility for
the event that is implemented, because he could always change the event by changing is
action. In addition, however, the dictator also bears partial ex post causal responsibility
for the hypothetical event that would have realized if nature would have chosen di↵erently.
For example, suppose an uninformed dictator chooses u and nature chooses l and thus the
event e1 realizes. The dictator bears full ex post causal responsibility for the bad event
e1, but he also bears partial ex post causal responsibility for the good event e3 - to degree
1
2 - that would have realized if the lottery would have chosen otherwise. Second, if the
dictator is not informed, he will bear ex ante causal responsibility for both possible events
that can follow from his action choice and the degree of ex ante causal responsibility is 12
for both events as nature chooses with equal probability.
Suppose an uninformed dictator chooses u, nature chooses l and thus the bad event e1
is implemented. Two e↵ects influence the overall judgment of the dictator’s behavior
compared to the situation when he was informed. First, the dictator still bears full ex
post causal responsibility for event e1, but the fact that he also bears lower ex ante causal
responsibility for e1 reduces his overall causal responsibility for e1 if agent K places some
weight on ex ante causal responsibility. Second, the fact that the dictator additionally
bears partial causal responsibility for the unrealized good event e3 that would have realized
if nature had chosen otherwise, furthermore increases the overall judgment of the dictators
behavior. Note that, if the third party would place weight on ex ante causal responsibility
only, then he would judge the overall behavior of the dictator independent of the choice of
nature, and thus would also allocate independently. The complete allocation predictions
are thus as follows:
Prediction 1. The comparative statics predictions for allocations to the dictator are
p(u|l) < p(u, l, (12 , 12))  p(u, r, (12 , 12)) < p(u|r) if the dictator chooses u, and p(d|r) <
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p(d, r, (12 ,
1
2))  p(d, l, (12 , 12)) < p(d|l) if the dictator chooses d.
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Figure 3.3: Observed punishment for dictator. Note that a higher punishment is equiva-
lent to a lower allocation.
Figure 3.3 shows the observed punishment attributed to the dictator after he chooses u or d
in both possible situations. The observed punishment pattern coincides with the allocation
predictions (a higher punishment equals a lower allocation). Every predicted di↵erence is
statistically significant in the experimental data.27 Interestingly, punishment still di↵ers
for an uninformed dictator, depending on the choice of nature. This can be interpreted
as evidence that the third party does not place weight on ex ante causal responsibility
only. Note that neither intention- nor outcome-based social preference theories predict a
similar punishment pattern (see discussion in the paper).
Relatedly, in Bartling and Fischbacher (2012), a player A could either implement a payo↵
distribution that grants him and a player B a high, but player C a low payo↵ (unfair
event), or a perfectly equal payo↵ distribution (fair event). Alternatively, player A could
delegate the decision to player B, who then faced the identical choice. After observing the
actions of player A and (potentially) player B, player C could distribute costly punishment
points to player A and B. This sequential setting can be analyzed with the same tools as
the simultaneous setting. Since nature is absent, ex ante and ex post causal responsibility
coincide .
For any interior reference point, player C judges the unfair allocation as bad and the
fair allocation as good. Punishment predictions are then as follows: Player C should
punish a player A who implements the unfair event on his own as much as a player B who
27The figure shows the data from the treatment in which the dictator could reveal the state of the
world, or remain uninformed. Using instead the data from the baseline for the allocation decisions of an
informed dictator does not change the qualitative pattern and significance.
67
implements the unfair allocation after being delegated the decision. In both cases, the
players bear full causal responsibility for the unfair allocation only, as they could have
implemented the fair allocation instead. Indeed, Bartling and Fischbacher find positive
punishment in both cases with no significant di↵erence in punishment between the two
cases.
On the other hand, if player A delegates, then causal responsibility theory predicts that
he should be punished less if player B implements the unfair allocation than if he would
have implemented it himself. In this case, player A is fully causally responsible for the bad
unfair but also partly causally responsible for the good fair allocation that would have been
implemented had player B chosen otherwise. Again, this prediction is confirmed by the
data: player A is still punished, but significantly less than if he would have implemented
the unfair allocation himself. However, if player B implements the fair allocation after
delegation, then player A is not punished more than if he implements the fair allocation
himself. According to causal responsibility, player A should receive a higher allocation in
the second case. However, as the experiment only allowed payo↵ reductions (punishment),
this could be an artifact of the design. Again, outcome-based and intention-based social
preference theories cannot explain these results (see discussion in the paper).
3.4.3 The e↵ect of partial causal responsibility
The last two sections analyzed situations in which a decision maker was fully ex post
causally responsible for an implemented event and, sometimes, in addition, partially ex
post causally responsible for a hypothetical event that was judged di↵erently. In this
section, I look at situations in which an agent has positive causal responsible for one
event only, but his causal responsibility for that event varies from full to partial to zero.
As the event, and thus the judgment, is held constant, a ceteris paribus change in causal
responsibility for an event that is judged bad or good should lead to an according change
in the allocation decision.
Unfortunately, I am not aware of experimental evidence with simultaneous decision mak-
ing in stage 1 that would allow such a direct test of the theory. However, there exists
experimental evidence with sequential decision making in stage 1, which can be interpreted
“as if” agents acted simultaneously. In Bartling, Fischbacher, and Schudy (forthcoming),
three agents, I = {A,B,C}, sequentially vote, Ai = {u, f}, on which of two possible
payo↵ allocation between them and three other agents to implement in stage 1 . One is
an unfair allocation, granting the three stage-1 agents a payo↵ of 9 and the other three
agents a payo↵ of 1, and the other is a fair allocation, granting all agents a payo↵ of
5. After all three votes are cast, the unfair allocation is implemented, if at least two
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agents voted u, otherwise the fair allocation is implemented. The set of events can thus
be described as X = {unfair, fair} and the voting rule provides the function that links
actions to events. This environment is therefore a sequential version of the collective gain
environment discussed before.
After observing the actions of all three agents and the stage-1 payo↵, the three other
agents independently attribute costly punishment points to each of the three stage-1
agents.28 Since only the allocation of one of the three stage-2 agents was randomly
selected and implemented, each of the three stage-2 agents can be interpreted as an
independent agent K. Furthermore, since the payo↵ of agent K from the unfair event is
lower than from the fair event, agent K judges the unfair (fair) allocation as a bad (good)
event, j(fair) > 0 > j(unfair), independent of the reference payo↵. Agent K could only
reduce the stage-1 agents’ payo↵s and only the choice of no punishment was costfree.
While voting happens sequentially, one can still analyze causal responsibility “as if” it
would happen simultaneously. For example, if all three stage-1 agents vote for the unfair
allocation, the vote of each agent was not pivotal for its implementation, but would have
been pivotal, if one of of the other agents would have voted di↵erently. Hence, for this
action profile, each stage-1 agent has partial causal responsibility for the unfair alloca-
tion.29 How would the predictions for punishment look like, if we interpret the experiment
in such a way? First, since nature is not present, ex ante and ex post causal responsi-
bility coincide. Second, in this environment, agents can only be causally responsible for
one event, either the unfair one, if they voted u, or the fair one, if they voted f . Since
only punishment was allowed, I henceforth focus on causal responsibility for the unfair
event. Three levels of causal responsibility are possible. First, an agent bears no causal
responsibility for the unfair event, if he voted for f . Second, an agent bears full causal re-
sponsibility for the unfair event, if he voted for u and, in total, two agents voted for u and
the third one for f . Third, an agent is partially causally responsible for the unfair event
(with degree 1/2), if he voted for u and either no other agent, or two other agents voted
for u. The comparative-statics predictions for punishment are therefore straightforward:
Prediction 2. Punishment for a stage-1 agent is highest after histories in which he bears
full causal responsibility for the unfair event, lower after histories in which he bears partial
causal responsibility and lowest after histories in which he bears no causal responsibility.
28The strategy method was used to elicit punishment decision, allowing a within-subject test of di↵er-
ences in punishment.
29Of course, treating the sequential vote “as if” it happened simultaneously might mask some important
features of sequential decision making. For example, if A and B already voted for the unfair event, agent
C knows that his vote has no influence anymore and this might influence how his decision is judged. On
the other hand, the same argument could be made if the game were played simultaneously and all three
stage-1 agents vote for unfair in a pure-strategy equilibrium. Also then, agent C’s vote has no impact
and everyone knows it.
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Note that, in the case of partial causal responsibility, the theory predicts no di↵erence
in punishment between the case in which the unfair allocation is actually implemented
(three u votes) and when it is not (one u vote). Thus, the design also allows a test of
the hypothesis that causal responsibility for an hypothetical, unrealized event is judged
in the same way as causal responsibility for a realized event.
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Figure 3.4: Average punishment depending on causal responsibility for the unfair event.
Figure 3.4 pools the data for all three stage-1 agents and shows the average punishment
levels for the stage-1 agents depending on their causal responsibility for the unfair event.
For example, the “Full CR”-bar shows the average punishment for stage-1 agents after any
history in which they are fully causally responsible for the unfair event. The data clearly
confirms the comparative-statics predictions. A subject who is fully causally responsible
for the unfair event is punished significantly more than a subject who is partially causally
responsible (2.00 vs. 1.31; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.000). Similarly, partial causal
responsibility for the unfair event is punished significantly more than no causal respon-
sibility (1.31 vs. 0.09; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.000).30 Furthermore, the data
also confirms the prediction that causal responsibility for an event does not depend on
the event’s actual implementation. An agent who is partially causally responsible for the
unfair event is not punished di↵erently depending on whether the unfair event is actually
implemented or not (1.40 vs. 1.23; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.670).
Importantly, the qualitative punishment pattern is still found when looking at the three
stage-1 agents separately, which indicates that the sequential nature of the voting decision
does not influence the qualitative punishment pattern predicted by causal responsibility.
For each of the three stage-1 agents, punishment is always highest in case of full causal
responsibility and lowest in case of no causal responsibility for the unfair event. The
30I am grateful to the authors of the study for letting me analyze their data.
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di↵erences between the three levels are statistically significant with the exception of agent
B for whom the di↵erence in punishment between full and partial causal responsibility is
not significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.133). Furthermore, for all three agents,
punishment for partial causal responsibility does never di↵er significantly depending on
whether the unfair event is actually implemented, or not.
Table 3.9: Robustness of causal responsibility as punishment motive
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4 OLS) (5) OLS (6) OLS (7) OLS
Pun. Pun. Pun. Pun. Pun. Pun. Pun.
Causal 1.956⇤⇤⇤ 1.903⇤⇤⇤ 1.375⇤⇤⇤ 1.215⇤⇤⇤ 1.606⇤⇤⇤ 1.737⇤⇤⇤ 0.657⇤⇤⇤
responsibility (0.193) (0.202) (0.305) (0.194) (0.248) (0.192) (0.208)
Outcome 0.073 0.048
unfair (0.113) (0.070)
Choice unfair 0.532⇤⇤ 0.453⇤⇤⇤
(0.231) (0.161)
“Intention unkind” 0.719⇤⇤⇤ 0.517⇤⇤
(0.157) (0.197)
Choice unfair X 0.360 0.042
“Intention unkind” (0.216) (0.227)
“Pivotality” 0.452⇤⇤⇤ 0.403⇤⇤
(0.161) (0.155)
Constant 0.143⇤⇤⇤ 0.127⇤⇤ 0.095⇤⇤⇤ 0.122⇤⇤⇤ 0.154⇤⇤⇤ 0.150⇤⇤⇤ 0.083⇤⇤
(0.041) (0.057) (0.033) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041) (0.037)
Observations 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728 1728
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.262 0.267 0.274 0.265 0.269 0.281
Notes: The dependent variable is attributed punishment points for voters. Besides the causal
responsibility variable, the other explanatory variables are constructed as in Bartling, Fischbacher,
and Schudy (forthcoming): Outcome unfair is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the unfair
allocation is implemented. Choice unfair is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the ai = u is
chosen. “Intention unkind” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respective voter opted for the
unfair allocation and no majority was achieved before her vote. “Pivotality” is a dummy equal to
1 if the ai = u is chosen, the unfair allocation occurred and the respective voter was the second
voter opting for the unfair allocation. Robust standard errors (clustered on 72 individuals) in
parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
When regressing the level of causal responsibility on punishment (see column (1) of Table
3.9), I find a large positive and highly significant e↵ect. Furthermore, the adjusted R2 of
0.262 shows that causal responsibility can explain a large part of the variation in punish-
ment. However, it might be that omitted variables both influence the causal responsibility
measure as well as punishment. For example, a positive causal responsibility level is only
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possible when the agent voted for the unfair event and voting for an unfair event might
itself be an independent motive for punishment. Hence, not including the voting decision
in the regression can lead to an omitted variable bias in the estimation of the causal
responsibility coe cient. In order to check the robustness of the e↵ect of causal responsi-
bility on punishment, I include, separately and jointly, all punishment motives considered
in the paper of Bartling et al. (see column (2)-(7) of Table 3.9). Causal responsibility
remains highly significant in all regressions. Besides causal responsibility, voting for the
unfair allocation, “unkind intentions” and “pivotality” (both in the definition of Bartling
et al.) have significant and positive e↵ects on punishment. Whether the outcome is unfair
or fair has no significant e↵ect on punishment.31
To summarize, the past three sections lent support to the assumptions that i) actions
of lotteries matter for the evaluation of causal responsibility, ii) causal responsibility can
not only be explained by the ex ante component and causal responsibility for unrealized
events matters, and iii) partial causal responsibility is predictive of allocation decisions.
For each of the three parts, the theory of causal responsibility makes better predictions
than the most established competing theories. What is still missing is a test of partial
ex post causal responsibility in a real simultaneous-move environment and a test of ex
ante causal responsibility, i.e. a test in an environment with a lottery that varies the
probability distribution of the lottery while holding everything else constant.
3.5 Discussion
This sections discusses some limitations of the framework and lies out directions for fu-
ture research. Specifically, possible generalizations of the causal responsibility function,
generalizations of the set of agents for whom causal responsibility is evaluated, and the
possible influence of psychological factors for responsibility perceptions are considered.
First, note that the distance to pivotality measure in equation 3.1, simply counts the min-
imum number of changes necessary to achieve pivotality, thereby treating every change of
action equally. One might argue that some changes are more likely than others, for exam-
ple, because they are cheaper, and that therefore an agent whose distance to pivotality is
31Bartling et al. define a stage-1 agents vote as “pivotal”, if the respective agent was the second voter
opting for the unfair allocation. I, on the other hand, view an agent’s vote as pivotal for an event, if the
event counterfactually depends on the vote. For example, if agent A and B vote u and agent C votes f , I
define both agent A and B’s votes as pivotal for the unfair allocation, whereas Bartling et al. would only
count agent B’s vote as pivotal. Controlling for pivotality in my definition still leads to a highly significant
e↵ect of causal responsibility, suggesting that it is not only predictive because it incorporates pivotality
(i.e. full causal responsibility), but also because partial causal responsibility is important. However, it is
not possible to include pivotality in my definition in the full regression as this would lead to collinearity
(the dummy for the vote choice and the dummy for pivotality together perfectly explain all variation in
the causal responsibility variable).
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three “likely” changes is more causally responsible than another for whom the distance
is three “unlikely” changes. An appropriate weighting of action changes in the function
that counts the di↵erences between two action profiles, c(y, x), could accommodate such
a feature. The distance function in equation 3.1 would then minimize not the absolute
number of changes, but the weighted number of changes.
Relatedly, I have only discussed discrete (and often binary) action sets, but the notion of
causal responsibility could be extended to continuous action sets. In many cases, agents
don’t decide about using clean or dirty technology, but about with what intensity to use
a certain technology. For example, governments do not only decide whether they want to
allow the emission of greenhouse gases or not, but about how much emissions they permit.
In this case, one might want to evaluate a country’s causal responsibility for the failure
or success of the world to stay below the target of a temperature increase of maximally 2
degrees Celsius that was set in the Copenhagen Agreement.32 Suppose temperatures rise
by more than 2 degrees Celsius if more than 100 units of greenhouse gases are emitted.
Furthermore, suppose the US and China each emit 55 units, Germany emits 20 units and
Fiji emits 1 unit, such that, in total, 131 units are emitted and the target is missed. An
appropriate measure of causal responsibility in this case should not only take the number
of changes necessary to reach pivotality into account (0 for the US and China and 1 for
Germany and Fiji), but also apply an appropriate weighting of the emission levels.
Second, instead of formulating a theory that explains how people allocate blame and
praise to other people depending on those other peoples’ causal responsibility, one could
just as well formulate a theory in which people care about their own causal responsibility
for an event.33 In fact, there exists experimental evidence suggesting that such a theory
can successfully predict how people choose in situations in which there is a trade-o↵
between benefits to oneself and the violation of some ethical standard. For example, in
the experiment of Falk and Szech (2013), subjects had to choose between killing a mouse
and receiving some money (option B) and saving the mouse and receiving no money
(option A) in the baseline condition.34 Thus, in this condition, every subject was fully
causally responsible (ex post and ex ante) for saving or killing the mouse and the theory
suggests that subjects would only kill the mouse if the monetary compensation was worth
more to them than the intrinsic blame resulting from bearing full causal responsibility for
32http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf
33For example, a utility function of the form ui(a,!) = ⇡i(a) + ⇢i
P
x2X ri,x(a,!) · ji(x) incorporates
feelings of blame and praise towards oneself for the causal responsibility for the implementation of some
event x.
34Relatedly, Charness (2000) study experimentally how the presence of an external party or a lottery
can alter a worker’s feeling of responsibility and, as a result, change his e↵ort provision and Charness
and Jackson (2009) study how a subject’s investment decision changes once it also influences and thus
is responsible for another subject. Other studies experimentally examine the role of organizational hier-
archies Ellman and Pezanis-Christou (2010) or the option to delegate decisions Hamman, Loewenstein,
and Weber (2010) on outcomes and refer to responsibility motives in explaining their results.
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the death of a mouse.
In the “di↵used pivotality” treatment, subjects were matched in groups of eight and
again given the choice between not receiving money (option A) and receiving some money
(option B). The key change is that if at least one out of the eight subjects chose option
B, eight mice would be killed, irrespective of the choices of the other subjects. They find
that, compared to the baseline, a significantly larger proportion, 58.6 percent, of subjects
chose option B in this treatment. Furthermore, they find that the probability to choose
option B decreases monotonically with ones (non-incentivized) belief of being pivotal for
the death of the mice, i.e. being the only one in the group that chooses B. Both findings
are very much in line with what a theory of intrinsic causal responsibility attribution
would predict. Namely, the more subjects choose option B, the lower is each of their
causal responsibility for the death of the mice. Hence, if a subject believes that other
subjects will choose option B, he is more likely to choose option B himself even if he would
not have chosen option B in the baseline treatment. This also exemplifies how few persons
who care only about their material payo↵ can trigger a cascade of causal responsibility
di↵usion after which even persons who care a lot about the negative externalities of their
actions take these actions because their causal responsibility is di↵used enough to not
deter them anymore.
Third, I have so far only considered the causal responsibility for an event of agents whose
actions directly feed into the event’s “production” function, f , which can be interpreted
as “direct” causal responsibility. I call these agents “first-order” agents. In addition,
one could extend the notion to also evaluate causal responsibility for “second-order”
agents whose actions do not directly feed into the function f , but whose actions influence
the actions of the “first-order” agents and, by doing so, indirectly influence the event.
For example, if a consumer demands a cheap product and the production of a cheap
product is only possible if the firm exploits its workers, then the consumer’s action does
not directly determine whether workers are exploited, but the firm’s decision will be
influenced by the demand of the consumer. The current version would not attribute any
causal responsibility to the consumer as he could never be directly pivotal for the event.
Hence, it makes sense to attribute “first-order” causal responsibility to the firm, but
also “second-order” causal responsibility to the consumer. Such “higher-order” causal
responsibility can be evaluated by the same methods as before. For example, given a
firm’s best-response function, which is rationally anticipated, a consumer’s “second-order”
causal responsibility for the exploitation of the workers could be equal to the sum of the
distance of his action from being pivotal for the firm’s action and the distance of the firm’s
action from being pivotal for the exploitation of the workers.
Fourth, a considerable body of evidence in moral psychology suggests that in addition to
rational reasoning, also emotional and intuitive factors play a role in moral decision making
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(Haidt, 2001; Haidt and Kesebir, 2009; Cushman, Young, and Greene, 2010; Greene, 2013).
If this is the case, emotional factors are also likely to influence perceptions of responsibility.
Hence, one should not interpret causal responsibility as the single relevant factor, but as
a “rational” benchmark, against which other factors can be tested. For example, there
exists evidence that people perceive the implementation of an “bad” event as less bad,
when it was implemented due to an omission (not changing the status quo) as opposed
to when it was implemented due a commission (changing the status quo) Cox, Servatka,
and Vadovic (2013). Furthermore, increased spatial, temporal and social distance might
reduce perceptions of responsibility, as might whether an event was implemented as a
means or as a side-e↵ect (for a discussion of these channels, see Greene (2013)).
All of these points highlight that there is considerable potential for future work and that
the present study should be seen as a starting point for the theoretic and empirical analysis
of (causal) responsibility perceptions in economic contexts.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper introduces the notion of causal responsibility into the economic framework.
Causal responsibility measures the causal impact of an agent’s action on the occurrence
of an event. When taking causal responsibility into account, an agent who likes or dislikes
the event will attribute reward or punishment to the agents involved in its implementation
in relation to their causal responsibility for the event. In many group processes causal
responsibility driven allocation decisions are distinctively di↵erent from what prominent
existing theories would predict. In particular, causal responsibility makes better predic-
tions when multiple actions determine the occurrence of an event, such that it is possible
that no single action is pivotal for the event. In these cases, causal responsibility depends
on an agent’s action’s distance from pivotality. By applying causal responsibility to two
common environments, the paper demonstrates that, in equilibrium, causal responsibility
for an event is maximally di↵used between all, and, in other cases, maximally focused
on some of the involved agents. In the former case, whether an event is implemented
in equilibrium crucially depends on the number of active agents which determines the
potential di↵usion of causal responsibility. Finally, the paper tests the predictive power
of the causal responsibility notion for allocation decisions in data from existing, incen-
tivized experiments and finds that the causal responsibility motive can explain observed
punishment patterns successfully and that it remains a highly significant predictor for
punishment even after controlling for several other potential punishment motives. Several
directions for promising extensions and applications of the notion of causal responsibility
are provided.
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To conclude, I want to discuss the relevance of causal responsibility-based preferences
in markets. First, perceptions of causal responsibility and the associated attribution of
blame can influence the willingness to consume goods that come with a negative external-
ity. For example, many forms of long-distance transportation come with environmentally
damaging emission of CO2. When facing the decision whether to use a certain trans-
portation method, the consumer also faces a decision about how causally responsible he
wants to be for the generated externality. Driving a car alone, for example, leads to full
causal responsibility of the driver for the negative externality generated, as, if he would
not use the car, no one else would. And, indeed, many people nowadays prefer not to
use cars and the reason brought forward is often their negative environmental impact.
On the other hand, when taking the plane, the same people seem much less concerned
about their responsibility for the negative externality generated, even though emissions
per passenger are often worse than if the same distance would be driven by car. Of course,
the plane would also not fly without passengers and thus there exists a necessary number
of passengers for the plane to fly. However, on a typical flight the number of passengers
exceeds the number of necessary passengers and causal responsibility is therefore di↵used
among them. This di↵usion can lead to a greater willingness to take planes compared to
the situation in which each passenger would bear full causal responsibility for the negative
externality.
Second, the evaluation of causal responsibility can also be linked to replaceability-arguments
which are often made in markets. For example, a government might excuse his role in
an arms deal with an authoritarian regime by stating that, if they would not have sold
the arms, some other government would have, implicitly referring to a non-pivotality con-
dition. The causal responsibility framework can capture such arguments by modeling
each government as an independent agent who decides about whether to o↵er arms or
not. Interestingly, it follows that the market structure is related to causal responsibility.
A monopolist in a certain industry is pivotal for which goods are traded. For example,
if a national monopolist on energy decides not to supply nuclear energy, it will not be
supplied. This can explain why people often blame power companies, but not as much
the individual electricity consumer for the existence of nuclear power plants and their
externalities. The more firms have the ability to supply a certain good, the greater is
the chance that there exists an equilibrium in which they all do it. One could therefore
argue that, the number of firms operating in industries with sensitive goods should be
controlled in order to focus causal responsibility on a few players.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Proofs
Theorem 1. The following two statements are equivalent:
a) P.1 and P.2 hold.
b) rEPi,x (a) =
1
di,x(a)
.
Proof of Theorem 1.
a)! b)
Suppose P.1 and P.2 hold. I show by contradiction that in this case rEPi,x (a) =
1
di,x(a)
has
to hold.
First, let di,x(a) = 1. Then any rEPi,x (a) 6= 1 would contradict P.1. Hence, rEPi,x (a) = 1 if
di,x(a) = 1.
Second, let di,x(a) = 1 and dj,x(a) = n with n 2 {2, 3, ..., |N |}.
Suppose rEPj,x (a) >
1
n . Then
rEPi,x (a)
rEPj,x (a)
< n. This contradicts P.2 which states that
rEPi,x (a)
rEPj,x (a)
=
dj,x(a)
di,x(a)
= n1 = n.
Next, suppose rEPj,x (a) <
1
n . Then
rEPi,x (a)
rEPj,x (a)
> n. This contradicts P.2 which states that
rEPi,x (a)
rEPj,x (a)
= dj,x(a)di,x(a) =
n
1 = n. Hence, r
EP
j,x (a) =
1
n if dj,x(a) = n.
Third, let di,x(a) =1. Then any rEPi,x (a) 6= 0 would contradict P.1. Hence, rEPi,x (a) = 0 if
di,x(a) =1.
Taken together, it was shown that, if P.1 and P.2 hold, then
rEPi,x (a) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if di,x(a) = 1
1
n
if di,x(a) = n with n 2 {2, 3, ..., |N |}
0 if di,x(a) =1.
Which is mathematically equivalent to rEPi,x (a) =
1
di,x(a)
as the two functions have the same
image on all possible subsets of the domain of the functions.
b)! a)
Suppose rEPi,x (a) =
1
di,x(a)
holds.
First, for di,x(a) = 1, rEPi,x (a) = 11 = 0 and for di,x(a) = 1, rEPi,x (a) = 11 = 1. Thus, P.1
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holds.
Second,
rEPi,x (a)
rEPj,x (a)
=
1
di,x(a)
1
dj,x(a)
= dj,x(a)di,x(a) . Thus, P.2 holds.
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Proof of Proposition 1.
Part (1)
The first part of Proposition 1 provides the conditions for which there exists a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which all stage-1 agents take action a. This is the
case if any agent who takes action a always has an incentive to deviate to action a, taking
into account that agent K will allocate in stage 2 according to 3.8. An agent will deviate
from a to a, if
⇡Ii (a) +
⇢
c
ri,e(a, a i) j(e) < ⇡Ii (a) +
⇢
c
ri,e(a, a i) j(e)
Note that, in this setting, we can express the distance measure in terms of the number
of agents that take a such that di,e(a, a i) = 1 + |
P
i2I 1(ai = a)   t| and di,e(a, a i) =
1 + |Pi2I 1(ai = a)   (t   1)|. Importantly, an agent who switches from playing a to
playing a increases the sum of agents who play a by one. Therefore, for any given a i,
di,e(a, a i) = di,e(a, a i) and ri,e(a, a i) = ri,e(a, a i).
Using this and solving for ⇢ yields
⇢ <
c
ri,e(a, a i)
· ⇡
I
i (a)  ⇡Ii (a)
j(e)  j(e)
The RHS of the inequality is decreasing in agent i’s causal responsibility for event e.
Therefore, when ⇢ is small enough such that an agent will deviate from a to a even when
he is fully causally responsible for e (ri,e(a, a i) = 1), then any agent will deviate from
a to a for any level of causal responsibility and, hence, all agents playing a and agent K
allocating according to 3.8 is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Part (2)
The second part of proposition 1 states that, if ⇢ is large enough such that deviating from
a to a is deterred in the case of full causal responsibility, then there exists an integer
m   1 such that, if a number of agents in the interval [t  m, t +m   2] takes action a,
then those who take action a have no incentive to deviate.
The lower bound is given by two conditions: First, if (t  m) agents take action a, then
none of the n   (t  m) agents who take action a has an incentive to deviate from a to
a (equation 3.9). Second, if (t  m   1) agents take action a, then the agents who take
action a have an incentive to deviate (equation 3.10).
⇡Ii (a) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |(t m)  (t  1)|   ⇡
I
i (a) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |(t m+ 1)  t| (3.9)
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and
⇡Ii (a) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |(t m  1)  (t  1)| < ⇡
I
i (a) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |((t m)  t)| (3.10)
Simplified, m is the unique integer that lies in the intervall (⇢c
j(e) j(e)
⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)
 1, ⇢c j(e) j(e)⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a) ],
or
m = {y 2 N | ⇢
c
j(e)  j(e)
⇡Ii (a)  ⇡Ii (a)
  1 < y  ⇢
c
j(e)  j(e)
⇡Ii (a)  ⇡Ii (a)
}
The interval uniquely identifies m, as one and only one integer lies in it. That m   1
follows immediately from the condition that ⇢   c · ⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)j(e) j(e) .
For the upper bound of the interval, the two conditions are that, if t+m  2 agents take
action a, none of those who take a has an incentive to deviate (condition 3.11), but if
t +m   1 take a, then there is such an incentive (condition 3.12). The reason for t  m
in the case of the lower bound and t + m   2 in the case of the upper bound is that
both yield the same distance from pivotality for event e, (t   1)   (t  m) = m   1 and
(t+m  2)  (t  1) = m  1.
⇡Ii (a) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |(t+m  2)  (t  1)|   ⇡
I
i (a) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |(t+m  1)  t| (3.11)
and
⇡Ii (a) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |(t+m  1)  (t  1)| < ⇡
I
i (a) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |(t+m)  t| (3.12)
Simplified,m is again the unique integer that lies in the interval (⇢c
j(e) j(e)
⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)
 1, ⇢c j(e) j(e)⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a) ].
The upper and the lower bound coincide, ifm = 1. In this case, punishment is just enough
to deter the pivotal agents from switching from a to a, but one step away from pivotality,
taking a is more profitable.
Part (2), i)
If t  m > 0, conditions 3.9 and 3.10 provide the conditions for an equilibrium in which
t m vote for a and n  (t m) vote for a and no agent has an incentive to deviate. This
proves part 2) i) of Proposition 1.
Part (2), ii)
If t  m  0, the distance from pivotality required to make taking a profitable is bigger
than t. Therefore, even when 0 agents take a, no agent has an incentive to deviate. Thus,
all n agents taking a and agent K allocating according to 3.8 is an equilibrium.
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Part (2), iii)
In contrast to the lower bound, the upper bound does not constitute an equilibrium if
m > 1, i.e. if upper and lower bound do not coincide. In this case, if exactly t +m   2
agents take action a, then any agent who does so has an incentive to deviate to a (condition
3.11). On the other hand, if more than t +m   2 agents take action a, then any agent
who takes a has an incentive to deviate to a (condition 3.12 holds for t+m  1 and any
higher number of agents who take a). Therefore, if t +m   2 < n, then there exists an
equilibrium with all n agents taking a and agent K allocating according to 3.8.
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Proof of Corollary 1.
The integer m is the unique integer provided by condition
m = {y 2 N | ⇢
c
j(e)  j(e)
⇡Ii (a)  ⇡Ii (a)
  1 < y  ⇢
c
j(e)  j(e)
⇡Ii (a)  ⇡Ii (a)
}
By definition ⇢ > 0, c > 0, j(e)  j(e) > 0, and ⇡Ii (a)  ⇡Ii (a) > 0.
As the length of the interval is equal to 1 and thus constant and there is only one integer
in the interval, it is su cient to show that the upper bound of the interval is increas-
ing/decreasing in a variable in order to show that m is increasing/decreasing in that
variable. The following partial derivatives prove the four statements in Corollary 1.
i)
@ ⇢c
j(e) j(e)
⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)
@ ⇢ =
1
c
j(e) j(e)
⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)
> 0
ii)
@ ⇢c
j(e) j(e)
⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)
@ c =   ⇢c2 j(e) j(e)⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a) < 0
iii)
@ ⇢c
j(e) j(e)
⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)
@ j(e) j(e) =
⇢
c
1
⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)
> 0
iv)
@ ⇢c
j(e) j(e)
⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)
@ ⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a)
=  ⇢c j(e) j(e)(⇡Ii (a) ⇡Ii (a))2 < 0
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Proof of Proposition 2.
In order to prove Proposition 2, I use backward induction. The optimal behavior in stage
2 by agent K is characterized in equation 3.8. In stage 1, the agents rationally anticipate
the behavior of agent K in stage 2 and act in order to maximize their payo↵ from the
whole game. Note that, by assumption, 0 < t  1 < n.
First, whenever less than t agents take a, any agent who does so has an incentive to
deviate if
⇡Ii (e) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |Pi2I 1(ai = a)  t| < ⇡Ii (e) + ⇢c j(e)1 + |Pi2I(1(ai = a)  1)  (t  1)|
where 1(ai = a) is equal to 1 if ai = a and zero otherwise. The condition simplifies to
j(e) < j(e)
which always holds by definition. Thus, if less than t agents take a, any agent who takes
a has an incentive to deviate and any agent who takes a has no incentive to deviate (by
the same condition). Therefore, there always exists a SPNE in which all stage-1 agents
take a and agent K allocates according to 3.8.
Second, whenever more than t agents take action a, then those who do so have an incentive
to deviate, if
⇡Ii (e) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |Pi2I 1(ai = a)  t| < ⇡Ii (e) + ⇢c j(e)1 + |(1(ai = a)  1)  (t  1)|
which again simplifies to
j(e) < j(e)
which always holds by definition. Hence, there is no equilibrium in which more than t
agents take a.
Third, whenever exactly t agents take action a, then those who do so have no incentive
to deviate, if
⇡Ii (e) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1
  ⇡Ii (e) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1
which simplifies to
⇢  c · ⇡
I
i (e)  ⇡Ii (e)
j(e)  j(e)
At the same time, if exactly t agents take action a, then those who do take a have no
incentive to deviate, if
⇡Ii (e) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |(1(ai = a))  (t  1)|   ⇡
I
i (e) +
⇢
c
j(e)
1 + |(1(ai = a) + 1)  t|
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which again simplifies to j(e)  j(e) which is always given.
Hence, if ⇢  c · ⇡Ii (e) ⇡Ii (e)j(e) j(e) , there exists an equilibrium in which t agents choose action a,
event e is implemented, and agent K allocates according to equation (3.8). This proves
part (2) of Proposition 2.
On the other hand, if ⇢ > c · ⇡Ii (e) ⇡Ii (e)j(e) j(e) , then there exists a unique equilibrium in which all
agents take action a, event e is implemented, and agent K allocates according to equation
3.8. This proves part (1) of Proposition 2.
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Chapter 4
The Spillover E↵ect of Institutions
on Cooperative Norms, Preferences,
and Beliefs1
4.1 Introduction
The success of any society is partly determined by the laws and norms that govern it.
These laws and norms are often in place to overcome social dilemma situations in which
the individual member’s incentives are diametrically opposed to what is best for the
society at large (common pool resources, public goods, etc.). Institutions help to back up
laws and norms by enforcing them directly or by punishing individuals that don’t comply
with them.2 One important aspect of the real world is that these institutions are limited
in scope - they can seldom monitor all relevant areas and behaviors. The e↵ectiveness
of an institution for the implementation of a law or norm depends therefore crucially
on whether the members of society comply with it, even when they are not monitored.
Additionally, the introduction of such institutions can have unintended consequences and
1This paper must be cited as: Engl, F., A. Riedl and R. A. Weber (2015): “The Spillover E↵ect of
Institutions on Cooperative Norms, Preferences, and Beliefs,” Working Paper. We thank Pedro Dal Bo,
Guillaume Fre´chette, Bernd Irlenbusch and Martin Kocher for valuable discussions and conference partic-
ipants at the 2015 Social Norms and Institutions conference in Ascona and the 2015 London Experimental
Workshop (LES) for helpful comments.
2There exists a large experimental literature on the ability of sanctioning institutions to enforce norm
compliance as well as on the endogenous uptake of sanctioning institutions (Faillo, Grieco, and Zarri,
2013; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Ga¨chter and Fehr, 2000; Galbiati
and Vertova, 2008; Gu¨rerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach, 2006; Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl, 2009; Kroll,
Cherry, and Shogren, 2007; Markussen, Putterman, and Tyran, 2014; Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and
Villeval, 2003; Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992; Putterman, Tyran, and Kamei, 2011; Reuben and
Riedl, 2013; Sutter, Haigner, and Kocher, 2010; Walker, Gardner, Herr, and Ostrom, 2000).
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even backfire, leading to lower compliance in areas beyond its scope.3 Understanding the
mechanisms through which institutions foster or deter people’s compliance with laws and
norms when they are not monitored is therefore of great importance to public policy and
economics.
For example, the government’s ability to check the correctness of tax payments di↵ers
depending on the type of the tax. While income tax payments can be perfectly monitored
in many countries, wealth taxes often rely on the voluntary provision of information. The
institution that governs income taxes can therefore have positive or negative influence
on the voluntary payment of wealth taxes. Relatedly, the police force cannot control all
areas or record every transgression. Its behavior in those domains that can be monitored
will a↵ect how law-abiding citizens are, when they cannot be caught. In other areas,
di↵erent but related behavior is monitored to a di↵erent extent. One such area is the
state’s aim to promote energy conservation. While the state can implement laws that
make it obligatory to comply with energy conservation in some areas, e.g. by phasing out
the supply of traditional light bulbs4 or by setting mission reduction targets for new cars5,
these policies only reach their goal if they change people’s behavior per se, i.e. if people
internalize energy conservation as a norm to be followed, e.g. by reducing the usage of
cars in favor of public transport, even when there is no direct obligation to do so.
In this paper, we study in a laboratory experiment whether social norms that are moni-
tored and enforced by an institution in one domain spill over to domains without such an
institution. Additionally, we explore whether the way in which an institution is formed
matters for the extent and direction of the norm compliance spillover. We are particu-
larly interested whether institutions that are endogenously adopted through a democratic
process facilitate the spillover compared to institutions that are exogenously imposed by
an external authority. Finally, we study if and how the presence of an institution di-
rectly alters pro-social preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness and whether
potential e↵ects extend to new counterparts.
To this end, we designed a laboratory experiment in which subjects simultaneously play
two standard public goods games, within identical groups, repeatedly for 20 periods.
In a “no institution” treatment both games are non-monitored and subjects can freely
choose their contribution. In the other two treatments, one of the two games is monitored
by an institution (“PGG Right”), the other is not (“PGG Left”). The institution that
3Such unintended consequences have been shown for environments that are actively regulated by an
institution. For example, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) demonstrate that introducing incentives which are
supposed to increase a worker’s e↵ort, actually lead to a decrease because they undermine the worker’s
feeling of being trusted. Frey (1993) argues that crowding out of intrinsic motivation might spill over to
areas in which such incentives are not present.
4http://ec.europa.eu/energy/lumen/index_en.htm
5http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/cars/index_en.htm
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we consider is a central authority that punishes subjects that contribute less than a
specified amount (minimum contribution requirement, henceforth MCR). The penalty
is the loss of all income in that period from the respective game. Depending on the
treatment the institution is either endogenously adopted or exogenously imposed. In
the “exogenous institution” treatment, the MCR is set to the full endowment. In the
“endogenous institution” treatment, the MCR is determined by a voting mechanism.
Each subject submits a vote for his preferred MCR. The implemented MCR in a group is
the minimal number that any member voted for. By comparing the contributions in the
non-monitored public goods game across the three treatments, we can observe i) whether
there exists a spillover of institution-backed norms to non-monitored environments and
ii) whether the procedure with which an institution is implemented a↵ects the spillover.
Furthermore, our design includes additional parts that measure the lasting impact of
institutions on beliefs about others’ cooperativeness and pro-social preferences. Both
beliefs and preferences are elicited with respect to familiar as well as unfamiliar group
members. A number of additional elicited individual characteristics allow us to disentangle
several potential channels.
We find that the presence of an institution that regulates cooperative behavior in one
domain generally enhances cooperation in domains that lie beyond the scope of the in-
stitution compared to a situation in which no institution was present in either domain.
As a result, institutions that regulate cooperation induce significantly positive indirect
welfare e↵ects in addition to their immediate welfare e↵ect in the regulated environment.
However, we also find that the institution formation procedure matters for the stability
of the spillover. Cooperation boosted by an exogenously imposed institution nevertheless
decays over time, while the endogenously adopted institution leads to stable voluntary co-
operation levels in domains beyond its scope. Additionally, we find that institutions have
positive e↵ects on cooperative behavior, preferences for cooperation and beliefs about oth-
ers’ cooperativeness that persist even after they cease to exist, compared to environments
in which an institution never existed. These e↵ects extend to new counterparts. Overall,
we therefore conclude that institutions which regulate cooperative behavior have, in our
study, unambiguously positive e↵ects on voluntary cooperative behavior in domains that
lie beyond the immediate scope of the institution and that endogenously implemented
institution have an advantage over exogenously imposed institution with regard to the
stability of the spillover e↵ects. When deciding about the implementation of such insti-
tutions in reality, these e↵ects should to be taken into account and can, potentially, alter
the analysis in favor of (endogenously implemented) institutions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the related literature and develops
hypotheses regarding the e↵ect of institutions on behavior outside of their scope. Section
3 introduces the experimental design. Results are presented in Section 4. In Section 5,
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we discuss possible explanations for our findings in light of the hypotheses of Section 2
and Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for future research.
4.2 Related literature and hypotheses
Our study is related to a literature in experimental economics that examines behavior
in simultaneously and sequentially played games. For example, studies have shown that
strategies that subjects develop while playing simple games are also applied to more
complex, simultaneously played games (Bednar, Chen, Liu, and Page, 2012), that par-
ticipation in a public goods game reduces overbidding in simultaneously played lottery
contests (Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2013), that pro-social behavior is greater if two simul-
taneously played public goods games are played with di↵erent groups as when they are
played with identical groups (McCarter, Samak, and Sheremeta, 2013, WP), and that
there is only a small behavioral spillover between two public goods games that are played
with di↵erent group members (Falk, Fischbacher, and Ga¨chter, 2013). Blackwell and Mc-
Kee (2003) also study simultaneously played public good games where one local group is
entailed in a larger global group and with varying MPCRs between groups. They find
that increasing the MPCR in the global group increases contributions at the expense of
the private account, not at the expense of contributions to the local group. In a simi-
lar setting, Fellner and Lu¨nser (2014) show that higher returns in global groups are not
su cient to guarantee cooperation when local groups provide an information advantage
about individual contributions. Bernasconi, Corazzini, Kube, and Mare´chal (2009) find
that splitting one public goods game into two simultaneously played public goods games
increases subject’s contributions.
In the case of sequentially played games, studies show that groups that manage to sus-
tain high e ciency levels in a weak-link game have higher cooperation rates in sub-
sequently played prisoner’s dilemma games (Knez and Camerer, 2000), that there are
learning spillovers between strategically similar games (Grimm and Mengel, 2012), that
there exist only very modest spillovers between competitive and cooperative games that
are played with the same opponents (Cason and Gangadharan, 2013). Furthermore, Ca-
son, Savikhin, and Sheremeta (2012) find behavioral spillovers between minimum- and
median-e↵ort coordination games when they are played sequentially, but not when they
are played simultaneously. Herz and Taubinsky (2013, WP) find that earlier experience in
ultimatum games with proposer or responder competition influences subsequent minimum
acceptance o↵ers of responders in standard ultimatum games. Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder
(2006) show the influence of minimum wages on subsequent reservation wages.
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Our study di↵ers from the aforementioned ones as it focuses on the e↵ect that an institu-
tion, which regulates cooperative behavior in one environment, has on behavior in another
environment, without such an institution. Prior experimental research in economics has
demonstrated the e↵ectiveness of institutions in enforcing high cooperation levels in social
dilemma situations (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992; Ga¨chter and Fehr, 2000) and
studied the endogenous uptake of such institutions by society (Gu¨rerk, Irlenbusch, and
Rockenbach, 2006; Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl, 2009). These institutions typically work
by changing the monetary incentives for non-cooperative behavior, making it more costly
relative to cooperative behavior. However, as argued in the introduction, in the real world,
such institutions are often limited in scope. If institutions only influence relative prices in
one domain, then they should not influence behavior in environments beyond their scope,
where relative prices are unchanged. Furthermore, if an institution only changes relative
prices, changes in behavior should not persist once the institution ceases to exist. This
yields our null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (Null). The presence of an institution in one domain does not a↵ect
cooperative behavior in domains beyond the scope of the institution.
This null hypothesis is supported under the standard preference framework of pure self-
ishness as well as under the assumption of outcome-based social preferences. Applied to
our experimental framework, if players are purely selfish, they should contribute zero in
“PGG Left” independent of the presence or the type of the institution that governs “PGG
Right” as contributing zero maximizes their own monetary payo↵.6 Similarly, the presence
of an equilibrium with positive contributions in “PGG Left” according to outcome-based
social preferences in the formulation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) does not depend on the
presence or the type of an institution in “PGG Right”.7
However, if institutions have an impact beyond changing monetary incentives, it is possible
that cooperative behavior in environments outside the scope of the institution is influenced
by its presence and type. The null hypothesis thus serves as a benchmark against which
to test such non-standard e↵ects of institutions. In the following, we develop hypotheses
regarding the potential impact of an institution on cooperative behavior beyond its scope
through its e↵ect on people’s preferences and beliefs.
Several studies have argued that institutions can a↵ect behavior, in addition to their
influence on monetary incentives, through a crowding out or crowding in of intrinsic
incentives (for survey articles, see Frey and Jegen (2001), Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel
6For a detailed summary of the theoretical predictions of standard preferences, see Appendix 4.A.1
7We refer the reader to Proposition 4 in the paper of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Importantly, the
conditions on the parameters for which any positive contribution level can be sustained as an equilibrium
are not a↵ected by our setup with two separate contribution decisions, or the implementedMCR in “PGG
Right”. If cooperation can exist in equilibrium, the theory is silent about the level of cooperation.
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(2011), and Bowles and Polan´ıa-Reyes (2012)).8 If institutions a↵ect intrinsic preferences,
then this change of preferences will spill over and influence a person’s behavior even in
domains in which the institution is not active (Frey, 1993). In the following, we discuss
several reasons why that might be the case for the kind of institutions that are active in
our experiment.
On the one hand, institutions can decrease people’s intrinsic willingness to act prosocially.
For example, people might be averse against exogenous control of their behavior because
it compromises their sense of authority (Deci, 1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Deci, Koestner,
and Ryan, 1999). Hence, an institution that enforces prosocial behavior might lead people,
even those who are intrinsically motivated to act prosocially, to resist the rule when
possible. While such resistance is not possible in domains that are regulated by the
institution, it can manifest itself in domains beyond the scope of the institution. In
our setting, such strict exogenous control of behavior is only active in the “PGG Right”
of the “exogenous institution” treatment, in which contribution of the full endowment is
exogenously enforced by a harsh punishment rule. Therefore, such resistance to exogenous
control can show up in lower contribution levels in the “PGG Left” compared to the setting
without an institution or when the institution was endogenously adopted.9
On the other hand, institutions can also increase people’s intrinsic willingness to act
prosocially. For example, Krupka and Weber (2013) hypothesize that people have a
preferences to follow known social rules or norms.10 If the MCR signals such a social
8Previous studies mostly compare behavior in the absence of an institution with behavior in the pres-
ence of an institution. For example, Bowles and Polan´ıa-Reyes (2012) interpret results of Irlenbusch
and Ruchala (2008) as evidence of crowding out because, after the introduction of a monetary incen-
tive, prosocial behavior should have risen even more than it did, compared to the absence of monetary
incentives. Our experimental design provides a cleaner test of such an e↵ect because we directly elicit
intrinsic preferences for cooperation both before and after an institution was active. To the best of our
knowledge, our study is first that provides such clean evidence on the causal e↵ect of institutions on
intrinsic preferences for cooperation.
9It has also been argued that institutions can signal distrust and that the feeling of being distrusted
crowds out intrinsic motivation (Frey, 1997; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel, 2011). For example, Falk and
Kosfeld (2006) provide evidence for such a channel in an experiment in which a principal could either let
an agent freely choose an e↵ort level or enforce a minimum level of e↵ort. They find that agents provide
lower e↵ort when a minimum level was enforced than when they were free to choose and that subjects
felt mistrusted when a minimum e↵ort was enforced (see also Tausch (2014)). Belot and Schro¨der (2015)
provide field experimental evidence that such an e↵ect might spill over to other domains. They find
that monitoring workers in one dimension of their task (work quality) has detrimental e↵ects on their
performance in another, non-monitored dimensions of their task (punctuality) compared to when there
was no monitoring of the first dimension. In our setting, subjects might interpret votes for a high MCR in
the “endogenous institution” treatment as a signal of distrust, and react by lowering their contributions in
“PGG Left”. However, since institutions are implemented by mutual agreement and the induced higher
cooperation benefits all group members and not only a principal, we don’t expect this channel to play a
major role.
10Relatedly, the literature on the expressive function of laws proposes that laws can change behavior
not only through changing incentive (the sanction function of law), but also through changing the norms
that people obey (the expressive function of law) (Cooter, 1998; Funk, 2007; Kahan, 1998; Sunstein,
1996).
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rule, then subjects might prefer to comply with it, even in the unregulated “PGG Left”.
Such an e↵ect would supposedly be stronger in the “endogenous institution” treatment
when the MCR is implemented by the voting process and thus reflects a social rule that
everyone in the group agreed to.
Relatedly, Rand, Peysakhovich, Kraft-Todd, Newman, Wurzbacher, Nowak, and Greene
(2014) propose a theory of human cooperation which argues that cooperativeness is driven
by intuitive heuristics, whereas own payo↵ maximizing behavior is driven by deliberative
thinking (Social Heuristics Hypothesis, henceforth SHH). Peysakhovich and Rand (forth-
coming) demonstrate how such intuitive heuristics can be shaped by the environments.
In stage 1 of their experiments, subjects play an infinitely repeated game that establishes,
depending on the treatment, either a cooperative or a non-cooperative norm. In stage 2,
subjects play a range of punishment games. They find that subjects who established a
cooperative norm in stage 1 are more likely to punish selfishness in stage 2. They also
show that subjects who score lower on the CRT, and are thus more likely to rely on intu-
itive responses, are especially prone to exhibit the e↵ect, which is interpreted as support
of the SHH. In our setting, the MCR in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the
“endogenous institution” treatment provides a simple heuristic of cooperativeness that
is easily applied: contribute as much as in “PGG Left” as the MCR dictates for “PGG
Right”.
Together, these arguments suggest that institutions can have an e↵ect on preferences
for cooperation and that the e↵ect might di↵er depending on whether the institution is
exogenously imposed or endogenously adopted. However, since the direction of the e↵ect
is not unambiguous, our hypothesis posits an e↵ect, but leaves open the direction.
Hypothesis 2 (Preference e↵ect). The presence of an institution that enforces cooperation
increases or decreases intrinsic preferences for cooperation.
A second channel through which an institution can a↵ect cooperative behavior in the
unregulated “PGG Left” is its e↵ect on beliefs about others’ cooperativeness. It has been
established that many people act as conditional cooperators in public goods games (Fis-
chbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr, 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). That is, they are willing
to cooperate if their group members also cooperate, but unwilling to do so if their group
members don’t cooperate. If this is the case, beliefs are an important determinant of
cooperative behavior as the higher a person’s beliefs about his group members’ coopera-
tiveness the more he will cooperate himself (Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010). Therefore,
if institutions directly change beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, this would provide
a channel through which cooperative behavior is a↵ected even beyond the scope of the
97
institution.11
In the “endogenous institution” treatment, beliefs about others’ cooperativeness in “PGG
Left” can be influenced by the MCR if the voting mechanism provides subjects with an
opportunity to learn about their group members’ characteristics. This could be the case
if subjects interpret, e.g., a fellow group member’s vote for an MCR of 20 as a signal
that that group member understands the game and agrees that high contribution levels
are what the group should strive for. If all group members vote for 20, the whole group
signals understanding of the game and the socially e cient solution. Such knowledge
about the group members’ understanding of what should be played can increase beliefs
about their cooperativeness in “PGG Left” in which a similar problem has to be solved.
If an increase in beliefs translates into higher cooperativeness, the e↵ect could be inter-
preted as an institution’s e↵ect on trust. Indeed, it has also been argued that institutions
can have a positive e↵ect on trust and trustworthiness (Tabellini, 2008). For example,
Cassar, D’Adda, and Grosjean (2014) finds experimental evidence that the presence of an
exogenously implemented institution that increases honest behavior increases trust levels
even after the institution stopped existing.
On the other hand, theoretical work in the principal-agent literature suggests that endoge-
nously implemented institutions can provide a signal for the type-distribution of agents
that goes in the other direction (Sliwka, 2007; van der Weele, 2009; Benabou and Tirole,
2011, WP). Specifically, an institution can signal a high proportion of selfish agents if
the person implementing the institution has knowledge of the type-distribution. Gal-
biati, Schlag, and van der Weele (2013) test this hypothesis in a lab experiment in which
sanctions could either be implemented exogenously, or by a subject with information ad-
vantage about the other subjects’ cooperativeness. They find that cooperative subjects
perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal about the types of the other sub-
jects to which they react by lowering their cooperativeness. In our setup, if a subject
votes for a high MCR, this can signal that he believes that his group members are selfish.
Thus, his vote can influence the beliefs of the rest of the group either because they trust
this judgment better than their own and update their own beliefs, or because they know
that, if the other player is conditionally cooperative and thinks he plays with selfish group
members, he will cooperate little in “PGG Left”.
The game-theoretical literature on play in separate games suggests that, when playing
su ciently complex games, players categorize games into equivalence classes. Within
one equivalence class, players then reduce complexity by bundling some aspect across all
11Note that the institutionally regulated contributions in “PGG Right” themselves don’t lead to in-
creased contributions for conditional cooperators in “PGG Left” as the conditional cooperators themselves
are also forced to contribute the same amount as their group members. Only if their conditional cooper-
ation schedule would have a slope above one, which is empirically seldom observed, would they increase
their contribution in “PGG Left”.
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games. For example, players can bundle their beliefs about the behavior of the other
players in an equivalence class (Jehiel, 2005). Evidence in support of this hypothesis was
found in Huck, Jehiel, and Rutter (2011). In our setting, if players think of the two
simultaneously played public goods games as belonging to one equivalence class, belief
bundling implies that players believe that the average contribution of the other players is
the same in the two simultaneously played games. Having an institution in the regulated
game can thus raise the belief about average contributions in the unregulated game.12
Together, these arguments suggest that institutions, especially endogenously implemented
ones, can have an e↵ect on beliefs about others’ cooperativeness. However, since the
direction of the e↵ect is not unambiguous, our hypothesis again posits an e↵ect, but
leaves open the direction.
Hypothesis 3 (Belief e↵ect). The presence of an institution that enforces cooperation in
one domain increases or decreases beliefs about the cooperativeness of group members in
domains beyond the scope of the institution.
Both, the preference and the belief channel can lead to an e↵ect of an institution in “PGG
Right” on cooperative behavior in “PGG Left”.13 In addition, there exist channels that
predict a change of behavior in “PGG Left” independent of a change in preferences or
beliefs. For example, pure altruism theory suggests that people want a certain amount of
public good provided and are indi↵erent whether it is provided through their own contri-
bution or those of others. Therefore, the theory would suggest that an institution, which
enforces contributions in the “PGG Right”, crowds out voluntary contributions to “PGG
Left” one-to-one if the institutionally enforced level lies above what the subject wanted
to achieve (Bernheim, 1986; Andreoni, 1988). Similarly, if people have preferences of im-
pure altruism and care about their own contribution to the public good, the institution
in “PGG Right” will lead to incomplete crowding out of own contributions (Andreoni,
1990). Together, these e↵ects give rise to the main hypothesis on the behavioral e↵ect
of institutions. In Section 5, we will return to discuss our results in light of the di↵erent
possible channels.
Hypothesis 4 (Behavioral e↵ect). The presence of an institution that enforces cooper-
ation in one domain increases or decreases cooperative behavior in domains beyond the
scope of the institution.
Some existing evidence from sequentially played games suggests that there is, indeed, a
positive e↵ect of monetary incentive for cooperativeness on cooperation even after the
12For other types of bundling, see Grimm and Mengel (2012).
13Note that there also exist feedback mechanisms between beliefs and preferences. If a group member
thinks the others’ preferences have changed, this will also change his belief about their behavior. Similarly,
if a group member’s belief about others’ cooperativeness increases, this might change his preferences if
he wants to conform with the group.
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monetary incentive is removed. For example, Brandts and Cooper (2006) find that while
increasing the monetary incentives for cooperation in repeatedly played weak-link games
increases cooperative behavior, a decrease in monetary incentives has only little e↵ect
on subsequent cooperation rates, thus leading to higher cooperation rates compared to a
situation in which the monetary incentive was never present. In a similar vein, Galbiati
and Vertova (2008) study how altering a minimal contribution requirement a↵ects con-
tributions in repeated public goods games. They, too, find that an increase in minimum
contribution requirements leads to increased contributions but that a decrease does not
lead to a similar decrease in contributions.
A series of studies has shown that endogenously adopted rules are more e↵ective in in-
stilling socially desirable behavior in social-dilemma situations than exogenously imposed
rules (Dal Bo´, Foster, and Putterman, 2010; Sutter, Haigner, and Kocher, 2010; Tyran
and Feld, 2006). Most related to our study, Kamei (2014, WP) studies two simultaneously
played public goods games with endogenously or exogenously implemented institutions.
The endogenously implemented institution was either present in both games, or one of
the two games was monitored by the endogenous and the other by the exogenous institu-
tion. He finds that, if an institution was endogenously implemented in one game, this had
positive e↵ects on contributions in both games, thereby demonstrating a spillover e↵ect
between two institutionally governed environments.
4.3 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of five parts. The main part (Part II) measures the extent
to which a norm for cooperation that is monitored and enforced by an institution in
one environment spills over to an identical environment that is not monitored by such an
institution. The treatments in Part II vary the way in which the institution is implemented
in order to distinguish between spillovers that are generated by endogenously adopted
versus exogenously imposed institutions. Parts I, III and IV are preference and belief
elicitation stages that help to disentangle whether treatment e↵ects are driven by changes
in subjects’ beliefs or preferences. These parts are identical across all treatments. Finally,
in Part V, individual characteristics are collected. An overview of the experimental design
is provided in Table 4.1.
The social dilemma situation considered is a standard public goods game. Across all parts
and treatments, the following characteristics of the public goods game are held constant.
It is played in groups of four members (n = 4). Each group member is endowed with 20
points (w = 20) and can decide how many points to keep for himself and how many to
contribute to a public good. The sum of points contributed to the public good is doubled
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and equally distributed among all members of the group (a = 0.5). We chose a “relatively
high” MPCR of 0.5 in order to incite some level of cooperation also in the baseline which
enables us to also detect a potential crowding out e↵ect on cooperation. Thus, given the
contribution of all group members (g = (g1, ..., g4)) the material payo↵ of group member
i in the standard game is equal to
⇡i(g) = 20  gi + 0.5
4X
j=1
gj
Before explaining Part I, III, IV, and V in more detail, we begin with describing Part II,
which is the main part of the experiment.
Table 4.1: Overview of experimental design
Part I Preference and belief elicitation
(randomly determined group)
Part II 20 periods of ‘PGG Left’ and ‘PGG Right’
(new group - absolute stranger matching)
No Exogenous Endogenous
institution institution institution
Part III Preference and belief elicitation
(same group as in Part II)
Part IV Preference and belief elicitation
(new group - absolute stranger matching)
Part V Individual characteristics
4.3.1 Part II: Treatment stage
At the beginning of Part II, subjects were randomly matched into groups of four subjects
with whom they had not interacted with before (absolute stranger matching). Within Part
II, subjects played repeatedly, for 20 periods, with the same group of subjects (partner
matching). Part II di↵ers between three treatments which are called “no institution”,
“exogenous institution”, and “endogenous institution” treatment.
“No institution” treatment
In each period of the “no institution” treatment, subjects simultaneously played two
public goods games with the same group members. The parameters of both games are as
specified before. The two public goods games were displayed next to each other on the
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same computer screen. In the following, these games are called “PGG Left” and “PGG
Right”.14
Before subjects made their contribution decision in the two public goods games, they
were asked to indicate, separately and in each period, their belief about the average
contribution of the other three group members in the two games. Belief elicitation was
not incentivized monetarily, but subjects were asked to enter their best estimates.
After that, subjects indicated, separately, their contribution to the public good in both
games. Subjects were endowed with 20 points for each game and were free to contribute
any integer value between zero and 20 points to each game.
At the end of each period, subjects were informed about the contributions of all group
members to the public good and their payo↵s from both games. Contributions were
displayed in descending order and it was not possible to identify which member of the
group contributed which number of points to the public good in the two games. The
payo↵ of each period consisted of the sum of the payo↵s of the two games. At the end of
the experiment, the payo↵ of one of the 20 periods was randomly selected to be paid out
to the subjects. Specifically, the payo↵ for the randomly selected period was multiplied
by 20, so that it counted for all 20 periods.
“Exogenous institution” treatment
We implemented two treatments in order to test our hypothesis. In both treatments,
the setup of “PGG Left” is identical to the “no institution” treatment, i.e. subjects
were free to contribute any integer amount between zero and 20 points to the public
good. The payo↵ structure of “PGG Right”, however, is a↵ected by the treatments. In
particular, “PGG Right” is governed by an institution that monitors the group members’
contributions in “PGG Right” and punishes those members that contribute less than a
certain minimum contribution requirement (henceforth MCR). Specifically, the income
from “PGG Right” of any group member who contributes at least as many points to the
group account as specified by theMCR is not a↵ected by theMCR, but any group member
who contributes fewer points to the group account than the minimum level specified by the
MCR loses any income from “PGG Right” in that period. In the “exogenous institution”
treatment, the MCR is set to 20. The payo↵ from “PGG Right” in the “exogenous
14In the experiment, the two games were neutrally labeled as “Task Left” and “Task Right”.
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institution” treatment treatment is thus determined as follows:
⇡i(g) =
8>><>>:
20  gi + 0.5 ·
4X
j=1
gj if gi = 20
0 if gi < 20
(4.1)
Note that, if one group member is penalized for contributing less than the contribution
threshold in “PGG Right”, the incomes of the other group members are not a↵ected.
Thus, the other group members still benefit from any contributions made by any group
member in “PGG Right”.
Again, the total per-period payo↵ of each subject was equal to the sum of the payo↵s
in “PGG Left” and “PGG Right”. Also, the payo↵ of one the 20 periods was randomly
selected to be implemented and multiplied by 20.
“Endogenous institution” treatment
The “endogenous institution” treatment consists of two stages that are repeated in every
period: an institution formation stage and a contribution stage.
Institution formation stage: The institution is identical to the MCR in the “exogenous
institution” treatment. The only di↵erence is that, in the “endogenous institution” treat-
ment, each group endogenously selects the MCR for that group in each period, instead of
facing an exogenously set contribution threshold of 20. Each member of the group casts
a vote on which MCR it would like to be implemented by specifying an integer value
between zero and 20. After all votes are collected, the lowest contribution threshold that
was voted for by any group member is implemented as the MCR for that period. This
mechanism ensured unanimity in the sense that each group member agreed that the MCR
should be at least as high as the implemented one.
At the end of the institution formation stage, the subjects were informed about the im-
plemented MCR for that period and the votes that were cast. Votes were displayed in
descending order and it was not possible to identify which member of the group voted for
which MCR.
After the subjects were informed about the MCR but before they made their contribution
decisions, they were asked to indicate their belief about the other group members’ average
contribution to the two public goods games.
Contribution stage: The contribution stage is identical to the “exogenous institution”
treatment with the only di↵erence that the MCR of each period is endogenously selected
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in the institution formation stage and not exogenously set to 20. Hence, the payo↵ from
“PGG Right” in the “endogenous institution” treatment is thus determined as follows:
⇡i(g1, ..., g4) =
8>><>>:
20  gi + 0.5 ·
4X
j=1
gj if gi   MCR
0 if gi < MCR
(4.2)
Again, the total per-period payo↵ of each subject was equal to the sum of the payo↵s
in “PGG Left” and “PGG Right”. Also, the payo↵ of one the 20 periods was randomly
selected to be implemented and multiplied by 20.
4.3.2 Part I, III & IV: Preference and belief elicitation stages
We elicited cooperative preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness (i) before
the main task (Part I), (ii) afterward with respect to the identical group from Part II (Part
III) and (iii) with respect to a new group of randomly-selected participants that they had
never interacted with before (Part IV). In these parts, there is no institution and the
parts are identical across all three treatments. The elicitation tests whether institutions
influence preference and beliefs even after they cease to exist and even towards new
counterparts that subjects had never interacted with before. Furthermore, it helps to
disentangle whether a spillover is driven by changes in subjects’ preferences or by changes
in subjects’ beliefs about the cooperativeness of others.
Each part consisted of two stages: a belief-elicitation stage and a preference-elicitation
stage. In the belief-elicitation stage, we elicited subjects’ beliefs about the contribution
decision of the other three group members in the standard public goods game with the
Truncated Interval Scoring Rule introduced by Schlag and van der Weele (2012). Specifi-
cally, subjects were asked to provide two integer values as the upper and the lower bound
of the range of values that they believe will contain the actual average contribution of
the other group members (rounded to the nearest integer). Subjects could earn 20 ECU
if they specified a range that consists of only one number and that number was equal to
the actual rounded average unconditional contribution of the other group members in the
preference-elicitation stage. For each unit that the provided range increased in width, a
subject’s potential earnings decreased by one ECU. Subjects earned nothing if the actual
average contribution of others lied outside of the range they specified. Thus, subjects were
incentivized to reveal their true beliefs as precisely as possible. The width of the range
they provided is a measure of how certain they were of the correctness of their beliefs.
While unconditional contributions are informative about cooperative behavior, they are
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not informative about a subject’s preference for cooperation. In the preference-elicitation
stage, we therefore employ a variant of the strategy method as introduced by Fischbacher,
Ga¨chter, and Fehr (2001) to elicit subjects’ conditional contributions. This procedure has
the advantage that, in contrast to observations of unconditional contribution decisions,
conditional contribution decisions are not confounded with beliefs, and are thus infor-
mative about a subject’s true preference for cooperation. Subjects first indicated their
unconditional contribution to a standard public good game. Then, subjects were asked
to specify how much they would contribute for each of the 21 possible levels of aver-
age contribution (rounded to integers) of the other group members. Three of the four
members of a group were then randomly selected to implement their specified uncondi-
tional contribution; for the last member of the group his conditional contribution decision
was implemented given the rounded average of the other group members’ unconditional
contributions.
4.3.3 Part V: Individual characteristics
In Part V, we collected individual characteristics from each of the participants. First,
we elicited cognitive ability by use of the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) and
rule-following propensity via the rule-following task introduced in Kimbrough, Miller, and
Vostroknutov (2014). In the rule-following task, subjects saw, on their computer screen,
two baskets, one yellow and one blue, and a ball. They were told that they would earn 2
ECU if they place the ball in the yellow basket and 1 ECU if they place the ball in the
blue basket. However, they were also told that the rule is to place the ball in the blue
basket. This procedure was repeated for 30 balls. The number of balls placed in the blue
basket is informative about a subject’s propensity to follow an arbitrary rule that does
not have any payo↵ consequences.
Additionally, we asked the subjects a series of questions in order to elicit their attitudes
towards risk, patience, altruism, reciprocity and trust. These questions were English
translations of the ones included in several waves of the German Socio Economic Panel
(SOEP) survey.15 The behavioral validity of the risk and patience question was established
with incentivized experiments in Dohmen, Falk, Hu↵man, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner
(2011) and Vischer, Dohmen, Falk, Hu↵man, Schupp, Sunde, and Wagner (2013).16
At the very end of the experiment, we asked subjects about their age, gender, and aca-
demic major. At that point we also asked them about their reasoning when making the
contribution decision for “PGG Left” and, in the “endogenous institution” treatment,
about their reasoning when making the voting decision for the MCR in “PGG Left”.
15All questions are reproduced in full in Appendix 4.A.4.
16Another example of the use of these questions is Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, and Kosse (2012).
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4.3.4 General procedures
Before subjects entered the lab, they randomly drew a place card that specified at which
computer terminal to sit. Subjects found paper copies of the consent form and the in-
structions for Part I at their assigned computer terminals. Subjects were informed that
the experiment consists of several parts, but were not informed about the content of each
part. At beginning of each part, the instructions of that part were read aloud to ensure
common information regarding the content of the instructions. The instructions to Part
I and Part II included comprehension questions that had to be answered correctly before
the respective part could begin. The original English instructions for Part I and the “en-
dogenous institution” treatment of Part II can be found in Appendix B, together with
screen shots of the decision-relevant stages. All sessions were conducted in English.
We conducted six sessions on three consecutive days in November 2014 in Maastricht,
Netherlands, with 136 subjects in total and six sessions on three consecutive days in
February 2015 in Zurich, Switzerland, with 136 subjects in total. Overall, 272 subjects
participated. Treatments were randomized across sessions and each treatment was run
four times, twice in the morning and twice in the afternoon, twice in Maastricht and twice
in Zurich. Each subject participated only once. Overall, 92 subjects participated in the
“no institution” treatment, 88 subjects in the “exogenous institution” treatment, and 92
subjects in the “endogenous institution” treatment.
The sessions in Zurich took place at the Laboratory for Behavioral and Experimental Eco-
nomics of the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich and the sessions in
Maastricht took place at the Behavioral and Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEE-
lab) of the School of Business and Economics at Maastricht University. The experiments
were run with the software “z-Tree” (Fischbacher, 2007). We used the softwares “hroot”
(Bock, Baetge, and Nicklisch, 2014) and “ORSEE” (Greiner, 2003) for recruitment. Sub-
jects were students from the University of Zurich, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
in Zurich and Maastricht University.
Sessions lasted about 2.5 hours. Payo↵s from the experiment, denominated in “ECU,”
were converted into money at the rate of 65 ECU to AC1 (about $1.25 at the time of
the experiment) in Maastricht and 100 ECU to CHF 3 (about $3.25 at the time of the
experiment) in Zurich. Subjects were paid out anonymously at the end of the experiment.
On average, subjects earned AC22.52 in Maastricht, with no show-up fee, and CHF 55.45
in Zurich , which included a show-up fee of CHF 10. The total payo↵ from the experiment
equaled the sum of the payo↵s in the five parts (plus the payment of a show-up fee in
Zurich). Subjects learned about the results of and their payo↵s from the five individual
parts only at the very end of the experiment, after all decisions were made.
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4.4 Results
This section presents the results of the experiment. First, Part II, the main part of the
experiment, is analyzed and then Part I, III, and IV are analyzed.
4.4.1 Part II
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of behavior in the three treatments. For each treatment,
it shows the average contributions to “PGG Left”, “PGG Right”, and the MCR. As
can be seen, institutions are indeed e↵ective in enforcing cooperative behavior in “PGG
Right”. Averaged over all periods, contributions to “PGG Right” are significantly higher
in the “exogenous institution” treatment (19.95) and the “endogenous institution” treat-
ment (16.95) compared to the “no institution” treatment (8.83) (Wilcoxon ranksum tests,
p=0.000 and p=0.000).17 The di↵erence between the “exogenous institution” treatment
and the “endogenous institution” treatment is also significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test,
p=0.000). The correlation between the MCR and contributions to “PGG Right” is pos-
itive and significant (Spearman’s rho, ⇢=0.933, p=0.000). The MCR in “PGG Right”
was violated in only 2 out of 1840 observations in the “endogenous institution” treatment
and in only 7 out of 1769 observations in the “exogenous institution” treatment. Hence,
subjects clearly understood the incentive e↵ects of the MCR and a higher MCR led to
higher contributions in “PGG Right”.
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Figure 4.1: Contributions to “PGG Left”, “PGG Right”, and the MCR.
As a result, profits from “PGG Right” were significantly higher in the “exogenous institu-
tion” treatment (39.95) and in the “endogenous institution” treatment (36.95) compared
to the “no institution” treatment (28.83) (Wilcoxon ranksum tests, p=0.000 and p=0.000).
The di↵erence between the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous in-
stitution” treatment is also significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p=0.000). Thus, the
17If not otherwise noted, reported results are from two-sided tests, based on part-II group averages.
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institution was e↵ective in raising cooperativeness and the increase in cooperation led to
a large and significantly positive welfare e↵ect for group members.
Spillover e↵ects
In order to study the e↵ects of an institution beyond its scope, we next analyze the
contributions to “PGG Left” in the three treatments. As is visible in Figure 4.1 the
contributions to “PGG Left” and “PGG Right” in the “no institution” treatment closely
track each other and follow the typical declining pattern found in standard public goods
games. Average contributions to “PGG Left” start at 11.45 in the first period and decline
steadily to 4.33 in the last period and, averaged over all periods, there are no significant
di↵erences between contribution to “PGG Left” and “PGG Right” in the “no institution”
treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p=0.637). This shows that the subjects did not
behave systematically di↵erent in the two games, when no institution was present.
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Figure 4.2: Contributions to “PGG Left”.
In the “exogenous institution” treatment, average contributions to “PGG Left” start at
12.16 in the first period, reach a maximum of 14.53 in the third period, and thereafter
decline steadily to 6.93 in the last period. In the “endogenous institution” treatment, on
the other hand, average contributions to “PGG Left” start at 11.60 in the first period
and remain in a corridor between 11.60 and 13.20 until the 20th period, in which they
decline to 9.27. As can be seen from Figure 4.2, which displays average contributions
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to “PGG Left”, the contributions to “PGG Left” in the “exogenous institution” treat-
ment and the “endogenous institution” treatment generally lie above the contributions
to “PGG Left” in the “no institution” treatment. Over all periods, the average contri-
butions to “PGG Left” are significantly higher in the “exogenous institution” treatment
and the “endogenous institution” treatment compared to the “no institution” treatment
(12.53 and 12.27 vs 9.15, respectively; Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p=0.026 and p=0.047)
and there is no significant di↵erence between the “exogenous institution” treatment and
“endogenous institution” treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p=0.856). Thus, our first
result is:
Result 1. The presence of an institution that enforces cooperation in one domain leads
to increased cooperation in other domains, beyond the reach of the institution.
As a result of higher cooperation in “PGG Left”, over all periods, the average profits
from “PGG Left” are significantly higher in the “exogenous institution” treatment and
the “endogenous institution” treatment compared to the “no institution” treatment (32.53
and 32.27 vs 29.15; Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p=0.026 and p=0.047). Thus, institutions
that regulate cooperation have significantly positive indirect welfare e↵ects beyond their
immediate e↵ect in the regulated environment. The di↵erence between the “exogenous
institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment is not significant.
Table 4.2: Contributions to “PGG Left”
Period
All 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20
No Inst. 9.15 11.15 10.23 8.07 7.14
(N=23) (1.07) (.91) (1.21) (1.34) (1.12)
Exo. Inst. 12.53 13.70 13.18 12.98 10.27
(N=22) (.95) (.83) (1.17) (1.28) (1.12)
Endo. Inst. 12.27 12.25 12.70 12.35 11.78
(N=23) (1.02) (.84) (1.13) (1.32) (1.31)
p-value 0.026** 0.047** 0.073* 0.013** 0.052*
(No vs. Exo.)
p-value 0.047** 0.386 0.153 0.020** 0.013**
(No vs. Endo.)
p-value 0.856 0.166 0.716 1.000 0.427
(Exo. vs. Endo.)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors. p-values are from
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
While aggregate levels of contributions do not di↵er between the “exogenous institution”
treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment, a closer look at Figure 4.2 suggests
that the institution formation process can have an impact on the stability of the spillover.
On average, contributions to “PGG Left” in the “exogenous institution” treatment still
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decline over periods, while contributions to “PGG Left” in the “endogenous institution”
treatment are almost perfectly flat until the last period. Indeed, while average contri-
butions decline significantly over periods in both the “no institution” treatment and the
“exogenous institution” treatment (Spearman’s rho, ⇢=-0.289, p=0.000 and ⇢=-0.174,
p=0.000, respectively), this is not the case in the “endogenous institution” treatment
(Spearman rank order correlation, ⇢=-0.022, p=0.639). Table 4.2 confirms that the ad-
vantage of the “endogenous institution” treatment emerges over time. In the first ten
periods, there is no significant di↵erence between the “no institution” treatment and the
“endogenous institution” treatment. However, in the last 10 periods, a significant dif-
ference emerges and, due to the decay of contributions in the “exogenous institution”
treatment, the contributions in the last 5 periods are highest in the “endogenous institu-
tion” treatment.
Result 2. The institution formation process matters for the stability of the spillover in
cooperative behavior. Exogenously imposed institutions do not lead to a stable contribution
level beyond their scope, while endogenously adopted institutions do.
These first two results are confirmed by regression analyses (see column (1) and (2) of
Table 4.3). They show that, indeed, the exogenously imposed institution leads to a parallel
upward shift of contribution levels, while the endogenously implemented institution leads
to a change in the slope of contributions over time, thereby o↵setting the typical decline
in contributions.
In order to better understand the driving forces behind results 1 and 2, we next analyze,
separately, the treatment e↵ects on the decision to contribute and on the level of contri-
bution (see Figure 4.3). Averaged over all periods, groups in the “exogenous institution”
treatment show no significantly di↵erent proportion of subjects who contribute a positive
amount than groups in the “no institution” treatment (78.18 percent vs 76.25 percent,
Wilcoxon ranksum test, p=0.991). However, with 85.76 percent, groups in the “endoge-
nous institution” treatment have a higher proportion of positive contributions and the
di↵erence to the “no institution” treatment and the “exogenous institution” treatment
is marginally significant (Wilcoxon ranksum tests, p=0.098 and p=0.108, respectively).
Thus, there exists some evidence that endogenously adopted institutions decrease free-
riding behavior even in environments beyond their scope. If contributions are positive,
they are significantly higher in the “exogenous institution” treatment (15.64) and the “en-
dogenous institution” treatment (13.91) than in the “no institution” treatment (11.49)
(Wilcoxon ranksum tests, p=0.001 and p=0.073, respectively). The di↵erence between
the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment is not
significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p= 0.128).
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Table 4.3: Treatment e↵ect on contributions to
“PGG Left”
(1) OLS (2) Tobit panel
Contributions Contributions
No (constant) 12.208⇤⇤⇤ 13.911⇤⇤⇤
(1.012) (1.234)
Exo 2.540⇤ 3.886⇤⇤
(1.405) (1.771)
Endo 0.477 0.690
(1.380) (1.750)
Period -0.291⇤⇤⇤ -0.490⇤⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.039)
Exo ⇥ Period 0.080 0.105⇤
(0.088) (0.056)
Endo ⇥ Period 0.252⇤⇤⇤ 0.475⇤⇤⇤
(0.091) (0.055)
Observations 5440 5440
Adjusted R2 0.062
Notes: The independent variable is contributions to
“PGG Left”. The omitted category “No (constant)”
is a binary variable that indicates participation in
the “no institution” treatment. Robust standard
errors (clustered on part-II groups in model (1)) in
parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The contribution dynamics in Panel 4.3b of Figure 4.3 reveal an intriguing pattern. The
correlation between periods and contributions, when only positive contributions are con-
sidered, is significant and negative in the “no institution” treatment (⇢=-0.159, p=0.001),
not significant in the “exogenous institution” treatment (⇢=-0.021, p=0.675), and signif-
icant and positive in the “endogenous institution” treatment (⇢=0.180, p=0.000). Result
3 summarizes these findings.18
Result 3. Endogenously implemented institutions decrease free-riding behavior in do-
mains beyond their scope compared to exogenously imposed institutions and to when no
institution exists. Exogenously and endogenously implemented institutions have a positive
and significant e↵ect on the level of contributions beyond their scope compared to the “no
institution” treatment.
18These findings are mostly in line with the results from a 2-stage hurdle model that seperately estimates
the treatment e↵ect on the decision to contribute and the level of contribution (see Table A.1 in Appendix
4.A.2).
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Figure 4.3: Decision to contribute and level of contribution
Next, we take a closer look at the relationship between the MCR and the contributions
to “PGG Left”. Taking group averages over all periods, contributions to “PGG Left”
and the MCR in “PGG Right” are highly correlated (Spearman’s rank order correlation,
⇢=0.315, p=0.009).19 However, such a positive e↵ect of theMCR can be driven by a simple
selection e↵ect: those groups that consist of more cooperative subjects vote for a higher
MCR and also contribute more to the public good. To test whether this happens, we focus
on the two cases of MCR’s for which we have observations of randomly selected groups
and groups that implemented the respective MCR endogenously. First, we only consider
groups that implemented a MCR of zero and compare their contributions to groups in the
“no institution” treatment (in which there is also an implicit MCR of zero). Subjects in
groups with an endogenously implemented MCR of zero contribute, on average, 7.64 to
“PGG Left”, compared to 9.15 in the “no institution” treatment. This di↵erence is not
statistically significant (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p=0.572).20 Similarly, the 19 groups in
the “endogenous institution” treatment that implemented a MCR of 20 in some periods,
contributed, on average, 12.34 to the “PGG Left” in those periods, compared to 12.53 in
the “exogenous institution” treatment. Again, this di↵erence is not statistically significant
(Wilcoxon ranksum test, p=0.875). Hence, there is no di↵erence in contributions between
19This result is confirmed in regression analysis (see column (1) of Table A.2 in Appendix 4.A.2).
Column (2) shows that being in the “exogenous institution” treatment or the “endogenous institution”
treatment compared to the “no institution” treatment has, if anything, a negative e↵ect on contributions
to “PGG Left” in addition to the e↵ect through the MCR. However, the regression results have to be
interpreted with caution as, in the “endogenous institution” treatment, behavior in past periods might
both influence the implemented MCR and contributions to “PGG Left”.
20To obtain the data for the “endogenous institution” treatment, we average a group’s contribution to
“PGG Left” over all periods in which that group implemented a MCR of zero. In total, only six groups
implemented a MCR of zero at least once.
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groups that endogenously implemented aMCR of zero or 20 and randomly selected groups.
Thus, it seems that at least those groups which implemented the maximal and the minimal
possible MCR are not di↵erent in their contribution behavior than randomly selected
groups.21
Result 4. Exogenously and endogenously implemented institutions increase cooperative-
ness beyond their scope through their e↵ect on the MCR. There is no evidence that selec-
tion e↵ects drive the results in the “endogenous institution” treatment.
Voting behavior
This sections aims to shed some light on subjects’ voting decisions. Figure 4.4 shows the
fraction of votes for a MCR of 20, a MCR between 10 and 19, and a MCR of below 10 over
the 20 periods. It is visible that subjects don’t immediately vote for high MCR’s, but that
votes for the highest possible MCR of 20 continuously increase and reach levels of over
80 percent after period 10. At the beginning, the largest fraction of subjects voted for a
MCR between 10 and 19. As the fraction of votes for 20 increases, this fraction decreases
continuously over time. Of the three groups, the fraction of subjects voting for a MCR
below 10 is always the smallest and decreasing over time, but, until the end, there are,
in every period, 3 to 4 subjects (out of a total of 92) who vote for such a low threshold.
Due to the voting mechanism, which implements the minimal vote as the group’s MCR,
even when most subjects vote for 20, there can be a large fraction of groups with a MCR
below 20. This is most apparent in the first period, where 17.39 percent of votes for a
MCR of below 10 translate into 56.52 percent of groups with a MCR of below 10 and
28.26 percent of votes for a MCR of 20 translate into zero groups with a MCR of 20. In
period 20, 89.13 percent of subjects vote for a MCR of 20 and 65.22 percent of groups
implement it.
In the following, we study the determinants of the voting decision in period 1, before
subjects had any experience with the mechanism and, thus, before their voting decision is
endogenous to their experience in previous periods. In the first period of Part II, subjects
vote, on average, for a MCR of 13.83 with the largest fractions voting for a MCR of 20
(28.26 percent), 15 (17.39 percent), and 10 (11.96 percent). There exists a significantly
positive correlation between a subject’s belief about his group members’ contributions
21It could be that the MCR influences contributions in “PGG Left”, because subjects simply imitate
their contributions to “PGG Right” in “PGG Left”. Fortunately, we have a good proxy to detect such
behavior. Namely, subjects entered their contributions to “PGG Left” and “PGG Right” separately and
we recorded the time at which each subject submitted their contribution decisions. Therefore, we know
which decision they submitted first and how much time passed in between the two decisions. If subjects
simply copied their contributions in “PGG Right” to “PGG Left”, then this should hold especially for
those who entered their decision for “PGG Right” first and who let little time pass in between their two
decisions. However, we don’t find this to be the case. For a detailed analysis, see Appendix 4.A.2.
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Figure 4.4: Voting behavior
in Part I and his vote in period 1. There also exists a significantly positive correlation
between a subject’s unconditional contribution decision in Part I and his vote in the first
period of Part II. All other independent characteristics show no significant correlation
(see Table A.4 in Appendix 4.A.2).22 The decision to vote for any positive level of MCR
is quite di↵erent from the decision to vote for the maximal possible MCR of 20 (only
the latter can be interpreted as a signal that the subject wanted to maximize social
e ciency). However, probit estimations for the e↵ects of the individual characteristics on
the likelihood to vote for a MCR of 20 no e↵ect of any of the individual characteristics
(see Table A.7 in Appendix 4.A.2).23
22OLS regressions of these individual characteristics on the vote in period 1 deliver a slightly di↵erent
picture. Only a subject’s unconditional contribution in Part I significantly predicts his vote in period 1
of Part II, but not his beliefs. Furthermore, there is a significantly positive e↵ect of the stated level of
altruism on the vote in period 1 (see A.5 in Appendix 4.A.2).
23The large amount of low votes in period 1 is puzzling as the guaranteed payo↵ from “PGG Right”,
when a MCR of 20 is implemented, is 40 ECU, whereas the actual average payo↵ from “PGG Right”
in period 1 was 32.12 ECU and only 4 out of 92 subjects earned more than 40 ECU in period 1. It
could be that subjects overestimate their group members’ contributions and think they can earn more
than 40 ECU by exploiting them. However, subjects’ expected payo↵s from “PGG Right”, given their
contributions and their (non-incentivized) beliefs about the contributions of their group members, is even
significantly lower (31.14 ECU) than their actual payo↵ (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.072), and this
holds also for the pivotal voters in period 1, who had no reason to update their beliefs between their
vote and their contribution decision. Hence, these pivotal voters knowingly voted for a MCR that gave
them a suboptimal payo↵. Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´, and Eyster (2015) suggest that subjects underestimate the
equilibrium e↵ects of institutions which can lead to the demand for suboptimal policies. Whether this is
also the case in our data and what drives subjects to pick up higher MCR’s over time lies beyond the
scope of the present analysis.
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4.4.2 Part I, III, IV - E↵ects on beliefs and preferences
Having established that there exists a significant spillover e↵ect between domains that
are regulated by an institutions and those that are not, we next analyze the persistent
treatment e↵ects on beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, cooperative behavior and pref-
erences for cooperation. The four panels of Figure 4.5 show, across parts and treatments,
(a) the average midpoints of the stated belief intervals, (b) the average width of the stated
belief intervals, (c) the average unconditional contributions, and (d) the average condi-
tional contributions. The associated mean values, standard errors and econometric test
results are summarized in Appendix 4.A.3, Tables A.11 to A.14. In Part I and for all four
variables, there are no statistically significant di↵erences across treatments.
E↵ects on beliefs about others’ cooperativeness
The data collected in the belief elicitation stage reveals that, in the “no institution”
treatment, the midpoint of the provided belief interval is, on average, significantly lower
in Part III (8.14) and IV (9.78) than in Part I (11.88) (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.000
and p=0.002). Thus, beliefs about others’ cooperativeness decrease in the “no institution”
treatment, but it decreases significantly more so for the group that one was associated
with in Part II, than for a new group of strangers (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.005).
In the “exogenous institution” treatment, the pattern is di↵erent. While the beliefs are
a bit lower in Part III (11.41) and IV (11.74) than in Part I (11.98), the di↵erences
are not statistically significant. Thus, the exogenously imposed institution stopped the
deterioration of beliefs. In the “endogenous institution” treatment, we find that beliefs
about cooperativeness with regard to the part-II group members (Part III) is significantly
higher than in Part I or Part IV (13.02 vs 11.42 and 11.97; Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p=0.018 and p=0.005). Furthermore, there is no significant di↵erence between Part I and
Part IV (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.260). Hence, the endogenously implemented
institution has a positive e↵ect on beliefs about own group members and keeps beliefs
about strangers’ cooperativeness stable.
Across treatments, we find that beliefs are significantly higher in the “exogenous insti-
tution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment than in the “no institu-
tion” treatment in Part III (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.012 and p=0.000) and Part
IV (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.047 and p=0.014). There is no significant di↵erence
between the two treatments with institution.24
24If we look at the very first period of Part II, when no history of play has been established and be-
liefs cannot be influenced by anything else than the institution, (non-incentivized) beliefs about others’
contributions are highest in the “exogenous institution” treatment (12.43), and lower in the “no institu-
tion” treatment (11.34) and the “endogenous institution” treatment (11.5). However, only the di↵erence
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Result 5. The presence of an institutions that enforces cooperation positively a↵ects be-
liefs about the cooperativeness of group members even after the institution stopped existing.
This extends to beliefs about cooperativeness of strangers, with whom there was no prior
interaction.
The average width of the belief interval in each part is not significantly di↵erent across
treatments. In all treatments, however, the average width is smaller in Part III than in
Part I. This di↵erence is significant in the “no institution” treatment and the “endoge-
nous institution” treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.055 and p=0.032). On the
other hand, the average width in Part IV is higher than in Part I in all treatments and
significantly higher in the “endogenous institution” treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
p=0.011). Thus, the repeated play over 20 periods increases subjects’ confidence in their
forecast of their group members’ behavior, but this does not extend to strangers.
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Figure 4.5: Treatment e↵ects on beliefs and cooperation.
E↵ects on pro-social behavior
Turning to the unconditional contributions in the three parts, a pattern similar to the
one for beliefs emerges. In the “no institution” treatment, unconditional contributions
between the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “no institution” treatment is significant at the
10 percent level (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p=0.097).
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drop significantly from, on average, 11.37 in Part I to 6.95 in Part III (Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, p= 0.000) and 8.65 in Part IV (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.002). In the
“exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment, on the
other hand, unconditional contributions remain stable, on average, with no significant
di↵erences between Part I, Part III and Part IV. Across treatments, this leads to signifi-
cantly higher unconditional contribution levels in the “exogenous institution” treatment
and the “endogenous institution” treatment compared to the “no institution” treatment
in Part III (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p=0.009 and p=0.002) and significantly higher con-
tributions in the “endogenous institution” treatment compared to the “no institution”
treatment in Part IV (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, p=0.017).25
Result 6. The presence of an institutions that enforces cooperation increases cooperative
behavior even after the institution stopped existing. This extends to cooperative behavior
towards strangers, with whom there was no prior interaction.
E↵ects on preferences for cooperation
Importantly, institutions do not only have an e↵ect on cooperative behavior and beliefs
about others’ cooperativeness, but also on preferences for cooperation. We find that the
average conditional contribution, i.e. the average amount a subject decided to contribute
conditional on all possible contributions of others (see Figure 4.5d), in Part III and Part
IV is significantly higher in the “exogenous institution” treatment (7.60 in Part III, 7.64
in Part IV) and the “endogenous institution” treatment (7.69 in Part III, 7.20 in Part IV)
than in the “no institution” treatment (5.63 in Part III, 5.76 in Part IV) (Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests, p=0.005 and p=0.008 in Part III, p=0.011 and p=0.024 in Part IV). As with
beliefs and unconditional contributions, this di↵erence is mainly driven by a deterioration
of preferences for cooperation in the “no institution” treatment from Part I to Part III and
IV which does not happen in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous
institution” treatment. Table 4.4 confirms the last four results in regression analyses.
25The finding that contributions in the “endogenous institution” treatment are significantly higher than
in the “no institution” treatment also provides some evidence that contributions in the “PGG Left” of
Part II were not higher in the “endogenous institution” treatment because group members were afraid of
loosing the institution in “PGG Right” in the next period. In Part III and IV there is no more institution
to implement and contributions are still significantly higher in the “endogenous institution” treatment.
Furthermore, it also provides evidence against a risk channel. In Part II, if agent’s are uncertain about
their group members’ contributions, contributing to the public good becomes a risky choice for conditional
cooperators. If they have decreasing absolute risk aversion they will contribute/invest more when they
receive a sure income in “PGG Right”. This channel cannot explain the findings in Part III and IV in
which there is no such di↵erence in guaranteed income across treatments (however, subjects could still
be influenced by their, in expectation, higher income from Part II).
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Table 4.4: Treatment e↵ects on belief midpoint, belief width, unconditional
contribution and average conditional contribution.
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS
Belief Belief Unconditional Avg. conditional
midpoint width contribution contribution
Part I (constant) 11.880⇤⇤⇤ 6.370⇤⇤⇤ 11.370⇤⇤⇤ 7.860⇤⇤⇤
(0.378) (0.281) (0.590) (0.493)
Exo 0.103 -0.017 0.028 0.620
(0.574) (0.363) (0.886) (0.661)
Endo -0.462 -0.315 0.163 0.086
(0.527) (0.366) (0.847) (0.601)
Part III -3.745⇤⇤⇤ -0.880⇤⇤ -4.424⇤⇤⇤ -2.229⇤⇤⇤
(0.701) (0.406) (0.873) (0.426)
Part III ⇥ Exo 3.176⇤⇤⇤ 0.653 3.424⇤⇤⇤ 1.348⇤
(1.045) (0.569) (1.268) (0.681)
Part III ⇥ Endo 5.342⇤⇤⇤ 0.293 4.924⇤⇤⇤ 1.969⇤⇤⇤
(0.927) (0.513) (1.235) (0.689)
Part IV -2.103⇤⇤⇤ 0.098 -2.717⇤⇤⇤ -2.096⇤⇤⇤
(0.508) (0.254) (0.722) (0.343)
Part IV ⇥ Exo 1.865⇤⇤ -0.052 1.615⇤ 1.260⇤
(0.713) (0.373) (0.954) (0.659)
Part IV ⇥ Endo 2.641⇤⇤⇤ 0.587⇤ 2.554⇤⇤ 1.348⇤⇤
(0.699) (0.342) (1.012) (0.561)
Observations 816 816 816 816
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.016 0.046 0.026
Notes: The omitted category “Part I (constant)” is a binary variable indicating
the decision was made in Part I. Robust standard errors (clustered on part-II
groups) in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Result 7. The presence of an institutions that enforces cooperation increases preferences
for cooperation even after the institution ceases to exist. This extends to preferences for
cooperation towards strangers, with whom there was no prior interaction.
In the following, we take a closer look at the treatment e↵ects on conditional contributions
and thus prosocial preferences. The three panels of Figure 4.6 show the average conditional
contribution levels for each possible average contribution by others in the three parts. As
can be seen from the figure, in Part III and IV the conditional contributions in the “no
institution” treatment lie considerably below the level of conditional contributions in the
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“exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment.
0
5
10
15
20
Co
nd
tio
na
l C
on
tri
bu
tio
n
0 5 10 15 20
Contribution by others
No institution
 Exo. institution
 Endo. institution
 45-degree line
(a) Part I
0
5
10
15
20
Co
nd
tio
na
l C
on
tri
bu
tio
n
0 5 10 15 20
Contribution by others
No institution
 Exo. institution
 Endo. institution
 45-degree line
(b) Part III
0
5
10
15
20
Co
nd
tio
na
l C
on
tri
bu
tio
n
0 5 10 15 20
Contribution by others
No institution
 Exo. institution
 Endo. institution
 45-degree line
(c) Part IV
Figure 4.6: Conditional contribution
Two di↵erent preference changes could lead to an overall positive e↵ect of institution on
preferences for cooperation compared to when no institution was present. First, insti-
tutions could change preferences for pro-social behavior which would lead to a constant
increase or decrease in contributions for all possible average contribution levels of the
other group members, thus a↵ecting the intercept of the conditional contribution sched-
ule. Second, institutions could also a↵ect preferences for reciprocation which would show
up as a change in the slope of conditional contribution decisions. For example, this would
be the case if a subjects who experienced the institution increases his contributions when
his group members contribute a lot, but not when his group members contribute little,
compared to a subject who did not experience the institution.
In order to disentangle these two potential e↵ects, we regress the treatment, the parts,
the contributions by others, and the interactions between the variables on the conditional
contribution decisions (see Table A.15 in Appendix 4.A.3). The regression confirms that
contribution schedules are significantly increasing in the other group members’ contribu-
tions and that, in Part I, there are no significant di↵erences between the three treatments
with the exception of the slope of the contribution schedule in the “exogenous institu-
tion” treatment, which is marginally significantly steeper than in the “no institution”
treatment. In both, the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institu-
tion” treatment, the intercept of the contribution schedules is significantly higher than in
the “no institution” treatment in parts III and IV. The slope, however, is not significantly
di↵erent in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treat-
ment compared to the “no institution” treatment in parts III and IV. Thus, these findings
indicate that the institution changes preferences for pro-social behavior and not prefer-
ences for reciprocation and that this change in preferences for pro-social behavior extends
to behavior directed at strangers, with whom a subject never interacted before.
Result 8. The presence of an institutions that enforces cooperation increases preferences
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for prosocial behavior, but leaves reciprocal preferences unchanged.
4.5 Discussion
Next, we discuss our results with respect to the di↵erent hypotheses suggested in Sec-
tion 2. To begin with, the data clearly rejects the null hypothesis of no institutional
influence on cooperative behavior in the “PGG Left” of Part II. In both, the “exogenous
institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution” treatment, contribution levels in
“PGG Left” are significantly higher than in the “no institution” treatment. Furthermore,
as documented in Part III and IV, cooperative behavior, preferences for cooperation and
beliefs about others’ cooperativeness are significantly higher in the “endogenous institu-
tion” treatment and the “exogenous institution” treatment. This confirms our hypothesis
2-4.
In the following, we try to shed light on which of the proposed channels drive the results for
cooperative preferences and beliefs. First, since we don’t find a crowding-out of intrinsic
preferences for cooperation, the proposed pure altruism channel, the control aversion
channel in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the distrust aversion channel in the
“endogenous institution” treatment can be dismissed as not being dominant in a↵ecting
preferences for cooperation and cooperative behavior in our setting.
Second, one potential preference channel was that subjects follow simple rules that are
provided to them and that the institution in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the
“endogenous institution” treatment provides such a rule. Our measure of rule-following
propensity (RFT), which was elicited in Part V, allows us to detect such an e↵ect. If
the institution is perceived as a rule that one should follow, then subjects who are more
willing to follow a randomly chosen rule in the RFT, should, ceteris paribus, also be more
willing to follow the social rule highlighted by the institution in the “exogenous institu-
tion” treatment and “endogenous institution” treatment (cf. Kimbrough and Vostroknu-
tov (forthcoming)). However, we find no significant e↵ects of the interactions between
subjects’ rule-following propensity and the “exogenous institution” treatment or the “en-
dogenous institution” treatment on contributions to “PGG Left”, (see column (1) of Table
A.9 in Appendix 4.A.2). Thus, there is no evidence that subjects interpret the institution
as a rule that they have to follow.
Third, another potential preference channels is provided by the Social Heuristics Hy-
potheses (SHH) which proposes that cooperative norms establish simple heuristics that
are followed intuitively. We can test whether channel is active using the results from
the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which was elicited in Part V. The CRT measures
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how intuitively subjects answer questions, with a lower score meaning higher reliance on
intuition. Therefore, if the institution in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the
“endogenous institution” treatment provides a heuristic for cooperation, then, according
to the SHH, subjects who score lower on the CRT should follow the norm intuitively and
contribute more in those treatments (cf. the argument in Peysakhovich and Rand (forth-
coming), chapter 3.2.3). Indeed, we find a negative e↵ect of the interaction between the
CRT score and the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution”
treatment on contributions to “PGG Left”. This e↵ect is significant for the “exogenous
institution” treatment (see column (2) of Table A.9 in Appendix 4.A.2). Therefore, we
find evidence that the exogenously implemented institution provides a cooperative norm
which is followed intuitively.
Fourth, we argued that institutions could a↵ect beliefs about group member’s coopera-
tiveness and that this influences contributions of conditional cooperators. Part III and IV
demonstrate that institutions indeed a↵ect beliefs positively compared to the case without
an institution. More specifically, in the “endogenous institution” treatment, beliefs could
be a↵ected if the others’ votes and thus the implemented institution provides a valuable
signal about their cooperative type. However, as suggested, the e↵ect could go both ways.
Higher implemented MCR’s could signal that group members are selfish and cooperation
needs to be enforced, or that group members understood the game and agreed that high
contributions are what the group should aim for. While beliefs about others’ cooperative-
ness are higher in the “endogenous institution” treatment than in the “no institution”
treatment in both, Part III and IV, we also find that, within the “endogenous institution”
treatment, beliefs in Part III are significantly higher than in Part I, before the institution
was implemented, and also significantly higher than in Part IV, when subjects played
with new group members. The same patter is not found in the “exogenous institution”
treatment where beliefs are not significantly di↵erent across parts. Thus, this can be
interpreted as evidence that the process of endogenous implementation provides subjects
with a signal that is specific to their group members’ cooperativeness and that is not
informative about cooperativeness of strangers. Indeed, when only considering period 1
of Part II, subjects’ non-incentivized beliefs about the average contribution of their group
members show a positive and significant correlation with their group members’ average
vote for the MCR (Spearman’s rho, ⇢=0.306, p=0.003). This indicates that the vote is
interpreted as a positive signal about others’ cooperativeness.26
To summarize, we find some evidence that institutions induce a behavioral spillover to non-
monitored domains through their e↵ect on beliefs and by providing an intuitive heuristic
that people follow. We don’t find evidence that subjects interpret the institution like as
26A regression analysis confirms that this result is robust to the inclusion of the implemented MCR
and a subject’s own vote as control variables (see Table A.10 in Appendix 4.A.2).
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a rule that they should follow. However, e↵ects on beliefs and preferences also reinforce
each other, which makes it di cult to disentangle the relative strength of the di↵erent
channels.27
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate that simple institutions which regulate
cooperative behavior a↵ect behavior beyond their scope. We also document an inter-
esting di↵erence between exogenously imposed and endogenously adopted institutions.
The exogenously imposed institution leads to an immediate positive impact on voluntary
cooperation, but the decline in cooperation over time is similar to the case without an
institution. The endogenous institution, on the other hand, produces a weaker immedi-
ate e↵ect, which was partly due to adoption of weaker institution in the beginning, but
the e↵ect perseveres more strongly than that of the exogenous institution. We also find
that both types of institutions have e↵ects that persist beyond their presence. Treated
subjects have more positive beliefs about others’ contributions and they contribute more,
both conditionally and unconditionally. These e↵ects also extend to new counterparts,
with whom no previous interaction occurred.
Beyond any immediate e↵ects of institutions on pro-social behavior, understanding “spillover
e↵ects” is important. Our results demonstrate that regulating cooperation does not nec-
essarily crowd out intrinsic motivation to cooperate. In fact, the opposite holds true.
Preferences for pro-social behavior are persistently higher even after an institution ceases
to exist compared to when such an institution never existed. This has important con-
sequences for policy making as regulators can hope for sizable spillover e↵ects that have
to be taken into account when deciding about the introduction of new regulations and
policies.
From a broader perspective, our study can also speak to the literature on the interrelation
between institutions and culture (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006, 2008; Tabellini,
2008, 2010; Alesina and Guiliano, forthcoming). The set of beliefs and preferences that
the members of a society hold are commonly acknowledged as important determinants
of a society’s culture. With this regard, we provide causal evidence that institutions can
shape culture persistently, and that the institutionally induced change in culture can lead
to sizable welfare e↵ects.
27There is a highly significant positive correlation in Part I between beliefs about others’ cooperativeness
and preferences for cooperation as measured by the average conditional contribution (Spearman’s rho,
⇢=0.353, p=0.000).
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Of course, more work is necessary to understand when and how the behavioral e↵ects of
institutions extend to unregulated behaviors and settings. In principle, many di↵erent in-
stitutions and settings are conceivable. For example, while our exogenously implemented
institution costlessly enforced the socially most e cient cooperation level, many insti-
tutions in the real world come with some form of ine ciency or related costs. Future
research should therefore examine how robust our findings are to the variation of the
institutions and whether di↵erent institutions can lead to di↵erent, interesting e↵ects.
Furthermore, future work should shed light on how institutions that regulate behavior in
one environment spill over to influence di↵erent kinds of behavior in other, unregulated
environments. For example, an interesting question could be how an institution that fos-
ters competitive behavior in one setting a↵ects behavior in another setting that relies on
cooperation, or vice versa. The present study should therefore be seen as the starting
point of a new area of research that can extend in many promising directions.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Theoretical predictions
Standard preferences
If we assume that players are only motivated to maximize their own material payo↵,
the game-theoretic predictions for the one-stage game are as follows. Since the material
payo↵ from the “PGG Left” is independent of the “PGG Right”, and vice versa, a player’s
overall utility Ui is additively separable into a utility-part from “PGG Left”, uLi , and one
from “PGG Right”, uRi .
Given the contributions of all other players, the utility uLi of player i from “PGG Left” is
equal to
uLi (g
L
1 , ..., g
L
4 ) = w
L   gLi + a
4X
j=1
gLj , (4.3)
where 0 < a < 1 < 4a. The parameter a models the marginal per capita return (MPCR)
from contributing to the public good, wL is the per period endowment, and gLi is player
i’s contribution to the public good in “PGG Left”. Assumption a < 1 implies that
contributing nothing is the strictly dominant action for every player with standard pref-
erences because every player’s material payo↵ is maximized by contributing zero to the
public good regardless of the other players’ contributions. In consequence, the strategy
profile (0, 0, 0, 0) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the “PGG Left”.
The utility uRi of player i from “PGG Right” is equal to
uRi (g
R
1 , ..., g
R
4 ) =
8>><>>:
wR   gRi + a
4X
j=1
gRj if g
R
i   MCR
0 if gRi < MCR,
(4.4)
where MCR is the minimum contribution requirement that is implemented by the insti-
tution. The MCR is equal to zero in the “no institution” treatment, equal to wR in the
“exogenous institution” treatment, and equal to the outcome of the voting process, in the
“endogenous institution” treatment.
Because the institution deters any material incentive to contribute less than the contri-
bution threshold, the dominant action for every player with standard preferences is to
contribute MCR in “PGG Right”. In the “no institution” treatment, the strategy profile
{(0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0)}) is thus the unique Nash equilibrium of the entire game. The
numbers in brackets stand for the contribution to “PGG Left” (left number) and “PGG
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Right” (right number). In the “exogenous institution” treatment, the strategy profile
{(0, wR), (0, wR), (0, wR), (0, wR)} is the unique Nash equilibrium.
In the “endogenous institution” treatment, every period consists of two stages - a voting
stage and a contribution stage. Therefore both the voting behavior in the first stage as well
as the later contributions are part of a player’s optimizing strategy. In a subgame perfect
equilibrium, players decide on their actions in every stage, rationally anticipating the
outcome of future stages by applying backward induction. Consider first the contribution
stage. If players attempt to maximize their material payo↵, they contribute nothing in
the “PGG Left” and MCR in “PGG Right”. Given this behavior in the contribution
stage one can derive the optimal voting behavior in the voting stage. The optimal vote
v⇤i depends on the other players’ votes v i:
v⇤i 2 [min{v i}, wR]
Assumption 4a > 1 implies that all players are better o↵ if everyone contributes his full
endowment to the public good. Therefore, voting vi = wR is a weakly dominant strategy:
If all other players voted wR, player i is strictly better o↵ by voting vi = wR as well. If at
least one player voted less than wR, player i is indi↵erent between voting for a threshold
in [min{v i}, wR].
PROPOSITION 1: If players have standard preference, there exists a unique strict sub-
game perfect equilibrium in which all players vote to set the MCR equal to the full endow-
ment (vi = wR 8 i), contribute their full endowment in “PGG Right” (gRi = wR 8 i), and
contribute nothing in “PGG Left” (gi = 0 8 i).28
28Note that there exist other subgame perfect equilibria in which at least two players vote for the same
MCR vi = vj < wR, vi = min {(vi)i2I}, all contribute vi = MCR in “PGG Right” and 0 in “PGG Left”.
This is the case because deviating in their vote from vi would not change the implemented threshold
(only the smallest vote counts).
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4.A.2 Part II - Results
Treatment e↵ects on the decision to contribute and the level of contribution
Table A.1 shows the two stages of a hurdle model that estimates, separately, the treat-
ment e↵ect on the decision to contribute and the level of contribution. In the first stage,
a Probit regression estimates the e↵ect of treatments, period, and treatment-period in-
teractions on the decision to contribute. Only the period has a significant (and negative)
e↵ect on the decision to contribute. Both, the “exogenous institution” treatment and
the “endogenous institution” treatment don’t influence the decision to contribute signifi-
cantly, compared to the “no institution” treatment. They also do not alter the dynamics.
Over time, more and more group members decide not to contribute at all and this e↵ect
is not statistically di↵erent in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endoge-
nous institution” treatment compared to the “no institution” treatment. The second
stage of the hurdle model estimates a linear regression model truncated at zero. Hence,
it measures the e↵ect on the level of contribution, if a subject decided to contribute a
positive amount. Here, we do find that the “exogenous institution” treatment leads to
significantly higher contribution levels compared to the “no institution” treatment, while
there is no such e↵ect for the “endogenous institution” treatment. On the other hand,
we again find that later periods lead to significantly lower contribution rates and that
this e↵ect is not attenuated when subjects are in the “exogenous institution” treatment.
In the “endogenous institution” treatment, however, the trend is significantly di↵erent
from the “no institution” treatment. In fact, in the “endogenous institution” treatment,
the decline over time is more than o↵set, such that, for those who decide to contribute,
contribution levels rise over time.
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Table A.1: Contributions to “PGG Left”
(1) Hurdle (2) Hurdle
Stage 1 Stage 2
No (constant) 1.294⇤⇤⇤ 13.213⇤⇤⇤
(0.193) (0.921)
Exo -0.087 3.142⇤⇤⇤
(0.285) (1.069)
Endo 0.298 -0.341
(0.290) (1.242)
Period -0.052⇤⇤⇤ -0.161⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.068)
Exo ⇥ Period 0.013 0.122
(0.015) (0.086)
Endo ⇥ Period 0.006 0.289⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.097)
Observations 5440 4357
Notes: The omitted category “No (con-
stant)” is a binary variable that indicates
participation in the “no institution” treat-
ment. The dependent variable in regres-
sion (1) is a dummy that equals 1 if contri-
bution is strictly positive and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable in regression (2) is
the level of contributions to “PGG Left”.
(1) Probit regression. (2) Linear regres-
sion truncated at 0. Robust standard er-
rors (clustered on part-II groups) in paren-
theses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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The e↵ect of the MCR on contributions to “PGG Left”
Table A.2: The e↵ect of the MCR on contribu-
tions to “PGG Left”
(1) OLS (2) OLS
Contribution Contribution
MCR 0.198⇤⇤⇤ 0.311⇤⇤⇤
(0.064) (0.117)
Period -0.211⇤⇤⇤ -0.291⇤⇤⇤
(0.039) (0.048)
No (constant) 11.189⇤⇤⇤ 12.208⇤⇤⇤
(0.909) (1.012)
Exo -3.687
(2.736)
Endo -2.852⇤
(1.673)
Exo ⇥ Period 0.080
(0.088)
Endo ⇥ Period 0.109
(0.086)
Observations 5440 5440
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.078
Notes: The omitted category “No (constant)” is
a binary variable that indicates participation in
the “no institution” treatment. Robust standard
errors (clustered on part-II groups) in parenthe-
ses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Evidence against imitation
In this part, we test whether our findings are driven by subjects who simply copied their
decisions in “PGG Right” to “PGG Left”. If that would be the case, then it could
explain the treatment e↵ects that we find, because, due to the MCR, contributions to
“PGG Right” are higher in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous
institution” treatment than in the “no institution” treatment. As imitation is an intuitive
heuristic that doesn’t require much thinking, we believe that this would be especially the
case for those subjects who submit their contribution decision for “PGG Right” first and
let little time pass in between the two decisions.
Averaged over all periods, the proportion of subjects who submitted their contribution
decision for “PGG Right” before their decision for “PGG Left” is indeed higher in the
“exogenous institution” treatment (34.55 percent) and the “endogenous institution” treat-
ment (37.17 percent) compared to the “no institution” treatment (30.49 percent). Fur-
thermore, in the very first period, the di↵erences are even more pronounced (26.14 percent
in the “exogenous institution” treatment and 31.52 percent in the “endogenous institu-
tion” treatment vs 15.22 percent in the “no institution” treatment).
However, when we regress the decision to submit first in “PGG Right” on the absolute dif-
ference in contributions between “PGG Left” and “PGG Right” (see column (1) of Table
A.3), we find that there is no e↵ect in the “no institution” treatment and the “exogenous
institution” treatment, but a significantly positive e↵ect in the “endogenous institution”
treatment. Thus, submitting the contribution to “PGG Right” first significantly increases
the di↵erence in contributions between the “PGG Right” and “PGG Left” in the “en-
dogenous institution” treatment compared to the “no institution” treatment, which is the
opposite of what one would expect in case of an imitation e↵ect.
Second, when regressing the absolute di↵erence in time between the submissions of con-
tributions in the two games on the absolute di↵erence in contributions (see column (2) of
Table A.3), we don’t find any significant e↵ect.
Finally, when regressing all interactions on the absolute di↵erence in contribution between
“PGG Left” and “PGG Right” (see column (3) of Table A.3), we find that, in the “no
institution” treatment, the di↵erence in contributions significantly decreases the shorter
is the di↵erence in time between the two decisions, but only if one decides about “PGG
Right” first. Thus, this looks like an imitation e↵ect. However, the e↵ect is completely
counteracted in the “exogenous institution” treatment and the “endogenous institution”
treatment. Thus, to summarize, we don’t find any evidence that imitation e↵ects could
explain our results.
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Table A.3: Influence of decision sequence and time on the di↵erence in contributions
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS
Di↵. in contr. Di↵. in contr. Di↵. in contr.
Period 0.135⇤⇤⇤ 0.140⇤⇤⇤ 0.138⇤⇤⇤
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
No (constant) 0.563 0.426 0.468
(0.507) (0.507) (0.503)
Exo 5.328⇤⇤⇤ 5.470⇤⇤⇤ 5.306⇤⇤⇤
(1.090) (1.023) (1.099)
Endo 3.000⇤⇤⇤ 3.447⇤⇤⇤ 2.898⇤⇤⇤
(0.919) (1.070) (0.993)
Right first -0.039 -0.781⇤
(0.295) (0.408)
Right first ⇥ Exo 0.437 1.279
(0.830) (0.896)
Right first ⇥ Endo 1.362⇤ 2.182⇤⇤
(0.764) (0.964)
Time di↵ 0.043 0.034
(0.043) (0.036)
Time di↵ ⇥ Exo -0.009 0.010
(0.060) (0.064)
Time di↵ ⇥ Endo 0.008 0.030
(0.085) (0.084)
Right first ⇥ Time di↵ 0.641⇤⇤⇤
(0.226)
Right first ⇥ Time di↵ ⇥ Exo -0.694⇤⇤⇤
(0.244)
Right first ⇥ Time di↵ ⇥ Endo -0.672⇤⇤⇤
(0.250)
Observations 5440 5440 5440
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.125 0.128
Notes: The dependent variable is the absolute di↵erence in contributions between
“PGG Left” and “PGG Right”. The omitted category “No (constant)” is a binary
variable that indicates participation in the “no institution” treatment. “Right first” is
a binary variable that is 1 if the subject submitted his decision for “PGG Right” first
and zero otherwise. “Time di↵” is the time di↵erence, in seconds, between the first
and the second submission of contribution decision. Robust standard errors (clustered
on part-II groups) in parentheses.
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Voting behavior
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Potential channels
Table A.9: Rule-following channel and So-
cial Heuristics Hypothesis
(1) OLS (2) OLS
Contribution Contribution
No (constant) 11.701⇤⇤⇤ 9.293⇤⇤⇤
(1.246) (1.303)
Exo 2.062 5.321⇤⇤⇤
(1.878) (1.794)
Endo 1.123 2.652
(1.658) (1.754)
Period -0.291⇤⇤⇤ -0.280⇤⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.061)
Exo ⇥ Period 0.080 0.062
(0.088) (0.096)
Endo ⇥ Period 0.252⇤⇤⇤ 0.210⇤
(0.091) (0.106)
RFT 0.037
(0.038)
Exo ⇥ RFT 0.036
(0.066)
Endo ⇥ RFT -0.047
(0.059)
CRT 1.636⇤⇤⇤
(0.468)
Exo ⇥ CRT -1.462⇤⇤
(0.669)
Endo ⇥ CRT -1.152
(0.928)
Observations 5440 3900
R2 0.069 0.080
Notes: The independent variable is con-
tributions to “PGG Left”. The omitted
category “No (constant)” is a binary vari-
able that indicates participation in the “no
institution” treatment. Fewer observation
in model (2) as we excluded those sub-
jects that indicated that they had seen the
CRT before. Robust standard errors (clus-
tered on part-II groups) in parentheses. ⇤
p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Votes as a signal of
others’ cooperativeness (period
1)
(1) OLS
Belief
MCR -0.062
(0.152)
Vote 0.137
(0.102)
Avg. vote of others 0.499⇤
(0.246)
Constant 3.151
(3.719)
Observations 92
R2 0.167
Notes: The independent vari-
able is beliefs about others av-
erage contribution to “PGG
Left”. Robust standard errors
(clustered on part-II groups) in
parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤
p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
145
4.A.3 Part I, III, IV - Results
Table A.11: Midpoint of belief interval
Part I Part III Part IV
p-value
(I vs. III)
p-value
(I vs. IV)
p-value
(III vs. IV)
No Inst. 11.88 8.14 9.78 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(N=23) (.38) (.94) (.70)
Exo. Inst. 11.98 11.41 11.74 0.987 0.871 0.291
(N=22) (.44) (.78) (.59)
Endo. Inst. 11.42 13.02 11.96 0.018** 0.260 0.005***
(N=23) (.37) (.66) (.52)
p-value 0.892 0.012** 0.047**
(No vs. Exo.)
p-value 0.422 0.000*** 0.013**
(No vs. Endo.)
p-value 0.346 0.196 0.708
(Exo. vs. Endo.)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Across treatments: p-values from
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Within treatments: p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
Table A.12: Width of belief interval
Part I Part III Part IV
p-value
(I vs. III)
p-value
(I vs. IV)
p-value
(III vs. IV)
No Inst. 6.37 5.49 6.47 0.055* 0.681 0.004***
(N=23) (.28) (.31) (.24)
Exo. Inst. 6.35 6.13 6.40 0.464 0.672 0.337
(N=22) (.23) (.36) (.24)
Endo. Inst. 6.05 5.47 6.74 0.032** 0.011** 0.000***
(N=23) (.24) (.35) (.27)
p-value 0.829 0.317 0.900
(No vs. Exo.)
p-value 0.441 0.708 0.574
(No vs. Endo.)
p-value 0.328 0.191 0.374
(Exo. vs. Endo.)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Across treatments: p-values from
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Within treatments: p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
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Table A.13: Undonditional contributions
Part I Part III Part IV
p-value
(I vs. III)
p-value
(I vs. IV)
p-value
(III vs. IV)
No Inst. 11.37 6.95 8.65 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.005***
(N=23) (.60) (1.01) (.88)
Exo. Inst. 11.40 10.40 10.30 0.398 0.168 0.961
(N=22) (.67) (.85) (.75)
Endo. Inst. 11.53 12.03 11.37 0.553 0.738 0.212
(N=23) (.61) (1.05) (.87)
p-value 0.901 0.009*** 0.173
(No vs. Exo.)
p-value 0.783 0.002*** 0.017**
(No vs. Endo.)
p-value 0.750 0.195 0.159
(Exo. vs. Endo.)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Across treatments: p-values from
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Within treatments: p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
Table A.14: Avg. conditional contributions
Part I Part III Part IV
p-value
(I vs. III)
p-value
(I vs. IV)
p-value
(III vs. IV)
No Inst. 7.86 5.63 5.76 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.867
(N=23) (.50) (.54) (.48)
Exo. Inst. 8.48 7.60 7.64 0.064* 0.127 0.948
(N=22) (.45) (.51) (.65)
Endo. Inst. 7.95 7.69 7.20 0.412 0.094* 0.023**
(N=23) (.35) (.35) (.45)
p-value 0.414 0.005*** 0.011**
(No vs. Exo.)
p-value 0.861 0.008*** 0.024**
(No vs. Endo.)
p-value 0.401 0.991 0.829
(Exo. vs. Endo.)
Notes: For each subject the average conditional contribution over all possible contributions,
from zero to 20, of other group members is calculated and then averaged across part-II
groups. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Across treatments: p-values from
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Within treatments: p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
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Table A.15: Treatment e↵ects on preferences for cooperation
(1) OLS
Conditional contribution
Part I (constant) 2.147⇤⇤⇤ (0.510)
Part III -1.078⇤⇤ (0.415)
Part IV -1.085⇤⇤ (0.434)
Exo -0.696 (0.674)
Endo -0.613 (0.677)
Part III ⇥ Exo 1.327⇤⇤ (0.635)
Part III ⇥ Endo 1.248⇤⇤ (0.613)
Part IV ⇥ Exo 1.779⇤⇤ (0.714)
Part IV ⇥ Endo 1.063⇤ (0.596)
Contribution of others 0.571⇤⇤⇤ (0.051)
Part III ⇥ Contribution of others -0.115⇤⇤⇤ (0.037)
Part IV ⇥ Contribution of others -0.101⇤⇤⇤ (0.031)
Exo ⇥ Contribution of others 0.132⇤ (0.067)
Endo ⇥ Contribution of others 0.070 (0.073)
Exo ⇥ Part III ⇥ Contribution of others 0.002 (0.068)
Endo ⇥ Part III ⇥ Contribution of others 0.072 (0.065)
Exo ⇥ Part IV ⇥ Contribution of others -0.052 (0.051)
Endo ⇥ Part IV ⇥ Contribution of others 0.028 (0.069)
Observations 17136
Adjusted R2 0.254
Notes: The omitted category “Part I (constant)” is a binary variable indi-
cating the decision was made in Part I. Robust standard errors (clustered
on part-II groups) in parentheses. ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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• Risk question (SOEP, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009)
How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take
risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Please tick a box on the scale where the value 0 means: “not at all willing to take
risks” and the value 10 means: “very willing to take risks”.
• Patience question (SOEP, 2008)
How would you describe yourself: Are you generally an impatient person, or someone
who always shows great patience?
Please tick a box on the scale where the value 0 means: “very impatient” and the
value 10 means: “very patient”.
• Altruism question (SOEP, 2004, 2008)
Is it important for you to be there for others?
Please tick a box on the scale where the value 0 means:“not at all important” and
the value 4 means: “very important”.
• Reciprocity question (SOEP, 2005)
For the questions below, please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means:
“does not apply to me at all” and the value 7 means: “applies to me perfectly”.
(1) If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it.
(2) If I su↵er a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter
what the cost.
(3) If somebody puts me in a di cult position, I will do the same to him/her.
(4) I go out of the way to help somebody who has been kind to me before.
(5) If somebody o↵ends me, I will o↵end him/her back.
(6) I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before.
• Trust question (SOEP, 2003, 2008)
For the questions below, please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means:
“totally disagree” and the value 4 means: “totally agree”.
On the whole one can trust people.
Nowadays one can’t rely on anyone.
If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can trust them.
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General instructions 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment. 
Please read this first page of the instructions carefully on your own. We will then read 
the rest of the instructions aloud in front of all participants.  
 
In the experiment you can earn a considerable amount of money in addition to the 10 Swiss 
francs that you receive for showing up on time. How much you earn will depend on your 
own decisions and those of the other participants. It is thus very important that you read the 
instructions carefully. If you have any questions please do not ask aloud but raise your hand.  
 
During the experiment, speaking with the other participants and the use of mobile 
phones are not allowed. Violation of these rules can lead to exclusion from the experiment 
and loss of all associated earnings. 
 
During the experiment, we will refer to earnings in Experimental Currency Units, or ECU. 
Your entire income will first be calculated in ECU. The ECU you earn during the experiment 
will be converted to Swiss francs at the end of the experiment, according to the following 
conversion rate: 
100 ECU = 3 CHF 
At the end of today’s experiment, you will receive these earnings plus the show-up payment 
of 10 Swiss francs in cash. 
 
At no point, during or after the experiment, will you learn the identities of the people 
with whom you interact during the experiment, nor will these people learn your 
identity.
B.1.1 Instructions for Part I
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The Experiment 
            
The experiment consists of several parts. At the beginning of each part you will receive 
instructions that explain that part of the experiment. The earnings that you will receive for the 
experiment consist of the sum of your earnings in the individual parts in addition to the fee 
for showing up. 
 
Part I 
Group Membership 
At the beginning of Part I, the computer will assign you at random to a group consisting of 
four participants. All interactions during Part I take place within the group to which you are 
assigned.  
Part I consists of two phases. In both phases you will make decisions related to a basic task. 
Before explaining the two phases in more detail, we first explain the basic task to you.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Basic Task 
Each of the four members of your group is endowed with 20 tokens. Each member of the 
group decides how many of the 20 tokens to put in a private account and how many to 
contribute to a group account. Any tokens you put in the private account cannot be 
contributed to the group account and vice versa. You can earn income from the private 
account as well as from the group account. 
 
Your income from the private account 
For each token you put in your private account you earn an income of one ECU. Nobody 
except you earns anything from tokens you put in your private account. 
EXAMPLE: If you put 6 tokens in your private account, you earn 6 ECU from the private 
account. 
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Your income from the group account 
For each token you contribute to the group account you and the other three group members 
each receive 0.5 ECU. Note that you will also earn income from the tokens that other group 
members contribute to the group account. For each group member the income from the group 
account will be determined as follows: 
Each group member’s income from the group account  
= 0.5 * sum of all tokens contributed to the group account 
Put differently, the total number of tokens in the group account will be doubled and then 
equally distributed among all four group members. This yields, for each group member, 0.5 
times the total number of tokens contributed. Suppose you contribute one token to the group 
account. The sum of tokens in the group account would then rise by one token. Your income 
from the group account would, thus, rise by 0.5 * 1 = 0.5 ECU. The income of each other 
group member would also rise by 0.5 ECU. So, contributing one token to the group account 
generates total income for the group of 4 * 0.5 ECU = 2 ECU.  
EXAMPLE: If the sum of tokens in the group account is 60 tokens, then you and all other 
group members each earn an income of 0.5 * 60 = 30 ECU from the group account. The total 
income for the group from the group account is 4 * 30 ECU = 120 ECU. 
 
Your total income 
Your total income equals the sum of your income from the private account and your income 
from the group account. 
Total income =  
Income from the private account + Income from the group account  =   
(20 – tokens you contribute to the group account) + (0.5 * sum of tokens in 
the group account) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Part I of the experiment consists of two phases. In the first phase you are asked to indicate 
your belief about how much the other three members of your group will, on average, 
contribute to the group account in a task identical to the one just described. In the second 
phase you are asked to decide how much you contribute to the group account in a task 
identical to the one just described.  
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a) Phase 1: Estimates of other group members’ average contributions  
In Phase 1, we ask you to estimate how many tokens the other three members in your group 
will, on average, contribute to the group account in Phase 2. Remember that each member has 
an endowment of 20 tokens and can contribute any amount from 0 to 20 tokens to the group 
account. Specifically, we ask you to provide a range of values that you believe will contain 
the average number of tokens that the other group members contribute to the group account. 
You will enter your estimate as two integers: one number for the lower end of the range and 
another for the higher end of the range.  
In Phase 2 of Part I, all group members will decide how much to actually contribute to the 
group account. We will round the actual average contribution of the other group members to 
the nearest integer, and compare it to the range you specified. You will earn ECU only if the 
actual (rounded) average contribution of others to the group account lies inside the range you 
specify. Furthermore, the wider the range you indicate the smaller are your potential earnings. 
More precisely, the exact amount you earn is calculated according to the following rules: 
• If the actual (rounded) average lies outside of the range you specify you earn 0 ECU.  
• The maximum you can earn is 20 ECU. You earn 20 ECU if you (a) specify only a 
single value – that is, if the lower number and the higher number you specify are the 
same – and (b) this value is equal to the actual (rounded) average contribution of 
others to the group account. So, for example, if you are certain that the average 
contribution of others will be 15 then you should enter 15 for both the lower number 
and the higher number. If the (rounded) average of others is actually 15 you will earn 
20 ECU. 
• As the range you specify becomes wider, you earn less money for a correct estimate. 
Specifically, for every unit that your range increases in width, your potential income 
decreases by 1 ECU. So, for example, if you enter 8 for the lower and 20 for the 
higher end of the range (i.e. your range has a width of 12) and the actual (rounded) 
average contribution of others is 14 tokens, then you will earn 20 – 12 = 8 ECU. You 
earn more than you would earn if you had entered a wider range, say from 5 to 20 
(income 20 – 15 = 5 ECU), but you earn less than you would earn if you had entered a 
narrower range, say from 10 to 15 (income 20 – 5 = 15 ECU) or if you had entered a 
range consisting only of 14 (income = 20 – 0 = 20 ECU).  
If you enter 0 for the lower end and 20 for the higher end, your range covers all possible 
average token amounts and the actual (rounded) average of others' contributions is thus 
guaranteed to lie in your range. In this case, you earn nothing (income = 20 – 20 = 0 ECU).  
To summarize, the rule is that you earn money for specifying a range that contains the actual 
average of others’ contributions,, but the amount you earn for such a correct estimate is 
smaller the wider the range you indicate.  
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b) Phase 2: “Unconditional contribution” and “contribution table” 
In the second phase of Part I, you will decide about your actual contribution to the group 
account. You have 20 tokens and you can choose to contribute any of these tokens to a group 
account. The tokens you do not contribute are put into your private account.  
In this phase, you will make two types of contribution decisions: an unconditional 
contribution decision and a decision through a contribution table. Only one of these 
decisions will count, but you will not know which one until the end of the experiment. This 
means that you should treat each one as if it is the one that determines your earnings from 
Phase 2. 
• In the unconditional contribution decision, you decide how many of the 20 tokens 
you contribute to the group account. You will enter your contribution decision as a 
single number between 0 and 20.  
• In the decision through a contribution table you may contribute different amounts 
for each possible average unconditional contribution of the other group members 
(rounded to the nearest integer). That is, you have to specify how much you want to 
contribute if the other three group members contribute, on average, 0 tokens, 1 token, 
2 tokens, etc., up to 20 tokens, to the group account. You will see a table, with all 21 
possible integer values from 0 to 20, corresponding to the possible average 
unconditional contributions made by the other three group members. 
Earnings from Part I 
After all four participants in a group have made both types of decisions in Phase 2, your 
earnings from Part I will be determined as follows.  
• First, the computer will compare the range you provided as an estimate for the other 
group members’ average contributions to their actual average unconditional 
contributions. This will determine your earnings from Phase 1. 
• Second, the computer will randomly select three group members to have their 
unconditional contributions count as their contribution decision. The computer will 
then calculate the average unconditional contribution of the three selected group 
members. This average determines how much the remaining group member will 
contribute, based on how that group member completed the contribution table.  
Together this determines the actual contributions of all four group members and, thus, 
each member’s earnings from Phase 2. 
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EXAMPLE: Assume that the three group members that were randomly selected to have their 
unconditional contributions count decided to contribute 0, 3, and 15 tokens. The average 
contribution of these three group members, therefore, is 18/3 = 6 tokens. The computer will 
then check the contribution table of the remaining group member, for the entry in the row 
corresponding to an average contribution of 6, and will use this entry to determine the 
contribution decision of this fourth group member. Suppose that this group member decided 
to contribute 10 when the average contribution by other group members is 6. Then, the 
computer will make this group member contribute 10. The total sum of contributions to the 
group account is thus 0 + 3 + 15 + 10 = 28 tokens. All group members, therefore, earn 0.5 * 
28 = 14 ECU from the group account plus their respective incomes from the private 
accounts.  
 
You will make these decisions only once in Part I. You will be informed about the 
contribution decisions of the other group members and your payoff from Part I at the end of 
the experiment, after everyone has made all decisions in the experiment. 
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will then come to you at your 
workplace. If not, please click “Continue” on your computer screen. 
Once we have answered all questions, we will ask you to answer some comprehension 
questions on your computer screen. These questions will ensure that everyone understands 
the instructions for Part I. 
B.1.2 Decision screens for Part I
Figure B.1: Beliefs about others’ contributions.
Figure B.2: Unconditional contribution decision.
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Figure B.3: Conditional contribution decision.
158
  1 
Part II 
Group membership 
At the beginning of Part II, the computer will assign you at random to a group consisting of 
four participants that you have not interacted with before. This part of the experiment 
consists of 20 periods and all interactions during Part II take place with the same group 
members. In each period, you will simultaneously participate in two tasks. They will be 
displayed next to each other on the same computer screen and we will, thus, refer to these as 
Task Left and Task Right.  
For each task, you have a separate endowment of 20 tokens that you can contribute to a group 
account or put in your private account, similar to the basic task in Part I. In Part II, everyone 
will make unconditional contributions. You will enter, separately, the number of tokens you 
decide to contribute to the group account in Task Left and in Task Right.  
 
Task Left 
On the left side of the computer screen, you will decide how many of your endowment of 20 
tokens to contribute to the group account and how many to put in your private account. You 
can enter any integer from 0 to 20. Your income from Task Left is calculated in the same way 
as described for the basic task and, thus, depends on your contribution and the contributions 
of the other three members of your group. 
 
Task Right 
On the right side of the computer screen, your group will, at the beginning of each period 
(and thus before a decision in Task Left can be made), first vote on a “contribution 
threshold.” The contribution threshold specifies a minimum level of contribution to the 
group account in Task Right for each group member. The contribution threshold can be any 
value between 0 and 20.  
The contribution threshold affects the income of group members from Task Right, depending 
on whether they contribute at least as many or fewer tokens to the group account than 
specified by the contribution threshold. Specifically: 
• The income from Task Right of any group member who contributes at least as many 
tokens to the group account as specified by the contribution threshold is not affected 
by the contribution threshold. The income from Task Right is then determined as 
described for the basic task.  
 
B.2.1 Instructions for Part II - “Endogenous institution” treat-
ment
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• Any group member who contributes fewer tokens to the group account than the 
minimum level specified by the contribution threshold loses any income from Task 
Right. That is, a group member that contributes less than the contribution threshold 
receives an income of 0 for Task Right, regardless of how much this group member or 
other group members contributed. Thus, there is a penalty for contributing fewer 
tokens to the group account than the contribution threshold, and the penalty is the loss 
of all income for that period in Task Right. A participant’s income in Task Left is 
not affected by anything that happens in Task Right and vice versa. Similarly, if 
one participant is penalized for contributing less than the contribution threshold in 
Task Right, the incomes of other participants are not affected. Thus, the other group 
members still benefit from any contributions made by any group member in Task 
Right. 
EXAMPLE: The contribution threshold is set to 15 in Task Right. Group member A 
contributes 5, member B 15, member C 20, and member D 20 tokens to the group account in 
Task Right. The total contributions are thus 60 tokens. Member A earns 0 ECU from Task 
Right, because he contributed less than the “contribution threshold” of 15 tokens. Member B 
earns 5 ECU from the private account plus an income of 0.5 * 60 = 30 ECU from the group 
account from Task Right. Member C and Member D earn 0 ECU from the private account 
plus 30 ECU from the group account in Task Right. Note that all group members also earn 
money based on what happens in Task Left, which is independent of Task Right. 
 
How the contribution threshold for Task Right is determined:  
At the beginning of every period, before any contribution decisions are made, all four 
members of a group vote on the contribution threshold for Task Right for that period. Every 
member votes for a desired contribution threshold, by specifying an integer value between 0 
and 20.  
The implemented contribution threshold for Task Right for that period is the lowest 
value voted for by any group member.  
EXAMPLE: Assume that group member A votes for 7, group member B for 12, group member 
C for 18, and group member D for 10. The implemented contribution threshold for Task 
Right in that period is 7, the lowest vote in the group. Any group member who contributes 
less than 7 tokens in that period in Task Right then earns 0 ECU from Task Right.  
After the voting takes place, all group members are informed about the implemented 
contribution threshold and about all of the separate votes cast by members of the group. The 
votes will be presented in descending order and it is not possible to identify which member of 
the group voted for which value of the contribution threshold.  
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Before you make your contribution decisions in Task Left and Task Right, we will ask you 
about your belief about the other group members’ average contribution in Task Left and Task 
Right. Contrary to Part I, you will enter your (rounded) belief as a single number. So, for 
example, if you believe that the (rounded) average contribution is 12 in Task Left and 8 in 
Task Right, you should enter the numbers 12 and 8 in the respective input boxes on the 
screen. Whether your beliefs are correct or not does not impact your payoff. Please enter your 
best estimates. 
After that you will make your contribution decisions in Task Left and Task Right. 
 
Summary                 
You will make the following decisions in Part II: 
• You will vote on a contribution threshold for Task Right. The contribution threshold 
changes the potential payoffs only in Task Right. It has no effect on the payoffs from 
Task Left. 
• You will enter your beliefs about the average contribution of the other group members 
in Task Left and Task Right. 
• You will then make two contribution decisions, one in Task Left and one in Task 
Right. 
Total income in each period         
Your total income in each period is equal to the sum of your incomes in the two tasks. So, for 
example, if you earn 30 ECU from Task Left and 10 ECU from Task Right, your total 
income in that period will be 40 ECU. At the end of each period all group members will be 
informed about their incomes in Task Left and Task Right and the respective contributions of 
all group members. The contributions will be presented in descending order and it is not 
possible to identify which member of the group contributed which number of tokens to the 
group accounts in Task Left and Task Right. 
Earnings from Part II              
At the end of the experiment, one out of the twenty periods from Part II will be randomly 
selected to count for payment. Your decisions and those of your group members in that 
period will then be implemented and will determine your earnings from Part II. Specifically, 
your payoff for the randomly selected period will be multiplied by 20, so that it counts 
for all 20 periods. Note that every decision in each of the twenty periods can be relevant for 
your payoff. It is therefore important that you make your decisions in every period as if it 
would be the period that determines your actual payoff. 
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will then come to you at your 
workplace. Once we have answered all questions, we will ask you to answer some 
comprehension questions on your computer screen. These questions will ensure that everyone 
understands the instructions for Part II. 
B.2.2 Decision screens for Part II - “Endogenous institution”
treatment
Figure B.4: Voting decision.
Figure B.5: Contribution decision for “PGG Left” and “PGG Right”.
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